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In hopes of legitimizing the independent state legislature doctrine, its
proponents have recently made two claims with respect to history, which
this Article refers to as the Substance/Procedure Thesis and the Prevailing
View Thesis. The former admits that the original understanding was that
state “legislatures” promulgating election law pursuant to the Elector
Appointment and Elections Clauses are required to comply with state
constitutionally-mandated “procedural” lawmaking requirements (such as a
potential gubernatorial veto), but asserts that they were otherwise
understood to be independent of “substantive” state constitutional
restraints. The latter asserts that the independent state legislature doctrine
was the “prevailing view” during the nineteenth century (before it was
abandoned in the twentieth century).
This Article debunks the Substance/Procedure Thesis. Previously
unreviewed historical evidence, including that arising from a review of the
1776 drafting history of the predecessor language of Article V of the Articles
of Confederation, confirms that the Founding generation understood that
“legislatures” would be subject to substantive state constitutional
restrictions as well as constitutionally-mandated lawmaking procedures.
The evidence shows that the Framers of the Elector Appointment and
Elections Clauses—including in particular John Dickinson and James
Madison—expected that state constitutions would impose substantive
limitations on “legislatures.” The evidence also demonstrates that the
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Framers’ subjective expectations were shared by other members of the
Founding generation. State constitutions adopted in the years immediately
following the Founding contained substantive restrictions on election law
that, although they did not explicitly refer to federal elections (as did the
Delaware constitution of 1792), were understood to apply to all elections,
including federal elections.
This Article also debunks the Prevailing View Thesis. It cannot be
sustained on any objective view of the evidence. A review of every state
constitution adopted during the 1800s reveals that both explicit and nonexplicit limitations on “legislatures” were widespread before, during, and
after the Civil War. On the other hand, apart from the House of
Representatives’ contested election case of Baldwin v. Trowbridge, the doctrine
was little more than a lawyer argument episodically invoked in House
contested election cases or state courts, without prevailing in either forum.
Suggestions to the contrary are based on mischaracterizations of the cases.
Finally, this Article argues that the episodic invocations of the doctrine
that did occur in the nineteenth century are irrelevant under any form of
argument from history relevant to constitutional interpretation.
In particular, Baldwin v. Trowbridge should not be treated as if it were judicial
precedent—and not only because it has been overtaken by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. In deciding contested election cases in the late
nineteenth century, and particularly in the 1860s, the House of
Representatives acted in a demonstrably non-judicial manner. Courts
should not afford its decisions respect under the doctrine of stare decisis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, I wrote an article about a then-obscure aspect of the
contested 2000 presidential election.1 In the course of reaching their
decision in favor of George W. Bush, the Justices of the Supreme Court
observed that the Elector Appointment Clause of the Constitution2 assigns
the power to direct the manner in which a state appoints its presidential
electors to the “legislature” of the state.3 The Court raised the possibility
that there was a limit on the extent to which a state constitution could

1. Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 731 (2001).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, [presidential electors].”).
3. Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) (per curiam).
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circumscribe a “legislature’s” exercise of this power.4 Three Justices went
further and argued that the legislative handiwork of such a “legislature” was
entitled to stricter adherence by state courts than ordinary state legislation.5
In my article, I gave these arguments what I intended to be a pejorative
name—the “independent state legislature doctrine” (the Doctrine)6—
and examined whether that doctrine had any basis in history. I concluded
that the Founding generation’s original understanding was contrary to the
Doctrine,7 but explained that the Doctrine had, in fact, emerged for a time
during the Civil War and subsequently when it was used to disregard state
constitutional place-of-voting restrictions that would have prevented
soldiers in the field from voting.8 I assumed that my article and the
Doctrine would quickly fade into history.
The Doctrine has not faded into history but roared back out of history
into the present. In the 2020 federal elections, the Doctrine became the
predicate for a number of lawsuits complaining about this or that aspect of
a state’s administration of the presidential and congressional elections,9 as
well as the purported basis for subsequent collateral attacks on President
Biden’s election, both in court10 and out of court.11 In the typical court
4. Id.
5. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
6. Smith, supra note 1, at 732; see also Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People
of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2000) (discussing “independent legislatures” under Article V of
the Constitution). The Doctrine would perhaps better be described as a theory aspiring to be a
doctrine.
7. Smith, supra note 1, at 743–64.
8. Id. at 764-83.
9. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Undue Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation, 30 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 59, 77 (2021) (cataloguing lawsuits). The Doctrine is now said to apply to
Congressional elections as well as presidential elections by virtue of the Elections Clause, which, similar
to the Elector Appointment Clause, provides that the state “legislatures” are to prescribe the rules for
Congressional elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.”).
10. See Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Compl., Bill of Compl., at 1, Texas v. Pennsylvania,
No. 220155 (U.S., Dec. 7, 2020) (alleging that “government officials” in Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Pennsylvania “usurped their legislatures’ authority and unconstitutionally revised their state’s
election statutes” in violation of the Elector Appointment Clause).
11. See 167 CONG. REC. H75, 77–78 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2021) (remarks of Rep. Stephen Scalise)
(“[N]owhere in Article II, Section 1 does it give the secretary of state . . . that ability; nowhere does it
give the Governor that ability; nowhere does it give a court that ability. It exclusively gives that ability
to the legislatures.”); id. at 78 (alleging that, in some states, “the Democratic Party has gone in and
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case, the complaining party characterizes the disfavored state-imposed
election practice—particularly any practice imposed by a court as mandated
by a state constitution—as an unconstitutional usurpation of the
“legislature’s” prerogative under the Elector Appointment and/or Elections
Clauses. Whether there has been a violation of either clause, and, if so, the
appropriate remedy, are federal questions, meaning that the Supreme Court,
not any state court, would be the final arbiter.12 Four Justices of the
Supreme Court expressed support for adopting the Doctrine,13 though the
full Court ultimately declined to take up the question.14
selectively gone around this process”); id. (the Supreme Court “chose to punt” but “[w]e don’t have
that luxury today” and must “fix this” and “restore integrity to the election process”); see also Carol D.
Leonnig & Philip Rucker, Audio: Trump Says He Spoke to a “Loving Crowd” at Jan. 6 Rally, WASH. POST,
at 03:22 (July 21, 2021, 10:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/21/trumpinterview-i-alone-can-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/6QMQ-JYTS] (audio recording of Donald J. Trump,
Mar. 31, 2021) (“The legislatures of the states did not approve all of the things that were done for those
elections. And under the Constitution of the United States, they have to do that.”); id. at 5:52 (arguing
that a state’s presidential election should be “sent back” when “the legislature . . . did not approve those
vast changes [concerning] hours, days, when to vote” but rather “it was all done [by] local politicians
and local judges”).
12. By contrast, the attempt to prevent President Biden’s election in Congress on January 6,
2021, would have had Vice President Pence be the “ultimate arbiter” of the validity of electoral votes
and reject some of Biden’s votes on the ground that they were tainted by alleged violations of the
independent state legislature doctrine and/or “fraud.” Matthew A. Seligman, The Vice President’s NonExistent Unilateral Power to Reject Electoral Votes, at 2 (Oct. 1, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3939020 [https://perma.cc/2SFV-CCUR]. The thinking is reflected in
John Eastman’s shocking memorandum of early January 2021, a copy of which is included as an
appendix to Seligman’s article. Seligman concludes that “[e]very major tool of constitutional
interpretation shows that the theory [that the Vice President has the power to reject electoral votes] is,
without question, legally incorrect.” Id. at 31.
13. Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2020) (reflecting statement of
Justice Alito); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in denial of application to vacate stay); id. at 34 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of
application to vacate stay); Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. at 732–33 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 738 (Alito,
J., dissenting). In 2022, the Doctrine was unsuccessfully used to seek interim Supreme Court relief
against state court involvement in North Carolina and Pennsylvania congressional redistricting
following the 2020 census. See Toth v. Chapman, No. 21A457, 2022 WL 667924, at *1 (Mar. 7, 2022)
(reflecting order denying injunction in Pennsylvania case); Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089, 1089
(2022) (reflecting order denying stay in North Carolina case). In the North Carolina case, Justices
Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch dissented from the denial of interim relief and expressed further support
for the Doctrine. See id. at 1090 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (“[The Elections Clause]
specifies a particular organ of a state government, and we must take that language seriously.”).
Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the denial of the stay but agreed with the dissenting Justices that
“the Court should grant certiorari in an appropriate case.” Id. at 1089 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
denial of stay).
14. See Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. at 732 (denying petition for writ of certiorari). We have good
reason to worry about how the Doctrine’s patina of legitimacy might operate lawlessly, outside of court,
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As the Doctrine has re-emerged, its proponents have sought to provide
various rationales for its existence. In terms of history, they have made two
claims: one relating to the alleged original understanding of the Doctrine
(the Substance/Procedure Thesis), and the other to the nineteenth-century
history of the Doctrine (the Prevailing View Thesis).
The Substance/Procedure Thesis of the original understanding is an
attempt to work around the previously accumulated evidence demonstrating
that the Founding generation understood that “legislatures” were subject to
their state constitutions when regulating federal elections, just like ordinary
legislatures. The authors of the thesis have seized on a purported distinction
between procedural lawmaking requirements arising from state
constitutions (which they admit “legislatures” are required to follow) and
substantive limitations (as to which they contend “legislatures” must remain
free), which distinction they claim is grounded in the original understanding
of the Constitution’s reference to “legislatures.”15 Apart from the textual
even without being blessed by the Supreme Court. See Richard L. Hasen, Identifying and Minimizing the
Risk of Election Subversion and Stolen Elections in the Contemporary United States, HARV. L. REV. FORUM
(forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3926381 [https://perma.
cc/BNV8-ZAWF] (explaining how a legislature unhappy with the outcome of an election could “send
in an alternative slate of electors based upon this supposed technicality” and could do so “even if there
was no good reason to believe that state courts or state election officials meaningfully deviated from
the intent of the legislature in running a presidential election”).
15. See Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State
Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1, 93 (2020) [hereinafter Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine,
Federal Elections, and State Constitutions] (concluding that the independent state legislature doctrine, as
modified by the substance/procedure distinction, is “faithful to both the text and structure of the U.S.
Constitution” and “furthers many of the Framers’ goals concerning federal elections”); id. at 27
(absence of discussion of the Doctrine at the founding “does not change either the original public
meaning of that language or the reasonable implications that may be drawn from it”); see also Mike
Rappaport, What Does the Constitution Mean by a State Legislature?, LAW & LIBERTY (Apr. 19, 2021)
[hereinafter Rappaport, LAW & LIBERTY], https://lawliberty.org/what-does-the-constitution-meanby-a-state-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/EQS5-GHRQ] (arguing that if a “legislature” is enacting an
election law, then it “use[s] its normal process for passage of a law,” but for substantive limitations the
state constitution “cannot override the state legislature”; this “original meaning makes sense, can be
understood, and places strict limits on how the Constitution applies to state legislatures in some
extremely important cases”). The blog of the Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism at the
University of San Diego School of Law has featured posts on this issue by three originalist scholars,
each of which posited a different original understanding. In the first, Professor Rappaport, the director
of that center, repeated the substance/procedure argument he made in the aforementioned Law &
Liberty article. See Mike Rappaport, What Does the Constitution Mean by a State Legislature?,
THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (May 3, 2021), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalismblog/2021/05/what-does-the-constitution-mean-by-a-state-legislaturemike-rappaport.html [https://
perma.cc/5L4Q-KLPY]. In the second, Rob Natelson, in a guest post, argued that neither substantive
nor procedural regulations apply—if there are “irregularities” in a presidential election, then the state

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

452

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:445

reference to “legislatures,”16 the view is derived from a perceived dearth of
Founding-era state substantive constitutional limitations on federal
elections17 and speculation that this arose from a belief in the Doctrine
legislatures can respond as “independent assemblies,” without regard to “their constitutions or other
institutions,” by investigating the “irregularities” and either “call[ing] a re-vote for presidential electors”
or “choos[ing] the electors themselves,” in all cases without the involvement of any governor.
Rob Natelson, On “Federal Functions,” the 2020 Presidential Election, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and Our
Constitutional Law Courses, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Feb. 18, 2022), https://originalismblog.typepad.
com/the-originalism-blog/2022/02/on-federal-functions-the-2020-presidential-election-the-necessar
y-and-proper-clause-and-our-constitu.html [https://perma.cc/664J-7GXD]. In a subsequent post,
Professor Michael Ramsey, a member of that center, offered a third, entirely different view of the
original understanding which, unlike the other two, appears consistent with the historical evidence
summarized in this Article. See Michael Ramsey, Helen White & Cameron Kistler on Originalism and Meaning
of State Legislatures, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 6, 2022), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/
the-originalism-blog/2022/03/helen-white-cameron-kistler-on-originalism-and-meaning-of-state-legi
slaturesmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/KAP3-KT3V] (“[T]here’s nothing remarkable about
the proposition that early post-ratification state constitutions contained provisions regulating federal
elections” because “it seems likely to me that this language was understood to give power to the
legislatures of the states, acting pursuant to their (state) constitutional procedures”).
16. According to Professor Rappaport, the Doctrine and the substance/procedure distinction
are correct because the Constitution “means what it says.” Rappaport, LAW & LIBERTY, supra note 15.
Similarly, Professor Morley refers to the Doctrine as the “plain-meaning interpretation of
‘Legislature.’” Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 22; id. at 89 (concluding that the Doctrine is “solidly grounded in the Constitution’s
plain text”). Oddly, this literal approach focuses on the noun “legislature” to the exclusion of the verbs
“direct” and “prescribe,” even though the latter words are the ones that specify the action that either
is, or is not, subject to normal constraints.
17. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 38 (“Neither the state constitutions adopted immediately after the U.S Constitution’s
ratification, nor those of new states that joined the Union in the 1790s, contained provisions relating
to federal elections.”). Others have invoked the substance/procedure distinction while remaining
agnostic as to whether it constitutes the original understanding. It appears that the distinction was first
articulated in the World War II soldier-voting case, Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d
691 (Ky. 1944), as a way to distinguish Supreme Court precedent. In reaching its decision ensuring
that “the youth of our native State” who were “absent in the defense of the nation” would be permitted
to vote, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reasoned that, while Supreme Court precedents made clear
that a “legislature” must “function in the method prescribed by the State Constitution in directing the
times, places, and manner” of elections, it “does not necessarily follow” that “the scope of its
enactment on the indicated subjects is also limited by the provisions of the State Constitution.” Id.
at 692–94. Some commentators later approvingly cited the substance/procedure distinction drawn by
O’Connell, while claiming that limited evidence of original intent is not to the contrary. See James C.
Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 495, 504 (1962) (making substance/procedure distinction, citing O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 694);
id. at 501 (“[A] reading of the debates in the Constitutional Convention and State Ratifying
Conventions is of little assistance.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 111 n.39 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2001)
(making substance/procedure distinction, citing Kirby, supra, at 500–04); id. at 217–18 (conceding that
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among the Founding generation.18 There is also a related supposition as to
constitutional purpose and structure—that the use of the word “legislature”
was intended to give life to some important constitutional value, under
which “legislatures” must enjoy extraordinary discretion to craft the
substance of the law governing federal elections, free from constitutional
restraints and other checks that would ordinarily apply.19
The Prevailing View Thesis is an attempt to legitimize the Doctrine by
characterizing certain episodes from the 1800s in which the Doctrine was
invoked as evidence that the Doctrine “reflect[ed] the prevailing
understanding of states, Congress, and other actors in the nineteenth
century.”20 The sentiment seems to be that this alleged “prevailing view”
was mistakenly discarded in the twentieth century, and should now be
“revitaliz[ed]” or “resuscitate[d]” by the Supreme Court.21 This account of
the Doctrine’s alleged prevalence in the nineteenth century has seeped into

the Doctrine is “a meaning very likely unintended by the Constitution’s framers”). See also Richard D.
Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811, 834 (2002)
(“The distinction between substance and procedure—however creaky it may be in other contexts—
serves well here . . . .”) (citing Kirby, supra, at 503–04).
18. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 38 (suggesting that the Founding generation did not impose substantive constitutional
restrains on “legislatures,” but “left the matter to the plenary discretion” of the legislatures, because
that was “[c]onsistent with the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause”).
19. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (referring to “respect
for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures”); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State
Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1) (“The Constitution provides that state legislatures—not federal judges,
not state judges, not state governors, not other state officials—bear primary responsibility for setting
elections rules.”); id. at 34–35 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay)
(referring to “the important federal judicial role in reviewing state courts about state law in a federal
Presidential election”); Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State
Constitutions, supra note 15, at 35 (arguing that “the independent state legislature doctrine is most faithful
to the Constitution’s underlying logic and structure”).
20. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 1 (“Throughout [the nineteenth century], the doctrine was consistently applied across a
broad range of circumstances.”).
21. Id. at 10, 14. This account of the history has been presented to the Supreme Court as
accurate. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Honest Elections Project in Support of Petitioners at *1, *4–8,
& *6 n.2, Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, No. 21-248, 2022 WL 216176
(Jan. 18, 2022) (citing Professor Morley’s account twelve times).
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the academic literature.22 It has also gained traction in more popular
accounts of the controversy surrounding the 2020 presidential election.23
Part II revisits the original understanding of the Doctrine and debunks
the Substance/Procedure Thesis. The historical evidence confirms that the
Founding generation understood that “legislatures” would be subject to
substantive state constitutional restrictions no less than constitutionallymandated lawmaking procedures.24 The evidence pertains to: (1) the
Framers’ original intent; (2) the broader public’s original understanding; and
(3) the lack of historical basis for the purpose/structure rationales offered
in support of the Doctrine’s extraordinary deference to “legislatures.”
First, the evidence demonstrates that the Framers of the Elector
Appointment and Elections Clauses intended and/or expected that state
22. See Derek T. Muller, Legislative Delegations and the Elections Clause, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717,
734 (2016) (“Historically, Congress also continued to turn to the independent state legislature doctrine
in ensuing [litigation], and state courts would continue to believe that the legislature could trump a state
constitution.”) (citing Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 189 (2014)); see also Justin Levitt, Failed Elections and the Legislative Selection of Presidential
Electors, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1052, 1057 n.14 (2021) [hereinafter Levitt, Failed Elections and the Legislative
Selection of Presidential Electors] (describing Professor Morley as having “chronicl[ed] support in several
nineteenth-century state supreme court decisions, and in several Reconstruction Congress evaluations
of congressional elections”) (citing Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and
State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 25–27, 41–45, 69, 91–92).
23. See Garrett Epps, In Election Litigation, An Ominous Sign, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 21, 2020),
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2020/11/21/in-election-litigation-an-ominous-sign/
[https://
perma.cc/RVS8-475R] (“There’s no question that the ‘independent legislature’ doctrine has some
historical grounding. In a detailed scholarly article published earlier this year, Michael Morley of the
Florida State University School of Law traces the concept to the early years of the republic.”).
24. Throughout this Article, I put the word “legislature” in quotes as shorthand to refer to a
state legislature exercising its power to: (a) “direct” the “manner” of appointing presidential electors
(under the Elector Appointment Clause); (b) “prescribe” the “time, place, and manner” of
Congressional elections (under the Elections Cause); and/or (c) “direct” the “manner” of appointing
delegates to Congress (under Article V of the Articles of Confederation). The original understanding
of these provisions was not simply the original understanding of the word “legislature,” in isolation,
but rather, in each instance, the original understanding of the word “legislature” as the grammatical
subject of a clause containing a certain lawmaking verb (“direct” or “prescribe”) and the object of that
verb (the “manner” of appointment or the “time, place, and manner” of election). See Grace Brosofsky,
Michael C. Dorf, & Laurence H. Tribe, State Legislatures Cannot Act Alone in Assigning Electors (Sept. 25,
2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/109FpcfXzXwcpJL43pgaTBmh-PD9pgDLx/view [https://
perma.cc/FM8R-JXHL] (evidencing the constitutional and historical interchangeability of “directing”
and “prescribing” and “lawmaking”). Questions about how a legislature might exercise other,
non-legislative powers assigned to it—such as the power to “ratify” a constitutional amendment or
“choose” a Senator—are governed by different constitutional clauses, in which “legislature” appears
before different verbs (“ratify” or “choose”) and the verbs act on different objects (an “amendment”
or a “senator”). Those provisions should be interpreted in light of their different texts, purposes,
history, and precedent, which I do not address in this Article.
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constitutions would impose substantive limitations on “legislatures.” When
the Framers drafted those provisions, they worked against the backdrop of
their prior experience under Article V of the Articles of Confederation,
which provided that delegates to Congress were to be “appointed in such
manner as the legislature of each State shall direct.”25 A review of the
previously unexamined 1776 drafting of Article V by John Dickinson and
others, combined with a review of the state constitutional limitations that
were placed on “legislatures” between 1776 and 1787, demonstrates that the
intent and experience under the Articles of Confederation were always that
“legislatures” referred to in that clause would be defined by, and subject to,
their state constitutions.26
In 1787, the members of the committees that drafted the Elector
Appointment and Elections Clauses were familiar with this prior
understanding of “legislatures.” Many had been personally involved in
drafting the Articles of Confederation or the state constitutional provisions
that regulated “legislatures.” If they had intended to switch from a regime
of dependent “legislatures” to a regime of independent “legislatures”—
and there is no evidence they did—it is beyond implausible that they would
have done so by using slight variations on the “legislature” language that
was widely understood to create dependent “legislatures.”27
The fact that these Framers expected state constitutions to continue to
control “legislatures” under the new Constitution is confirmed by two
salient, but previously overlooked, points of post-Founding history, one
involving John Dickinson and the second James Madison.28 Dickinson was
the original drafter of the “legislature” language in 1776, and, at the
Philadelphia Convention, he served on the Committee of Unfinished Parts
(a/k/a the Brearley Committee), which generated the Elector Appointment
Clause. After the Founding, he returned to Delaware and became the
president of the Delaware constitutional convention that convened in late
1791 and produced a new constitution for the state in early 1792. That
constitution was flatly inconsistent with what we now call the independent
legislature doctrine as it expressly regulated the way in which the state’s

25.
26.
27.
28.

U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V.
See infra Part II.B.1.a.
See infra Part II.B.1.b.
See infra Part II.B.1.c.
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“legislature” might prescribe the manner of electing the state’s
representatives to Congress.29
Like Dickinson, Madison served on the Committee of Unfinished Parts,
but his opportunity to help create a new state constitution for his state did
not come until 1830. In that year, Virginia’s constitutional convention
decided to constitutionally limit the way in which its “legislature” might
apportion the state’s congressional seats, requiring that apportionment be
based on the number of free persons plus “three-fifths of all other
persons.”30 Although this provision was also flatly inconsistent with what
we now call the independent legislature doctrine, Madison voted in favor of
it (as did John Marshall and several other famous Virginians).
Second, the Framers’ subjective view was shared by other members of
the Founding generation, and this is demonstrated by more than just the
existence of the Delaware constitution of 1792. Previous scholarship
(including my own) overlooked the fact that several state constitutions
adopted from 1789 to 1803 contained substantive restrictions on election
law that, although they did not explicitly refer to federal elections like the
Delaware constitution of 1792, were understood by the Founding
generation to apply to all elections held in the state, including federal
elections. For example, Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1790 provided that
“[a]ll elections shall be by ballot, except those by persons in their
representative capacities, who shall vote viva voce.”31 The existence of such
non-explicit substantive limitations further contravenes the Substance/
Procedure Thesis of the original understanding.32
Third, the historical record contradicts the notion that the Founding
generation saw any “structural” reason to give these “legislatures” an
exemption from substantive regulation by state constitutions or freedom
29. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
578 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 1 CONSTITUTIONS].
30. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 6, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3823 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1909) [hereinafter 7 CONSTITUTIONS].
31. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 2, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3096 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1909) [hereinafter 5 CONSTITUTIONS].
32. See infra Part II.B.2.
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from the normal checks and balances of state government. They did not
perceive anything special or unique about either the role that “legislatures”
were to play in the constitutional design, the nature of “time, place, and
manner” legislation, or the threat of court interference with such
legislation.33
Part III revisits the nineteenth-century history of the Doctrine and
debunks the Prevailing View Thesis. That thesis inexplicably disregards the
many restraints on “legislatures” that Americans included in their state
constitutions during the nineteenth century. A review of every state
constitution adopted during that century reveals that both explicit and nonexplicit limitations on “legislatures” were widespread before, during, and
after the Civil War. Just a few examples of constitutions that imposed
explicit limitations on “legislatures” are the Maryland constitution of 1810,
which gave free white males the right to vote, by ballot, in presidential and
congressional elections;34 Iowa’s constitution of 1846, which precluded the
“legislature” from creating congressional districts that ignored the integrity
of counties;35 Connecticut’s 1864 amendment to its constitution of 1818,
which ensured that soldiers outside the state could vote in presidential and
congressional elections;36 South Carolina’s constitution of 1868, which
provided that “Presidential electors shall be elected by the people”;37 and
Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1873, which provided that the trial and
determination of contested presidential elections “shall be by the courts of
law.”38 The most frequent non-explicit limitation that state constitutions

33. See infra Part II.B.3.
34. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV (adopted 1810), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1705 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 3 CONSTITUTIONS].
35. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 3, Legis. Dep’t, § 32, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1129 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 2 CONSTITUTIONS].
36. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. XIII (adopted 1864), reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 29, at 550.
37. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 9, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
3298 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 6 CONSTITUTIONS].
38. PA. CONST. of 1873, art. VIII, § 17, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31,
at 3140–41.
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imposed on “legislatures” (throughout the nineteenth century) was the
requirement that “all elections” be either “by ballot” or “viva voce.”39
The Prevailing View Thesis emphasizes the 1866 House of
Representatives contested election case of Baldwin v. Trowbridge, as if the
adoption of the Doctrine in that case was the rule in the nineteenth century,
not the exception.40 However, this disregards that, prior to Baldwin, the
House had twice rejected the Doctrine (once in 1850 and again in 1861).
Baldwin was a flip-flop. After Baldwin, the Doctrine merely existed as an
argument that was sometimes invoked in House contested election cases or
state courts, without prevailing in either forum. Over time, the Doctrine
was rejected by courts and ignored by the House. To the extent the
Prevailing View Thesis suggests otherwise, it is based on
mischaracterizations of the House contested election and state court cases
upon which it purports to rely.41
With the history set straight, Part IV explains why the episodic
invocations of the Doctrine that did occur in the 1800s are irrelevant to
interpretation of the Constitution today. The history—when accurately
recounted—does not support any recognized “argument from history,”
such as originalism, liquidation, or gloss.42 Nor is the nineteenth-century
history of the Doctrine relevant as a source of legal precedent. It was long
ago superceded by a line of Supreme Court cases that speak directly to the
invalidity of the Doctrine.43
The only nineteenth-century invocation of the Doctrine that resembles a
judicial “precedent”—the House’s 1866 decision in Baldwin—should not be
treated as precedent to be followed by a court. The historical evidence
demonstrates that in the late nineteenth century, and particularly in the
1860s, the House was not operating in a judicial manner when it decided
contested election cases like Baldwin. The House lacked any meaningful
procedure for litigating and deciding these matters; the limited process that
did exist was not mandatory; the House’s decision-making was largely
opaque, with the grounds for decision often unclear; and congressmen were
hardly in a position to act like judges. The contemporaneous impression of
both insiders and outsiders was that House contested election cases were
39. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
40. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 48 (describing Baldwin as the “best-known example” of the Doctrine being applied).
41. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See infra Part IV.A.
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rife with partisan decision-making untethered from the law.
This impression is confirmed by pulling back the “judicial” curtain on the
House’s treatment of three issues that recurred during the 1860s:
(i) application of the Incompatibility Clause to congressmen who held
commissions as military officers; (ii) the effect of electoral improprieties in
Missouri; and (iii) the independent state legislature doctrine. On these
issues, it appears that the House’s determinations depended, not on the
outcome of anything resembling a judicial process, but on the partisan bona
fides of the “judges” and contestants. Given the House’s injudiciousness in
these matters, the rationale for stare decisis—the reasons why courts are
supposed to follow precedent—would not be furthered by treating the
House’s decisions as precedent.44
II. REVISITING THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Existing Scholarship Identifying Evidence of the Original Understanding
The scholarship identifying evidence as to the Founding generation’s
understanding of “legislatures” begins with my 2001 article. I reviewed the
debates at the Constitutional Convention and ratifying conventions
pertaining to the selection of the President and found nothing suggesting an
intent to create independent “legislatures,”45 but rather expressions of
hostility to giving them a decisive role in the process.46 Moreover, I
identified that the language chosen by the Framers for the Elector
44. See infra Part IV.B. The evidence of injudiciousness in House contested elections during this
period also suggests some wishful thinking among some about the manner in which the House might
exercise its power to judge election cases if it decided to resume that function. See Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, The New Pro-Majoritarian Powers, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 2357, 2368 (2021) (suggesting that
Congress should exercise its judging powers to effectively set aside unsavory state election laws); Justin
Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787, 1841 (2014) [hereinafter Levitt,
The Partisanship Spectrum] (suggesting that House members are able to “forego tempting opportunities
to pursue [tribal partisanship]” in contested elections); Muller, supra note 22, at 736 (“Evidence suggests
that Congress has generally resisted raw tribal partisanship in adjudicating election contests.”) (citing
Levitt, supra, at 1840–41); JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE
PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 172 (2007)
(“Members of Congress sitting in judgment should make a bona fide effort to clear their minds both
of partisan loyalty and of any personal relationship with the parties to the dispute.”).
45. Smith, supra note 1, at 743–57; see also Jack N. Rakove, Presidential Selection: Electoral Fallacies,
119 POL. SCI. Q. 21, 30 (2004) (“[I]n the absence of any recorded debate of the point, we should
similarly balk at ascribing too much importance . . . to the decision allowing the state legislatures to
determine the mode of appointing electors.”).
46. Smith, supra note 1, at 756.
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Appointment Clause echoed that contained in Article V of the Articles of
Confederation, under which most state constitutions had been explicitly
regulating “legislatures” prior to the Convention.47 There was not the same
amount of explicit state constitutional regulation of “legislatures” after the
Founding, but there was some.48 And the “legislatures” which engaged in
the first exercises of power pursuant to the Elector Appointment and
Elections Clauses clearly believed that they were bound by their state
constitutions. They submitted “manner” regulations to the relevant veto
power (where applicable),49 and proceeded on the basis that state
constitutions determined whether legislative appointments of electors and
senators had to be made in joint session or concurrently.50
More recently, three scholars (Grace Brosofsky, Michael C. Dorf, and
Laurence H. Tribe) have adduced additional evidence that Founding-era
state “legislatures” understood that, when they “directed” the manner of
appointing electors, they were exercising lawmaking power governed by
state constitutional procedures.51 State “legislatures” in 1788 and 1789
proceeded as if they were passing ordinary legislation subject to ordinary
constitutional lawmaking requirements, not as if “directing” the manner of
appointment involved some special form of extra-constitutional Article II
legislation.52 Such “manner” legislation was passed in the normal fashion
in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Virginia.53 Interestingly, South Carolina’s legislature
apparently believed it necessary to enact normal legislation giving itself the
power to appoint electors before actually proceeding to appoint the electors
itself.54 Moreover, in Georgia, the Governor sounded the alarm when the
state legislature could not obtain a quorum to pass the necessary “manner”
legislation, and the legislature attempted to go through its constitutionallymandated multi-day lawmaking process before ultimately directly

47. Id. at 754–56.
48. Id. at 757–58.
49. Id. at 759–61; see also Nathaniel F. Rubin, Essay, The Electors Clause and the Governor’s Veto,
106 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 57, 67–69 (2021) (discussing role of gubernatorial veto under the
Elector Appointment Clause).
50. Smith, supra note 1, at 761–64.
51. Brosofsky, Dorf, & Tribe, supra note 24.
52. Id. at 5–6.
53. Id. at 6–7 n.5.
54. Id. at 7.
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appointing the electors.55 Similarly, New York sat out of the election
altogether because its legislature could not, consistent with the state’s
constitutional lawmaking requirements, manage to direct the manner of
appointing electors.56 Professor Natelson has similarly pointed out that
Founding-era “legislatures” prescribed “manner” legislation for
congressional elections by statute rather than by something less than law.57
Further confirmation that “directing” the manner of appointing
presidential electors was understood to require full constitutional lawmaking
is provided by Bruce Ackerman and David Fontana’s account of an episode
arising in the 1796 presidential election. As they have recounted, Alexander
Hamilton desired to cast doubt on the validity of Vermont’s electors as part
of a strategy to cause his preferred Federalist candidate (Thomas Pinckney
of South Carolina) to prevail over the obvious Federalist candidate
(John Adams).58 Hamilton did so by spreading the false rumor that
Vermont’s appointment of electors had been made via a mere “Resolve of
the Legislature, not a law.”59 This aspersion did not elevate Pinckney over
55. Id. at 7–8. Rhode Island and North Carolina had not yet ratified the Constitution and so
did not participate in this election. Connecticut participated, but it did not have a constitution.
Its legislature directly appointed electors, apparently within the bounds of its governing document
(“a revised version of its colonial charter”). Id. at 7 n.6, 9.
56. Smith, supra note 1, at 761.
57. Robert G. Natelson, Federal Functions: Execution of Powers the Constitution Grants to Persons and
Entities Outside the U.S. Government, 23 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 193, 199 n.41 (2021) [hereinafter Natelson,
Federal Functions]. At the same time, Professor Natelson incorrectly concluded that, under the Elector
Appointment Clause, “legislatures” directed the manner of appointing presidential electors by “simple
resolution, without the signature of the governor, rather than by legislation,” citing Massachusetts as
an “example” of this occurring. Id. at 199 n.44; see also Natelson, supra note 15 (arguing that
“legislatures” can act as “independent assemblies” in presidential elections). While it is true that
Massachusetts used “resolutions” to direct the manner of appointing electors, the Massachusetts
constitution required the governor to approve “resolutions” as well as bills, and this is exactly what
happened with respect to the first federal elections. See Smith, supra note 1, at 759–60 (demonstrating
how, in November 1788, both houses of the Massachusetts legislature presented their resolutions
directing the manner of appointing electors to the governor, John Hancock, for his signature, which
he gave). The Massachusetts governor’s involvement in promulgating “manner” legislation is further
demonstrated by an incident in 1796 in which the governor, Samuel Adams, expressed regret to the
legislature for having “approved” the “resolve” they had sent him concerning how “vacancies” in
presidential electors would be filled. See ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASS. 1796–97, at 641–42 (Boston,
Young & Minns 1896) (expressing reservations about how the resolve he approved would allow the
electors to fill such vacancies).
58. Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA.
L. REV. 551, 569 (2004).
59. Id. at 569, 572–75. The rumor was false because, as the archives of Vermont demonstrate,
the state’s 1796 electors were appointed by a “grand committee” as directed by a 1791 law that was
enacted pursuant to the Vermont constitution’s regular lawmaking requirements. Id. at 574–75. The
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Adams as Hamilton had hoped, but it generated a “cloud of suspicion” as
to the validity of Vermont’s electors until Adams’s Republican opponent,
Thomas Jefferson, disclaimed the rumor, explaining in a letter to James
Madison that whatever had occurred must have conformed in substance
with the lawmaking requirements of “the Vermont constitution.”60
Professor Morley reviewed the debates from the Constitutional
Convention and ratifying conventions concerning the Elector Appointment
and Elections Clauses.61 He concluded that these sources “do not shed
light . . . on whether either the Framers or the greater public intended or
understood those provisions as establishing the independent state legislature
doctrine,” but nevertheless proceeded to argue that history somehow
supports the Doctrine.62
Most recently, Professors Vikram Amar and Akhil Amar have delivered
a comprehensive explanation of why the Doctrine is wrong as a matter
of text, history, precedent, and other reasons; from their deep and
well-informed knowledge of the Founding, they conclude that the Doctrine
has no basis in the original understanding of the Constitution.63
Apart from the preceding, scholarly attention to evidence of the original
understanding of these clauses has focused on concepts other than the
independent state legislature doctrine. In 2010, Professor Natelson studied
Vermont constitution required proposed laws to be presented to the governor and council for their
revision and concurrence before they became law, see VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § XVI, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3757, and this requirement was followed with respect to the 1791
law directing the manner of appointing presidential electors, see MANNING J. DAUER, THE ADAMS
FEDERALISTS 105–06 n.58 (1st ed. 1953) (“[T]he first law providing for choice of electors was passed
on November 1, 1791, concurred in by the Governor and Council on Nov. 3, and duly became law.”).
60. Ackerman & Fontana, supra note 58, at 575, 577 (“I cannot suppose that the Vermont
constitution has been strict in requiring particular forms of expressing the legislative will.”).
61. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 30–32 (discussing the Elector Appointment Clause); id. at 28–30 (discussing the Elections
Clause).
62. Id. at 32. Professor Morley’s latest article on the independent state legislature doctrine,
published at the end of 2021, provides a helpful “descriptive taxonomy of the doctrine’s possible
applications, with a normative assessment of their relative merits,” Michael T. Morley, The Independent
State Legislature Doctrine, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 508 (2021) [hereinafter Morley, The Independent State
Legislature Doctrine], but does not identify any new historical evidence from the eighteenth or nineteenth
centuries or otherwise engage with the contents of this Article other than describe it as providing
“competing views that question the doctrine’s historical foundation.” Morley, The Independent State
Legislature Doctrine, supra, at 536 n.279.
63. Vikram David Amar & Akhil Reed Amar, Eradicating Bush-League Arguments Root and Branch:
The Article II Independent-State-Legislature Notion and Related Rubbish (forthcoming 2021 Supreme Court
Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3731755 [https://perma.cc/VJ3DWRP5].
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the original meaning of the Elections Clause, but he was focused on whether
that language gives Congress the power to regulate congressional
campaigns, not the possibility of an independent state legislature doctrine.64
In 2015, several prominent historians filed an amicus brief in Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,65 but they were
focused on the different question of whether an initiative-created
constitutional provision giving the power of the “legislature” to an
independent redistricting commission was consistent with the Elections
Clause, not whether “legislatures” exercising their Elections Clause power
must remain “independent” of run-of-the-mill constitutional regulation.66
In 2021, Eliza Sweren-Becker and Michael Waldman examined the
Elections Clause at the Founding, but they were focused on the original
understanding of the scope of Congress’s power to override “time, place,
and manner” regulations prescribed by state legislatures.67
It is against the evidence summarized in the prior paragraphs—all of
which tends to show that the original understanding was contra to the
independence of “legislatures”—that proponents of the Doctrine have
formulated the Substance/Procedure Thesis. That thesis concedes that
“legislatures” were understood to be bound by constitutionally-required
lawmaking procedures, but contends that they were understood to not be
bound by substantive limitations. The following section identifies new
evidence from the historical record that debunks the thesis by showing that
the Founding generation understood that “legislatures” were as much
subject to substantive restraints as procedural ones.
B. The Failure of the “Substance/Procedure” Thesis of the Original Understanding
The Substance/Procedure Thesis is incorrect. The Founding generation
did not understand that “legislatures” would remain free from substantive
restrictions when acting pursuant to the Elector Appointment and Elections
64. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1, 1 (2010).
65. Brief of Jack N. Rakove, Richard R. Beeman, Alexander Keyssar, Peter S. Onuf, &
Rosemarie Zagari for Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Ariz.
State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015) (No. 13-1314).
66. See Brief of Jack N. Rakove, Richard R. Beeman, Alexander Keyssar, Peter S. Onuf, &
Rosemarie Zagari for Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 4,
26, Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015) (No. 13-1314)
(analyzing Election clause sufficiency as it relates to an independent redistricting commission).
67. Eliza Sweren-Becker & Michael Waldman, The Meaning, History, and Importance of the Elections
Clause, 96 WASH. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (2021).
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Clauses. The historical record compels this conclusion in three ways.
First, the evidence demonstrates that the Framers of these provisions, who
drafted against the backdrop of their prior experience with “legislatures”
under the Articles of Confederation, expected that state constitutions would
impose substantive limitations on “legislatures.” Second, the expectations
of the Framers coincided with the original understanding of the broader
Founding generation. This is evidenced by the fact that, in the years
immediately following adoption of the Constitution, the Founding
generation imposed a number of substantive restrictions on “legislatures,”
well beyond merely requiring them to follow constitutionally-mandated
lawmaking procedures. And, third, the historical record contradicts the
notion that the Founding generation saw any reason to treat these
“legislatures” with unusual deference—that is, allow these “legislatures” to
operate “independently”—because they perceived something special or
unique about either the role that “legislatures” were to play in the
constitutional design, the nature of “time, place, and manner” legislation, or
the threat of court interference with such legislation.
1. The Framers’ Intent Regarding Substantive Limitations on
“Legislatures”
The following analysis of the Framers’ intentions and expectations
regarding substantive limitations on “legislatures” begins with their
experience with “legislatures” under Article V of the Articles of
Confederation, the precursor to the Elector Appointment and Elections
Clauses. The analysis then turns to the Framers’ decision in 1787—
informed by their experience under the Articles—to adopt Article V’s
“legislature” language for use in the Constitution. Finally, the analysis finds
confirmation of the Framers’ intent that state constitutions would continue
to regulate “legislatures” under the new Constitution, as they had under the
Articles, in the fact that two key Framers, John Dickinson and James
Madison, participated in creating new constitutions for their states that did
just that.
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a. The Experience with “Legislatures” Under the Articles of
Confederation
Article V of the Articles of Confederation provided that “delegates
[to Congress] shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature
of each State shall direct.”68 The intent and experience under the Articles
of Confederation was that “legislatures” referred to in that clause would be
defined by, and subject to, their state constitutions. This is demonstrated
by a review of the drafting history of Article V as well as a review of the
state constitutional limitations that were placed on “legislatures” between
1776 and 1787, and then adhered to in subsequent years.
i. The Framing of Article V of the Articles of
Confederation
On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee proposed that Congress declare the
Colonies be “free and independent States” and prepare “a plan of
confederation” to “transmit[] to the respective Colonies for their
consideration and approbation.”69 Congress debated his proposal on
June 8.70 Conservatives, including John Dickinson, favored the formation
of the confederation before a declaration of independence, and, as a result,
consideration of independence was postponed to July 1.71
In the meantime, on June 12, Congress formed a committee to “prepare
and digest the form of a confederation to be entered into between these
colonies.”72 That committee (the “confederation committee”) consisted of
one member from each colony. Dickinson was the representative from
Pennsylvania.73 Although there is little evidence regarding the committee’s

68. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V.
69. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 425 (Worthington C. Ford
ed., Gov’t Prtg. Off. 1906) [hereinafter 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS] (footnote
omitted).
70. Id. at 427; MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774–1781, at 114
(1940).
71. JENSEN, supra note 70, at 114–15; 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra
note 69, at 428–31.
72. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 433.
73. Id. The journals identify the members of the confederation committee as Josiah Bartlett
(New Hampshire), Sam Adams (Massachusetts), Stephen Hopkins (Rhode Island), Roger Sherman
(Connecticut), Robert R. Livingston (New York), John Dickinson (Pennsylvania), Thomas McKean
(Delaware), Thomas Stone (Maryland), Thomas Nelson (Virginia), Joseph Hewes (North Carolina),
Edward Rutledge (South Carolina), and Button Gwinnett (Georgia). Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

21

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

466

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:445

work, according to historian Merrill Jensen, Dickinson was “given the task
of writing the Articles which were presented to Congress,” there is “little
doubt that Dickinson was dominant in the committee,” and the draft
ultimately presented to Congress on July 12 was “an embodiment of the
views of the conservatives, and of [Dickinson’s] views in particular.”74
When Dickinson and the confederation committee began drafting, they
had at their disposal the draft “Sketch of Articles of Confederation” that
Ben Franklin had submitted to Congress a year before.75 With respect to
the selection of delegates to Congress, Franklin’s draft provided as follows:
Art. IV. That for the more convenient Management of general Interests,
Delegates shall be annually elected in each Colony to meet in General
Congress at such Time and Place as shall be agreed on in each the next
preceding Congress. Only where particular Circumstances do not make a
Deviation necessary, it is understood to be a Rule, that each succeeding
Congress be held in a different Colony till the whole Number be gone
through, and so in perpetual Rotation; and that accordingly the next Congress
after the present shall be in the at Annapolis in Maryland.76

Other documents that are thought to have been considered by Dickinson
and the committee did not touch on the issue of how delegates to Congress
were to be selected.77
Dickinson’s use of Franklin’s language to frame what became Article V
of the Articles of Confederation is illuminated by the three successive drafts
of the articles produced by Dickinson in the summer of 1776. The first
draft—believed to be a clean copy of an early Dickinson draft in the hand
of Josiah Bartlett—provided as follows:
Art. 14th. For the more Convenient management of the General Interest,
Delegates shall be Annually appointed by Each Colony to meet in General
74. JENSEN, supra note 70, at 126–27.
75. See 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 252 (Paul H. Smith et al. eds.,
Lib. of Cong. 1979) [hereinafter 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES] (“[T]here can be no doubt that the
members of the committee began their work with a copy of Benjamin Franklin’s proposed Articles of
Confederation before them . . . .”).
76. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 196 (Worthington C. Ford
ed., Gov’t Prtg. Off. 1905).
77. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS, AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 136–38 (1979) [hereinafter THE BEGINNINGS OF
NATIONAL POLITICS] (discussing two draft confederation plans, prepared by Silas Deane and the
Connecticut delegates, which pre-dated the drafts prepared by Dickinson).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/4

22

Smith: Revisiting History of the Independent State Legislature Doctrine

2022]

HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

467

Congress in the City of Philadelphia in the Colony of Pennsylvania until
otherwise ordered by Congress which meeting shall be on the first Monday of
November Every year, with a power reserved in Each Colony to supersede
the Deligates thereof at any time within the year and to send new Deligates in
their Stead for the Remainder of the year. Each Colony shall support its own
Deligates in Congress.78

The second draft, in Dickinson’s own hand, is believed to be the draft
that he used in the confederation committee in late June. It provided as
follows:
Art. [17]. For the more convenient Management of the general Interests,
Delegates shall be annually appointed by Legislature of each Colony or such
Branch thereof as the Colony shall authorize for that purpose, to meet in
General Congress at the City of Philadelphia in the Colony of Pennsylvania
[until] otherwise ordered by Congress, which Meeting shall be on the first
Monday in November in every Year, with a Power reserved to those who
appointed the said Delegates, to supersede them or any of them, at any Time
within the Year, and to send new Delegates in their stead for the Remainder
of the Year.79

78. 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES, supra note 75, at 241; see also id. at 233–50 (reprinting Bartlett’s
draft, with provision relating to representation at page 241); id. at 252 (“There is no evidence to indicate
that Barlett’s manuscript is anything more than a clean copy of one of Dickinson’s drafts.”); Rakove,
THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 77, at 139 n.6. In reproducing the text of
Bartlett’s draft, the editors of LETTERS OF DELEGATES used angle brackets and regular brackets to
identify variations between the draft and the subsequent draft that was reported to Congress on July 12.
See 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES, supra, at 252 (explaining that “words appearing in Bartlett’s manuscript
but omitted from the committee draft are placed in angle brackets” while “words substituted in or
added to the latter appear in this text in regular brackets”). I have removed the editors’ notations to
show just the text of the Bartlett draft.
79. 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES, supra note 75, at 241 (footnote omitted). This second draft
(the earliest in Dickinson’s hand) is reprinted in the fourth volume of LETTERS OF DELEGATES in
parallel with the prior draft in Josiah Bartlett’s hand, with the clause relating to representation appearing
at page 241. See id. at 233–50 (reproducing text of drafts); see also id. at 251–55 (providing explanatory
notes). Dickinson did not number the articles in this draft, but the editors of LETTERS OF DELEGATES
marked this provision “Art. [17].” Id. at 241. The asterisk in the text marks a query that Dickinson
wrote in the margin next to this language: “Q. How Representation in Congress to be regulated?
How many shall make a Quorum, save in the [Executive?].” Id. at 253 n.12. The editors of LETTERS
OF DELEGATES commented that it was “highly likely that this document was the basic draft Dickinson
employed in committee from about June 17 to July 1, and from which he copied the committee draft
reported to Congress.” Id. at 251; see also RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS, supra
note 77, at 139 (noting that this draft “apparently served as a working copy for the committee”).
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The third draft, again in Dickinson’s hand, is believed to be the draft that
was used to report the confederation committee’s work to Congress on
July 12.80 It provided as follows:
Art XVI. For the more convenient Management of the general Interests of
the United States, Delegates should be annually appointed in such Manner as
the Legislature of each Colony shall direct, or such Branches thereof as the
Colony shall authorize for that purpose, to meet in General Congress at the
City of Philadelphia, in the Colony of Pennsylvania, until otherwise ordered
by Congress the United State assembled; which Meeting shall be on the first
Monday of November in every Year, with a Power reserved to those who
appointed the said Delegates, respectively to supercede recal them or any of
them at any time within the Year, and to send new Delegates in their stead for
the Remainder of the Year. Each Colony shall support its own Delegates in
Congress a Meeting of the States, and while they act as Members of the
Council of State, herein after mentioned.81

After famously arguing against independence during the debate on July 1,
and absenting himself from the vote the following day, Dickinson left
Philadelphia to serve in the Pennsylvania militia.82 The alterations indicated
in the text are believed to reflect changes made by Dickinson before he
left,83 and thus before the draft was read to Congress on July 12, by which
time Dickinson was with his battalion in New Jersey.84 Indeed, the
document that Congress printed to reflect the first reading on July 12
(First Printed Form) incorporated the alterations.85
Dickinson thus brought the language close to what was finally included
in Article V of the Articles of Confederation, but Congress subsequently
made two additional non-stylistic changes. After Dickinson left, debate on
80. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 546 n.1.
81. Id. at 549–50.
82. JANE E. CALVERT, QUAKER CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JOHN DICKINSON 242 (2009); DAVID L. JACOBSON, JOHN DICKINSON AND THE REVOLUTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA 1764–1776, at 113–15 (1965).
83. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 546 n.1.
84. See 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES, supra note 75, at 251–52 (explaining that “it seems unlikely
that much time was devoted to [Dickinson’s draft] after [July 1]” because “the independence debate
preempted the attention of Congress” and Dickinson’s time was dominated by “the call for the
Pennsylvania militia to meet the British military threat to New York and New Jersey”).
85. On July 12, “[t]he committee appointed to prepare articles of confederation brought in a
draught, which was read,” and then 80 copies were ordered to be printed. 5 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 546, 555. For the resulting First Printed Form, see id.
at 674–89 (displaying draft Article XVI at 680–81).
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the First Printed Form was “intermittently conducted in a committee of the
whole of Congress between July 22 and August 20,”86 at which time
Congress voted a second print reflecting further revisions (Second Printed
Form).87 It provided as follows:
Art. XII. For the more convenient management of the general interests of
the United States, Delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as
the legislature of each State shall direct, to meet at the city of Philadelphia, in
Pennsylvania, until otherwise ordered by the United States in Congress
Assembled; which meeting shall be on the first Monday in November in every
year, with a power reserved to each State to recal its Delegates or any of them
at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder
of the year. Each State shall support its own Delegates in a meeting of the
States, and while they act as members of the Council of State, herein after
mentioned.88

Here can be seen the two non-stylistic changes that Congress made from
the First Printed Form. First, “should be annually appointed” was changed
to “shall be annually appointed.”89 Second, the power to “recal” delegates
was now reserved “to each State,” as opposed to “those who appointed the
said Delegates.”90 According to John Adams’ notes of the debates on
July 26, 1776, the second change occurred after Francis Hopkinson of
New Jersey moved “that the power of recalling delegates be reserved to the
State, not to the Assembly, because that may be changed.”91
After the Second Printed Form (August 20, 1776), Congress delayed
further consideration of the articles until April 1777 because some states
were unrepresented and because the demands of the war took precedence.92
When debate continued in April and afterwards, significant changes to the
draft continued to be made, but the language of this provision relating to
selection of representation did not materially change. It ultimately became
86. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 77, at 139; see also JENSEN,
supra note 70, at 249–50 (listing the dates which Congress debated the First Printed Form).
87. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 674–89. The Second
Printed Form is set forth as such in the fifth volume of JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
in parallel with the First Printed Form. See id. at 674–89 (displaying draft Article XII at 680–81).
88. Id. at 680–81.
89. Id. at 680.
90. Id.
91. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 1077 (Worthington C. Ford
ed., Gov’t Prtg. Off. 1906).
92. JENSEN, supra note 70, at 251; JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 118.
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Article V of the final document that Congress sent to the states for
ratification in November 1777,93 the adoption of which was not completed
until March 1781.94
Thus, from Ben Franklin’s draft to its final form, the language governing
state selection of representation in Congress evolved as follows:
•

“Delegates shall be annually elected in each Colony” (Franklin
draft);95 to

•

“Delegates shall be Annually appointed by Each Colony,” but “with
a power reserved in Each Colony to supersede [and] send new
Deligates” (first Dickinson draft, in Bartlett’s hand);96 to

•

“Delegates shall be annually appointed by Legislature of each
Colony or such Branch thereof as the Colony shall authorize for
that purpose,” but “with a Power reserved to those who appointed
the said Delegates, to supersede . . . [and] send new Delegates”
(second Dickinson draft, in Dickinson’s hand);97 to

•

“Delegates should be annually appointed in such Manner as the
Legislature of each Colony shall direct, or such Branches thereof as
the Colony shall authorize for that purpose,” but “with a Power
reserved to those who appointed the said Delegates, respectively to
supercede [and] send new Delegates”98 (Dickinson’s third draft,
before his cross-outs); to

•

“Delegates should be annually appointed in such Manner as the
Legislature of each Colony shall direct,” but “with a Power reserved
to those who appointed the said Delegates, respectively to recal
them [and] send new Delegates” (Dickinson’s third draft, after his

93. JENSEN, supra note 70, at 253. For the final draft of the Articles of Confederation,
see 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 907–25 (Worthington C. Ford ed.,
Gov’t Prtg. Off. 1907) [hereinafter 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS] (displaying the
final draft of the Articles of Confederation).
94. JENSEN, supra note 70, at 238.
95. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, supra note 76, at 196.
96. 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES, supra note 75, at 241.
97. Id.
98. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 549–50.
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cross-outs, i.e., the First Printed Form, read to Congress on July 12,
1776);99 to
•

“Delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the
legislature of each State shall direct,” but “with a power reserved to
each State to recal [and] send others” (Second Printed Form and
Article V as adopted).100

In sum, Dickinson and the confederation committee began by deciding
against calling upon each colony to “elect” or “appoint” its delegates
without providing them with any further instructions as to how that was to
occur. They then considered whether delegates ought to be directly
“appointed by Legislature” or “Branch thereof,” but decided against that as
well. Instead, they decided that “the Legislature” would “direct” the
“manner” in which delegates would be appointed.101 The Framers also
decided to delete language that would have provided that, instead of “the
Legislature,” the colony could “authorize” particular “Branches” of the
legislature to direct the manner of appointment. And finally, Congress
chose to reserve “to each State,” instead of “those who appointed,”
the power to recall and replace delegates.
Several aspects of this drafting history are contrary to the notion, central
to the independent state legislature doctrine, that the Framers intended for
institutional “legislatures” to enjoy independence from the constraints
ordinarily imposed on them. First, the confederation committee’s
consideration of language that would have made clear that a colony could
authorize “Branches” of “the Legislature” to exercise the function instead
of “the Legislature” is significant. The fact that there could have been
“branches” (plural) comprising a subpart of “the Legislature,” can only
mean that that they were thinking of the “the Legislature” as having more
than two branches, and thus in the broader sense as the entire group of
governmental institutions involved in lawmaking, and not in the narrower

99. Id.
100. Id. at 680–81; see also 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS supra note 93,
at 909–10.
101. The move from “appointment by Legislature” to “appoint[ment] in such manner as the
Legislature . . . shall direct” gave the states the choice of whether to appoint their delegates to Congress
through legislative appointment or by popular vote. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE
PEOPLE, THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 264 (1988) (noting that
Rhode Island and Connecticut delegates were “chosen at large by the voters”).
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sense of a bicameral assembly that came to dominate American discourse in
the years that followed.
Indeed, there is compelling evidence that, at the time he was drafting,
Dickinson would have been thinking of “the legislature,” and “branches
thereof,” in that broader sense. In the fall of 1776, shortly after the
confederation committee completed and presented its draft of the Articles
of Confederation, Dickinson drafted Essay of a Frame of Government for
Pennsylvania (Frame) as an alternative to the radical, unicameral constitution
recently adopted by that state.102 For Pennsylvania, Dickinson proposed
that laws would be passed by the “General Court,” comprised of three
branches: an Assembly, a Senate, and an executive Council (selected from
the Assembly and Senate) consisting of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
and thirteen others.103 The Council would have the power to “assent,
dissent or propose amendments” to bills received from the Assembly or
Senate.104 Dickinson explained that “vesting the Supreme Legislature in
three different bodies” in this fashion would “give maturity and precision to
acts of legislation . . . by preventing measures from being too much
influenced by sudden passions.”105 At the same time, Dickinson hoped
that “all the branches of the Legislature” would “enter into the generous
contest of gaining the greatest share of approbation of [the people], by most
effectually promoting their happiness.”106 Amendment of the constitution
would require, among other things, “two-thirds of each branch of the
Legislature.”107
Dickinson’s view was not idiosyncratic. In Thoughts on Government (1776),
John Adams wrote about “the legislature” and “branches of the legislature”
in similarly broad terms.108 According to Gordon Wood, this document
102. CALVERT, supra note 82, at 255 (“In the autumn of 1776 [Dickinson] published An Essay
of a Frame of Government for Pennsylvania.”); Robert F. Williams, The Influences of Pennsylvania’s 1776
Constitution on American Constitutionalism During the Founding Decade, 112 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
25, 32 (1988) (noting that Dickinson “attacked” the 1776 constitution in this document but recognizing
some dispute over its authorship); Paul Leicester Ford, The Adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776, 10 POL. SCI. Q. 426, 453 (1895) (“In the middle of July Dickinson himself printed an Essay of a
Frame of Government for Pennsylvania . . . .”).
103. AN ESSAY OF A FRAME OF GOVERNMENT FOR PENNSYLVANIA 5–8 (Phila., James
Humphreys, Jr. 1776) [hereinafter FRAME].
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15.
108. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT 196 (Phila., John Dunlap 1776) [hereinafter
JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT].
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was “widely circulated among the leading Revolutionaries in several states”
and was “the most influential pamphlet in the early constitution-making
period.”109 In it, Adams made the case against giving “the whole power of
legislation” to the “single assembly” representing the people.110 Adams
proposed a “distinct assembly,” an upper house that would act as a
“mediator” between “the two extreme branches of the legislature,” which
he identified as “that which represents the people, and that which is vested
with the executive power.”111 The Assembly and the upper house would
“unite” to choose a Governor who, stripped of royal prerogatives, would
have “a free and independent exercise of his judgment, and be made also an
integral part of the legislature.”112 Both the upper house and the Governor
would have a “negative” on legislation.113
Nor was this broader view of “legislature” merely hypothetical.
The South Carolina constitution of 1776—one of two constitutions existing
when Dickinson drafted the articles—vested South Carolina’s “legislative
authority” in “the president and commander-in-chief, the general assembly
and legislative council.”114 When in 1778 the latter branches created a new
constitution vesting the “legislative authority” in “a general assembly, to
consist of two distinct bodies, a senate and a house of representatives,”115
the incumbent president, John Rutledge, issued a futile veto, and then
109. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 203
(1969) [hereinafter WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC].
110. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT, supra note 108, at 196.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also Robert J. Taylor, Construction of the Massachusetts Constitution, 90 AM.
ANTIQUARIAN SOC. 317, 336 (1980) (“Adam’s theory of balance . . . required that the governor in his
capacity as part of the legislature should have a negative on laws that was as effective as that of the
Senate or House.”). Chief Justice Roberts referenced the eighteenth-century notion of a three-branch
legislature in his dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Ariz.
State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 827–28 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
114. S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3244.
In 1777, the New York Constitutional Convention actually adopted a proposal that “the legislature
consist of three separate and distinct branches, intending to add the governor as the third branch
[and giving him] a negative on all laws passed by the senate and assembly,” before reverting back to a
two-house legislature at John Jay’s urging. See CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK 504 (1906); see also WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 109, at 225 (describing the debate over the proposed “incorporation of the governor as a
third ‘separate and distinct’ branch of the legislature” and the compromise of a “separate Council of
Revision of which the governor was made a member”).
115. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. II, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3248.
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resigned.116 Rutledge explained that the new constitution “annihilate[d]
one branch of the legislature” in disregard of the fact that, in the old
constitution, “the people, being at liberty to choose what form they pleased,
agreed to one vesting an authority for making the laws by which they were
to be bound in three branches.”117 He feared that “if we have power to
lop one branch of the legislature, we may cut off either of the other
branches, and suffer the legislative authority to be exercised by the
remaining branch only.”118
Under this broader view of what constituted “the legislature” and
“branches thereof,” the exact composition of the “legislature” that was to
“direct” the manner of appointing delegates would have to be delineated by
the state, either in its constitution or by law.119 That indefiniteness gives
rise to two important conclusions about the intentions of Dickinson and his
compatriots. First, for them, in 1776, there could have been no room for a
“legislature” to operate independently of the state—the term had no definite
meaning until it was fixed by the state. Second, it is clear the Framers did
not intend, by specifying “legislature,” to necessarily empower either
bicameral or unicameral institutional assemblies of representatives.120 This
undermines any assumption that they thought such assemblies had some
special competence with respect to directing the manner of appointment, or
that they had in mind some particular “separation of powers” principle
when they used the word “legislature.”
The provision that Dickinson included in his draft Frame specifying how
Pennsylvania would appoint its delegates to Congress underscores the
indefiniteness of “the Legislature.” Under Dickinson’s Frame, the power
was not given to what would now be considered the bicameral legislature
116. DAVID RAMSAY, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, FROM A
BRITISH PROVINCE TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE 131–32 (1785).
117. Id. at 133.
118. Id. at 134.
119. The Framers’ decision not to include the language about “Branches” could have reflected
a determination that either: (a) the entire “Legislature” (not just “Branches thereof”) had to be involved
in directing the manner of appointment; or (b) the language was unnecessary, i.e., a colony’s authority
to pick which legislative “branches” would act as the “legislature” was clear without spelling it out.
Either way, the state would have to delineate the institutions that would act as the “legislature.”
120. It was not only that the “Legislature” could be defined as more than the two representative
houses. It was conceivable that a state might choose to designate one of its two legislative houses to
play the role. For example, in 1776, one of Thomas Jefferson’s drafts for the Virginia constitution
would have assigned the responsibility to elect delegates to the lower house of the Assembly.
See 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 351 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950) (displaying Jefferson’s
second draft for the Virginia constitution).
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(the Senate and Assembly) but rather to all three branches of what he
referred to as the “Supreme Legislature,” including the executive committee
with Governor and Lieutenant Governor, which he referred to as the
Council.121 This approach contrasted with that of South Carolina’s
constitution of 1776, which assigned the power to choose delegates to
“the general assembly and the legislative council,”122 even though the
colony’s “legislative authority” also included a third branch, consisting of
the president.123
Moreover, whatever was to comprise “the Legislature” of a given state,
neither the drafting history of Article V nor the resulting language gives any
reason to think that the Framers intended for that institution
(or institutions) to act “independently.” It is apparent from the evolution
of the language, which went through several iterations, that it was carefully
crafted, and also perhaps “bitterly fought over,” as was the rest of the
draft.124 As Committee Member Edward Rutledge wrote to John Jay on
June 29, 1776, the draft had “the Vice of all [Dickinson’s] Productions to a
considerable Degree; I mean the Vice of Refining too much.”125 Surely, if
it had been their intention, Dickinson and his colleagues would have found
a more direct way to express their desire for legislative independence than
just specifying it was the “legislatures” that were to direct the manner of
appointing delegates.
The fact that Dickinson and his colleagues did not include—and evidently
never considered including—an explicit expression of legislative
independence is particularly significant because, as they drafted this
language, two colonies had adopted constitutions which regulated their
“legislatures” with respect to the selection of delegates to Congress.
The South Carolina constitution (March 26, 1776) required delegates to be
“chosen by the general assembly and legislative council, jointly by ballot, in
the general assembly.”126 Similarly, the Virginia constitution (June 29,
1776) required delegates to be “chosen annually, or superseded[] in the mean

121. See FRAME, supra note 103, at 14 (“The Council, Senate and Assembly to join, and by ballot
chuse annually from themselves, Delegates to represent this colony in Congress. The election to be
conducted in the same manner as the election of members of the Council.”).
122. S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XV, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3246.
123. S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VII, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3244.
124. JENSEN, supra note 70, at 127.
125. Letter from Edward Rutledge to John Jay (June 29, 1776), in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES,
supra note 75, at 337, 338.
126. S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XV, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3246.
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time, by joint ballot of both Houses of Assembly.”127 If Dickinson’s
committee considered these constitutional impingements on “legislatures”
to be problematic—as they would have if they were proponents of
legislative independence—it is hard to explain why they did not explicitly
address the problem in their drafting. And as the full Congress, and then
the states, further considered Dickinson’s draft before final adoption of the
Articles in 1781, this backdrop of constitutional regulation of “legislatures”
only increased as more state constitutions were adopted, as explained in the
next section of this Article.
Finally, it is telling that Congress consciously chose, on the motion of
Francis Hopkinson, to reserve the power to recall and replace delegates, not
to “those who appointed” the delegates, but “to each State.” This gave the
“State” the power to effectively undo, and then redo, the allegedly special
handiwork of the “legislature.” This was inconsistent with the concept
(if indeed it was a concept at the time) of some specific institutional
“legislature” operating, with special expertise, independently of the state of
which it was a part.
ii. Constitutional Limitations on “Legislatures” from
1776–1787
That substantive regulation of “legislatures” was expected by Dickinson
and his colleagues on the confederation committee is confirmed by their
subsequent actions. After completing their work, several of them returned
to their home states and participated in creating state constitutions that
expressly regulated the way in which “legislatures” could exercise their
power to direct the manner of appointing delegates to Congress, and those
regulations were subsequently followed.
Dickinson himself missed the drafting of the Pennsylvania constitution
in the summer of 1776 because he was in New Jersey with the militia.128
However, as noted previously, Dickinson’s draft Frame for Pennsylvania,
prepared in the fall of that year, would have required the three branches of
the state’s legislature (Council, Senate and Assembly) to “join, and by ballot
to chuse [the Delegates] annually from themselves,” with the election to be
conducted “in the same manner as the election of members of the

127. VA. CONST. of 1776, The Constitution or Form of Government, reprinted in
7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3817.
128. JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 119.
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Council.”129 The members of the Council were to be “chosen one after
another by the Senate and Assembly jointly by ballot, from themselves.”130
Election would require two thirds of the votes, but if that could not be
achieved after two ballots, then the election would be “determined by
lot.”131
Delaware’s representative on the confederation committee was Thomas
McKean.132 After July 1776, McKean returned to Delaware to participate
in its constitutional convention, held in August and September of 1776.133
While McKean’s later assertion that he wrote the state’s first constitution
“in a tavern without a book or any assistance” is likely an exaggeration,134
he was a member of the drafting committee and there is no doubt that he
played a key role, along with George Read, who had also been in Congress
in July 1776.135 The constitution they created specified that Delaware’s
delegates to Congress would be “chosen . . . by joint ballot of both houses
in the general assembly.”136
Button Gwinnett was Georgia’s representative on the confederation
committee.137 After July 1776, Gwinnett returned to Georgia and
participated in the elected body which assembled in October 1776 and
produced the state’s first constitution, ultimately adopted on February 5,
1777.138 Gwinnett served on the committee that drafted the constitution

129. FRAME, supra note 103, at 14.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id.
132. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 433.
133. See Richard Lynch Mumford, Constitutional Development in the State of Delaware,
1776–1897, at 59–62 (June 1968) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Delaware) (on file with author)
(detailing the convention proceedings).
134. McKean made this claim in a letter dated August 22, 1813. See ROBERDEAU BUCHANAN,
LIFE OF THE HON. THOMAS MCKEAN 51 (1890) (quoting McKean’s letter) (internal quotations
omitted). Mumford explains why this claim was very likely an exaggeration. Mumford, supra note 133,
at 57–58.
135. Mumford, supra note 133, at 57–59, 62.
136. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 11, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 564.
The journal of the convention reflects that this provision of the committee draft (among others) was
considered on September 18, 1776. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE LOWER COUNTIES
ON DELAWARE 1770–1776, OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1776, AND OF THE HOUSE
OF ASSEMBLY OF THE DELAWARE STATE 1776–1781, at 217 (Claudia A. Bushman et al. eds., 1986).
The entire draft of the committee was approved on September 20, 1776. Id. at 219.
137. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 433.
138. ETHEL K. WARE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA 29–31 (Columbia Univ.
eds., 1967).
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and appears to have played a prominent part in its drafting.139
The constitution that he and others created specified that the “continental
delegates” were to be “appointed annually by ballot,” apparently by the
the
state’s unicameral legislature, the “house of assembly.”140 Notably,
constitution stated that this provision was subject to “the regulations
contained in the twelfth article of the Confederation of the United
States.”141 This was a reference to Article XII of the draft articles that
appeared in the Second Printed Form printed by Congress on August 20,
1776, which later became Article V of the Articles of Confederation sent to
the states for ratification in November 1777.142
New York’s representative on the confederation committee was Robert
R. Livingston.143 Livingston returned to his home state of New York after
July 1776 and helped draft its constitution, adopted in April 1777.144
Livingston was appointed to the drafting committee and, along with John
Jay and Gouverneur Morris, is thought to have been primarily responsible
for the draft constitution.145 The initial drafts provided that delegates
would be “annually appointed by an act of the Legislature, without the
nomination of the Governor, which shall originate in the . . . senate but be
liable as all other acts to the amendment of the general assembly below.”146
However, at the suggestion of Morris, the following elaborate provision was
substituted:
[T]he senate and assembly shall each openly nominate as many persons as
shall be equal to the whole number of delegates to be appointed, after which
nomination they shall meet together, and those persons named in both lists
shall be delegates; and out of those persons whose names are not on both
lists, one half shall be chosen by joint ballot of the senators and members of
assembly so met together as aforesaid.147

139. See id. at 30–32 (“[I]t is natural that Gwinnet should have taken a prominent part in the
drafting of the Constitution.”).
140. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XVI, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 780.
141. Id.
142. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 680–81 (displaying
Art. XII of the draft articles).
143. Id. at 433.
144. 1 LINCOLN, supra note 114, at 500 (“The discussion on the proposed Constitution began
on the day of its presentation, March 12, and continued until its adoption on the 20th of April.”).
145. Id. at 490–91, 496.
146. Id. at 536–37.
147. Id. at 537.
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This became Article XXX of the New York constitution of 1777.148
Samuel Adams was the Massachusetts representative on the
At the Massachusetts constitutional
confederation committee.149
convention of 1779, Adams was a member of the committee appointed to
frame the constitution, and also, along with John Adams and James
Bowdoin, the three-person subcommittee that did the preliminary work.150
The resulting constitution specified that the state’s delegates to Congress
would be annually “elected by the joint ballot of the senate and house of
representatives, assembled together in one room.”151
This understanding that “legislatures” were dependent on state
constitutions was not unique to the members of the confederation
committee that framed Article V. Most of the state constitutions adopted
between Independence and the adoption of the United States Constitution
purported to regulate the selection of delegates to Congress.152 This
demonstrates a widespread understanding among Americans of the time
that, under the Articles as drafted, “legislatures,” when directing the manner
of appointing delegates to Congress, were to act subject to state
constitutional commands.
Lest there be any doubt about the understanding, after these constitutions
were established, the credentials that “legislatures” gave to their delegates
148. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXX, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2634–35.
149. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 69, at 433.
150. Taylor, supra note 113, at 326.
151. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. IV, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1906.
The proposed Massachusetts constitution that had been rejected in 1778 contained a similar provision,
specifying that delegates would be selected by joint ballot of the Senate and House of Representatives.
See MASSACHUSETTS, COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH 51–58 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1961) (reflecting a
copy of the failed constitution).
152. Smith, supra note 1, at 755; DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 11, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 29, at 564; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 11, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3085;
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXVII, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1695; N.C. CONST.
of 1776, art. XXXVII, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2793; GA. CONST. of 1777,
art. XVI, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 780; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXX, reprinted
in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2634; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXII, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3253; MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. IV, reprinted in
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1906; N.H. CONST. of 1784, Part II.—The Form of Government,
Delegates to Congress, reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2467 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
[hereinafter 4 CONSTITUTIONS]. These are listed earliest to latest; Gordon Wood provides the exact
dates of adoption for the earlier of these constitutions. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, supra note 109, at 133.
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for delivery to Congress reflected that appointment had been made pursuant
to the state constitutions. For example, in November 1785, the credentials
of the Massachusetts delegates made clear that they had been elected
“by joint Ballot of the two branches of the General Court agreeably to the
Constitution.”153 The November 1785 credentials of James Monroe reflect
that he was appointed by “joint ballot of both Houses,” which was the
method of appointment provided for in the Virginia constitution.154
Similarly, the credentials of the New York delegates that year referred to the
“[n]omination” process set forth in the New York constitution.155
b. The Framers’ Adoption of the “Legislature” Language in
Light of Their Experience Under the Articles of Confederation
The drafting history of the Elector Appointment and Elections Clauses
at the constitutional convention in 1787 has been reviewed by lawyers
previously. The Elector Appointment Clause emerged in September from
a committee chaired by David Brearley of New Jersey (the Committee of
Unfinished Parts, sometimes called the Brearley Committee),156 and the
Elections Clause emerged in August from the committee chaired by John
Rutledge of South Carolina (the Committee of Detail).157 In both
instances, the language that came out of committee was adopted by the
convention without any changes that are material to the present discussion.
Nothing from this drafting history supports the notion that the Framers
intended for “legislatures” operating pursuant to these clauses to be immune
from constitutional restraint or otherwise treated differently than
legislatures going about their normal legislative business.158 However, this

153. 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 879 (Worthington C.
Ford ed., Gov’t Prtg. Off. 1933); MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. IV, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 34, at 1906 (requiring delegates to be “elected by the joint ballot of the senate and house of
representatives”).
154. 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 153, at 902; VA. CONST. of
1776, The Constitution or Form of Government, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3817
(providing delegates were to be chosen “by joint ballot of both Houses of Assembly”).
155. 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 153, at 880; N.Y. CONST. of
1777, art. XXX, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2634–35.
156. Smith, supra note 1, at 751–52; Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal
Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 31.
157. Sweren-Becker & Waldman, supra note 67, at 1005; Morley, The Independent State Legislature
Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 28–29; Natelson, Federal Functions, supra
note 57, at 198–199.
158. Smith, supra note 1, at 777–78.
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does not mean that the evidence of the framing is neutral as to the existence
of the Doctrine.159
The “legislature” language adopted by the Framers for the Elector
Appointment and Elections Clauses closely resembles the “legislature”
language of Article V of the Articles of Confederation.160 Each of the three
clauses gave the “legislature” the responsibility to direct or prescribe the
manner of appointment or election of national representatives, whether to

159. To the contrary, in addition to the argument in text, reasonable inferences can be drawn
from the drafting history against the existence of the Doctrine. See Smith, supra note 1, at 756–57
(arguing that the drafting history suggests an aversion to giving too much power to “legislatures”).
But see Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 32 (concluding that the “histories do not shed light . . . on whether either the Framers or
the greater public intended or understood those provisions as establishing the independent state
legislature doctrine”). See also Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 661 (2001) (finding “no relevant legislative history”).
160. Compare U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V (“[D]elegates [to Congress]
shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct . . . .”), with U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”) and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof . . . .”). Under the Articles of Confederation, most delegates to Congress were
appointed by the legislatures themselves. See supra note 101 (noting that only two states held popular
elections for delegates). Therefore, the predominant practice with respect to the selection of delegates
under the old constitution (legislative appointment) was similar to the requirement with respect to the
selection of senators under the new Constitution (legislative “choosing”). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,
cl. 1 (providing that each state’s senators were to be “chosen by the Legislature thereof”). And thus it
has often been said that the selection method for senators reflected that senators were to “represent[]
not the people of the respective states, but the states themselves,” as had delegates to Congress under
the Articles of Confederation. Michael Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO.
L. REV. 969, 999 (2008) [hereinafter Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism]. This is true,
but it ignores a lot of textual differences to further say that “the selection method [for Senators] was a
direct carry-over from the Articles, where the state legislatures (under [Article V]) chose their delegates
to the Congress.” Id. Textually speaking, the “direct carry-over from the Articles” was the Elector
Appointment Clause, which, like its predecessor under the Articles, but unlike the new provision for
“choosing” senators, gave states optionality as to the manner of appointing representatives
(by providing that “legislatures” would “direct the manner” of appointment). John Dickinson
recognized these distinctions when he wrote that, under the new Constitution, selection of senators
would have to be made in “the same manner, in which the members of Congress are now appointed,”
resulting in a senate “created by the sovereignties of the several states.” John Dickinson, Fabius II
(1788), reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION, WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS,
1787–1788, at 61 (Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell, eds., 1998). On the other hand, because
presidential electors were “to be appointed, as the legislature of each state may direct, the fairest, freest
opening is given for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose, as shall be most signally qualified
to fulfill the trust.” Id. at 63.
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the confederation Congress (a hybrid executive/legislature),161 Congress
(the legislature), or the Electoral College (to pick the executive). Given the
textual similarities, the Framers’ decision to use the “legislature” language
again in the new Constitution should be viewed in light of their prior
experience under the Articles.162
As established in the previous section, under the Articles of
Confederation, it was understood that “legislatures” were normal
legislatures, subject to substantive regulation by state constitutions. The
Framers knew this when they gathered in 1787. For example, consider the
members of the two committees who framed the Elector Appointment and
Elections Clauses (the Committee of Unfinished Parts and the Committee
of Detail).163 The Committee of Unfinished Parts included both John
Dickinson and Roger Sherman. In 1776, Dickinson and Sherman had
worked together on the confederation committee, which produced the
original “legislature” language of Article V of the Articles of Confederation.
Other members of the Committee of Unfinished Parts had participated in

161. See RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 77, at 383 (noting
“the anomalous character of Congress,” which was described by Thomas Burke as “a deliberating
Executive assembly”).
162. The original understanding of the Articles of Confederation can be “crucial evidence of
the Constitution’s meaning” when the latter borrowed language from the former. Ramsey, Missouri
v. Holland and Historical Textualism, supra note 160 at 986 (arguing that the Framers “surely knew how
the Articles granted treatymaking power to the Congress and how that power had been understood
throughout the 1780s” and that “[t]here is no reason to suppose that [the Framers] would have used
parallel language in the Constitution had they intended a wholly different effect, and every reason to
suppose that they saw their language as parallel.”). Making the comparison is useful for present
purposes, but should not be taken as a suggestion that the nature of national representation did not
change from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution. Madison, for example, “envisioned a
genuine national government, resting for its authority, not on the state governments and not even on
the peoples of the several states considered separately,” but rather on “an American people” who
“constituted a separate and superior entity, capable of conveying to a national government an authority
that would necessarily impinge on the authority of the state governments.” MORGAN, supra note 101,
at 267.
163. The Committee of Unfinished Parts consisted of Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire),
Rufus King (Massachusetts), Roger Sherman (Connecticut), David Brearley (New Jersey), Gouverneur
Morris (Pennsylvania), John Dickinson (Delaware), Daniel Carrol (Maryland), James Madison
(Virginia), Hugh Williamson (North Carolina), Pierce Butler (South Carolina), and Abraham Baldwin
(Georgia). Madison’s Notes (Aug. 31, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 475, 481 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
The Committee of Detail consisted of Edmund Randolph (Virginia), James Wilson (Pennsylvania),
Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut), John Rutledge (South Carolina), and Nathaniel Gorham
(Massachusetts). Journal (July 24, 1787), in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 97,
97.
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creating the state constitutions which regulated “legislatures.” This included
James Madison (Virginia constitution of 1776) and Gouverneur Morris
(New York constitution of 1777). Both Dickinson (in his draft Frame for
Pennsylvania) and Morris (at the New York constitutional convention) had
personally proposed specific state constitutional provisions designed to
regulate “legislatures.” Likewise, the Committee of Detail’s members also
included delegates who had participated in creating state constitutions which
regulated “legislatures,” specifically Edmund Randolph (Virginia
constitution of 1776) and Nathaniel Gorham (Massachusetts constitution of
1780). Others on the two committees may not have had such first-hand
experiences but nevertheless would have been able to observe how state
constitutions had been regulating “legislatures” under the Articles of
Confederation, including by having themselves been appointed to Congress
prior to 1787 by state “legislatures” pursuant to state constitutional
requirements.164
Assume for a moment that by 1787, in a departure from the past,
legislative “independence” had become a concept that the Framers wanted
to enshrine in the new constitution.165 If that were the case, it is simply
164. Nine of the eleven members of the Committee of Unfinished Parts (all but Roger Sherman
and David Brearley), and four of the five members of the Committee of Detail (all but Oliver
Ellsworth) had been appointed to Congress in the years before 1787 by state “legislatures” that were
subject to state constitutions which contained substantive regulations of “legislatures.” See CALVIN
JILLSON & RICK K. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL DYNAMICS: STRUCTURE, COORDINATION, AND
CHOICE IN THE FIRST AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 330–42 (1994) (“Appendix E, Delegate
Listing by Congressional Year, 1774-88.”).
165. Proponents of the Doctrine have not pointed to any evidence that the Framers developed
an affinity for independent “legislatures.” To the contrary, the period leading up to 1787 was
characterized by a growing animus towards the state legislatures. Brief of Jack N. Rakove, Richard R.
Beeman, Alexander Keyssar, Peter S. Onuf, & Rosemarie Zagari for Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n
as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 15, Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
576 U.S. 787 (2015) (No. 13-1314) (citing WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
supra note 109, at 362); id. at 18. Moreover, that growing mistrust of legislatures strengthened the basis
for the emerging concept of judicial review of legislative overreach. See WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 109, at 456 (quoting May 1787 newspaper which had argued
that legislative acts were subject to “scrutiny by the people, that is, by the Supreme Judiciary, their
servants for this purpose; and those that militate with the fundamental laws, or impugn the principles
of the constitution, are to be judicially set aside as void, and of no effect”). John Dickinson reflected
this trend in thought. At the constitutional convention, he said that no power of judicial review ought
to exist, but was “at a loss what expedient to substitute.” Madison’s Notes (Aug. 15, 1787),
in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 163, at 296, 299. However, when
Dickinson subsequently advocated for adoption of the Constitution, he cited judicial review as a
positive feature of the new charter. See John Dickinson, Fabius IV (1788) (explaining that the states
and the people would be represented by “the federal independent judges” in “the determination of
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inconceivable that they would have attempted to incorporate this novel
concept into the new constitution by using language so closely resembling
that of the old constitution, under which—as they knew very well—
“legislatures” had been decidedly non-independent.
c.

The Framers’ Intent Implemented

The Framers’ expectation that state constitutions would continue to
control “legislatures” is confirmed by the involvement of both John
Dickinson and James Madison in creating post-Founding state constitutions
that did just that.
i.

John Dickinson and the Delaware Constitution of 1792

In late 1791 and early 1792, Delaware held a constitutional convention to
replace its constitution of 1776. Two veterans of the federal convention—
John Dickinson and Richard Bassett—were delegates.166 Dickinson was
chosen president and, according to a leading analysis of the convention,
he was its leader.167
Early in the convention a draft constitution emerged which contained the
following provision regulating the way in which the “legislature” might
prescribe the place and manner of electing members of Congress:
The Representative, and when there shall be more than one, the
Representatives of the People of this State, in Congress, shall be voted for at
the same Places where Representatives in the State Legislature are voted for,
and in the same Manner.168

[the] constitutionality [of the laws]”), reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION, WRITINGS OF THE
“OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 1787–1788, supra note 160, at 219.
166. JOHN A. MUNROE, FEDERALIST DELAWARE 1775–1815, at 195 (1954); Mumford, supra
note 133, at 121.
167. Mumford, supra note 133, at 114, 119. Mumford explains that Dickinson’s political views
“corresponded in large measure with the general tenor of changes made by the convention.” Id. at 119.
168. MINUTES OF THE GRAND COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE CONVENTION OF THE
DELAWARE STATE WHICH COMMENCED AT DOVER, ON TUESDAY, THE TWENTY-NINTH DAY OF
NOVEMBER, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-ONE,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING, ALTERING, AND AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS
STATE; OR, IF THEY SEE OCCASION, FOR FORMING A NEW ONE IN STEAD THEREOF 77
(Wilmington, James Adams 1792).
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This provision, without alteration, was included in the final draft of the
constitution adopted by the convention.169 The existing minutes do not
reflect any debate concerning this clause.
Thus, we see Dickinson making his fourth and final appearance in the
history which debunks the theory that the Framers codified the independent
state legislature doctrine when they referred to “legislatures” in the
Constitution. In the summer of 1776, Dickinson was the original drafter of
the “legislature” language used in Article V of the Articles of Confederation;
in the fall of 1776, he drafted a constitution for Pennsylvania that would
have substantively regulated the state “legislature” in its selection of
delegates to Congress; in the summer of 1787, he was a member of the
Committee of Unfinished Parts that framed the Elector Appointment
Clause, incorporating the “legislature” language from the Articles; and,
finally, in 1791–1792, he led the Delaware constitutional convention which
adopted a provision that substantively regulated how the state’s “legislature”
might exercise its power under the Elections Clause.
ii.

James Madison and the Virginia Constitution of 1830

More confirmation that the Framers expected state constitutions to
regulate “legislatures” with respect to federal elections comes from James
Madison’s participation in the Virginia constitutional convention of
1829–1830. On January 12, 1830, John W. Green, a judge of the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, proposed that the new constitution provide that
the number of congressional seats to which Virginia was entitled be
apportioned “amongst the several counties, cities, boroughs and towns of
the State, according to their respective numbers,” and that those numbers
were to be determined by “adding to the whole number of free persons,
including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians
not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.”170 As John Randolph
explained, the question prompted by Green’s proposal was “shall the
169. MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION OF THE DELAWARE STATE, AT THE SECOND SESSION
THEREOF, WHICH COMMENCED AT DOVER, ON TUESDAY THE TWENTY-NINTH DAY OF MAY,
IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD, ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-TWO, FOR THE
PURPOSE OF REVIEWING, ALTERING, AND AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS STATE, OR IF
THEY SEE OCCASION, FOR FORMING A NEW ONE INSTEAD THEREOF 64, 101 (Wilmington,
Brynberg and Andrews 1792); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 29, at 578.
170. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829–30,
at 857 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1830) [hereinafter DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE
CONVENTION].
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apportionment of representation which the Federal Constitution secures to
the slave-holding States, be the apportionment on which members of
Congress shall be elected, or shall it not?”171 This would regulate the core
of the Virginia “legislature’s” power under the Elections Clause to prescribe
“manner” legislation.
There was a brief debate before the convention adopted Green’s proposal
by a vote of 60–35.172 James Madison was among those voting “aye,” and
he was joined by other notable figures, including Chief Justice John
Marshall, future Associate Justice Phillip P. Barbour, and future
U.S. President John Tyler.173 Evidently, none of them were convinced by
Lewis Summers, a delegate from the western part of the state. Summers—
briefly invoking what we now call the independent state legislature
doctrine—argued against Green’s proposal on the ground that it was
“unnecessary and improper, to regulate by the State Constitution, any of the
powers or duties devolved on the Legislature by the Constitution of the
United States”; he did not think such power or duties could be “abridged or
restrained by any act of the Convention.”174
Although Madison did not speak on the issue—other than through his
“aye” vote—his thinking may also be reflected in comments he made earlier
that day on the separate issue of how much authority the Virginia legislature
would have to reapportion its own membership. Madison would have
preferred that the constitution prescribe “an exact and permanent rule for
the apportionment” for future legislatures.175 Instead, the convention had
agreed that the legislature would be obliged to reapportion every ten years
within certain “great districts” established by the constitution but expressly
prohibited from reapportioning as between those “great districts.”176
171. Id. at 858.
172. Id. at 859; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 6, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30,
at 3823.
173. DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION, supra note 170, at 859.
174. Id. at 857. It appears that Summers and the other delegates were less concerned with this
constitutional question than with the underlying question of whether slaves would be accounted for in
representation. Summers was the only one to mention the Doctrine, and he made clear that, even if
he was wrong about it, he could not vote to “consecrate” an apportionment rule “for the benefit of
slave-holders, while every effort to secure the rights of the free white population in the State
Legislature, was so obstinately and successfully resisted.” Id. John Randolph was the primary
responder to Summers, and he dwelled on how rejecting Green’s proposal would create “a most violent
presumption—almost to the point of direction affirmation—that the [Three-Fifths Clause] of the
Constitution of the United States, Virginia stands ready to give up.” Id. at 858.
175. Id. at 847.
176. Id.; VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 4, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3823.
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Madison thought that some provision needed to be made for the latter
because otherwise the people would inevitably “resort to another
[constitutional] convention,” for which “there seemed to be a universal wish
to guard [against].”177 Madison proposed that a supermajority of the
legislature (“two-thirds of each House concurring”) be given the power to
reapportion every ten years “throughout the commonwealth.”178
Madison’s proposal was adopted by the convention,179 but only after
surviving several attempts at amendment, including one that sought to strike
the supermajority requirement on the ground that “a majority ought to
govern.”180 In opposing that motion, Madison explained that “its effect
would be to give the State a legislative Constitution, instead of a
constitutional Legislature.”181 Madison thought that, with the two-thirds
requirement baked into the constitution, “the Legislature might be safely
entrusted with the task of apportionment.”182
2. The Public’s Original Understanding—Substantive Constitutional
Limitations on “Legislatures” from 1789 to 1804
The Framers’ expectation that “legislatures” would be subject to
substantive constitutional regulation was not idiosyncratic or unique to their
generation. The historical record shows that this was also the original
understanding of the broader American populace that imposed state
constitutional limitations on “legislatures” in the years following the drafting
and adoption of the Constitution.
As explained in the previous section, Delaware’s constitution of 1792
regulated its “legislature” with respect to the Elections Clause. This reflects
not only the original intent of the two Framers who were present at the state
constitutional convention—John Dickinson and Richard Basset—but also
the original understanding of the rest of the convention’s members.183
Prior to the Delaware convention, another express constitutional
regulation of a “legislature” had been briefly considered at the Pennsylvania
convention which produced that state’s constitution of 1790. On
February 1, 1790, Albert Gallatin proposed that Pennsylvania be “divided
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION, supra note 170, at 847.
Id.
VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 5, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3823.
DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION, supra note 170, at 849.
Id.
Id.
See Mumford, supra note 133, at 113–18 (describing the delegates to the convention).
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into districts for the purpose of electing members of the house of
representatives of the United States,” with the representatives “apportioned
between the said districts in proportion to the number of taxable inhabitants
contained in each.”184 There was no debate, and Gallatin withdrew his
motion the following day without explaining why.185
Moreover, the explicit regulation contained in Delaware’s constitution of
1792 and proposed for Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1790 are not the only
evidence confirming the Founding generation’s understanding that state
constitutions could regulate “legislatures” with respect to federal elections.
Several state constitutions adopted from 1789 to 1803 contained provisions
that, although they did not explicitly refer to federal elections, were
understood to apply to all elections held in the state, including federal
elections. The existence of these non-explicit substantive limitations
further contravenes the Substance/Procedure Thesis of the original
understanding.186
Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1790 provided that “[a]ll elections shall be
by ballot, except those by persons in their representative capacities, who
shall vote viva voce.”187 On its face, a provision relating to “all elections”
would seem to apply to federal elections as well as state and local elections,
and, indeed, this was the understanding. William Findley was a delegate to
the Pennsylvania constitutional convention in 1789–90 and a member of the
nine-member committee which reported the first draft of the constitution,
which included the “All elections shall be by ballot” provision.188 Findley

184. THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790,
THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FORMED THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
1776 AND 1790, AND A VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1776, AND THE
COUNCIL OF CENSORS 373 (Harrisburg, John S. Wiestling 1825) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF
PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION OF 1790].
185. Id. at 374.
186. In my 2001 article, I identified only some of the state constitutional provisions dating from
the years following ratification that, like the revolutionary state constitutions that preceded them,
purported to explicitly regulate the functioning of state legislatures. Smith, supra note 1, at 757–58.
I identified the provision from the Delaware constitution (regulating Congressional elections),
provisions in the Georgia and Kentucky constitutions (regulating elections by the state legislatures
themselves, which would have included elections of presidential electors and senators), and the 1810
amendment to the Maryland constitution (regulating both Congressional and presidential elections).
Id. at 758.
187. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 2, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3096.
188. PROCEEDINGS OF PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION OF 1790, supra note 184, at 154, 158.
Another member of the drafting committee was James Wilson. Id. at 154. As noted previously, Wilson
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later served in House of Representatives (from 1791–1799 and again from
1803–1817)189 and was the chairman of the Committee on Elections in
1804 when that committee made a report to the House in the contested
election case of John Hoge of Pennsylvania.190 In defending the
committee’s report in the Hoge matter to the full House, Findley, who
rightfully claimed a special “acquaint[ance]” with the “laws and practice
respecting elections” in Pennsylvania,191 made clear that the state
constitution’s “all elections shall be by ballot” provision was intended to
apply to congressional elections.192
Hoge had been elected to the House in a special election called by the
Governor of Pennsylvania, pursuant to Article I, Section 2, to fill a vacancy
caused by resignation.193 Hoge’s election (which occurred simultaneously
with the presidential election) was challenged on the ground that the
Governor had provided insufficient notice of the election and precipitated
an election that lacked sufficient legal authority.194 The committee found
that there had been sufficient notice,195 and during the floor debate, Findley
explained why there was sufficient legal authority for every part of the
special election that had occurred: the United States Constitution gave the
Governor the authority to schedule the special election by issuing the writ,
“the laws of Pennsylvania” provided for “election officers” who were to act
“at all elections . . . for national purposes throughout the year,” and “[t]he
constitution of Pennsylvania prescribe[d] the manner that citizens shall vote,
by ballot.”196
Substantially similar clauses requiring that “all elections shall be by ballot”
appeared in the constitutions of Georgia (1789), Kentucky (1792),
Tennessee (1796), and Ohio (1803).197 In addition to the broadly worded
had been part of the Committee of Detail which framed the Elections Clause at the Federal Convention
in 1787.
189. Findley, William 1741–1821, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG.,
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/F000124 [https://perma.cc/N6Y9-9CKX].
190. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 841 (1804).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 842.
193. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”).
194. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 839.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 849–50. Ultimately, the House voted in favor of Hoge, and he retained his seat. Id.
at 857–58.
197. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 789; KY.
CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 2, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1269; TENN. CONST. of
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language (“all elections”), there are three other good reasons to think that
the drafters of these constitutions, like John Findley in Pennsylvania, made
a considered choice—and meant what they said—when they specified
“by ballot” as the method of voting for “all elections.”
First, the choice between elections “by ballot” or “viva voce” was an
important issue at the time. When James Madison identified what the
Elections Clause meant by “manner” legislation, the first item on his list was
“[w]hether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce.”198 The choice
could mean the difference between secret ballot elections in New England,
where “elections were pretty tame affairs,” and viva voce elections in the
South, often characterized by a raucous, sometimes violent atmosphere,199
in which the “voters, one by one, had to swear that they were qualified and
then publicly declare the names of those they were voting for.”200 Election
by ballot was more susceptible to fraud,201 while viva voce voting, though
transparent, had its own obvious issues, “especially where less wealthy men
had to announce their vote in the presence of those to whom they were
beholden—landlords, employers (possibly of family members), local
officials with real authority.”202
Second, the choice between ballot and viva voce voting was an actively
contested issue. Only a few years after providing that “all elections” would
be “by ballot,” both the Georgia constitution (1798) and the Kentucky
constitution (1799) switched to provide that “all elections” would be “viva
voce.”203 In Kentucky, the change was spearheaded by John Breckinridge,
1796, art. III, § 3, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3418; OHIO CONST. of 1803, art. IV,
§ 2, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2907.
198. Madison’s Notes (Aug. 9, 1787), in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 163, at 230, 240.
199. MORGAN, supra note 101, at 183; see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 204 (1996) (“And how, literally, were citizens
to give their votes: by voicing their preference to the sheriff, who would then record their vote in a
poll book, or by secret ballot; at a raucous public fete, with people gathered from miles around for the
closest approximation to carnival a Protestant society could produce, or in widely separated polling
places, with a decorum more suited to republican manners?”).
200. Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy, 1787–1828, 33 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 219, 234 (2013).
201. JOAN WELLS COWARD, KENTUCKY IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 143 (1979).
202. Ratcliffe, supra note 200, at 234.
203. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 800
(“In all elections by the people the electors shall vote viva voce until the legislature shall otherwise
direct.”); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. VI, § 16, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1287
(“In all elections by the people, and also by the senate and house of representatives, jointly or separately,
the votes shall be personally and publicly given viva voce.”).
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future U.S. Attorney General under President Jefferson, who believed that
“viva voce voting provided the only way for the poor man to exert his
influence: only by voting aloud and seeing his name recorded could the
citizen be sure his vote was correctly recorded.”204 In Vermont’s 1786
constitution, all elections had been “by ballot,” but now, in 1793, this was
removed, such that the method of voting was no longer constitutionally
mandated.205
Finally, this generation of constitution-makers was perfectly capable of
using language that would limit such provisions to state elections. The
“by ballot” clause in the Delaware constitution of 1792 did not itself apply
to “all elections”; rather, it was limited to “elections of governor, senators,
and representatives.”206 The ballot requirement was made applicable to
congressional elections only by the separate provision (Article VIII,
Section 2) requiring that congressional elections be held in the same manner
as elections for state representatives.207
In addition to ballot/viva voce provisions, another set of “all elections”
provisions that appeared in constitutions dating from this time period was
the “all elections shall be free and equal” provision. Provisions such as this
were included in the constitutions of Kentucky (1792 and 1799), Delaware
(1792), New Hampshire (1792), Vermont (1793), and Tennessee (1796).208
Similarly, several of these constitutions also provided that electors would,
“in all cases,” be “privileged from arrest” during elections, at least so long
as they were innocent of treason, felony, or breach of the peace.209

204. COWARD, supra note 201, at 143.
205. Compare VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § XXXI, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37,
at 3759 (“All elections . . . shall be by ballot, free and voluntary.”), with VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. 2, § 34,
reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3770 (“All elections . . . shall be free and voluntary.”).
206. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 574.
207. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 578.
208. KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 5, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1274;
KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 5, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1289; DEL. CONST. of
1792, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 568; N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. XI,
reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2472; VT. CONST. of 1793, art. VIII, ch. 1, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3763; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. 2, § 34, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3770; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 5, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3422.
209. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 3, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3096; KY.
CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 3, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1269; DEL. CONST. of
1792, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 574; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. III,
§ 2, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3418.
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At least one other state constitution from this period contained a
provision that was thought to regulate the state’s “legislature” even though
it did not even purport to apply to “all elections” or similar. In 1791, James
Jackson contested Anthony Wayne’s election (by a margin of twenty-one
votes) as one of Georgia’s representatives to Congress. In arguing his case
to the House of Representatives, Jackson invoked the Georgia constitution
of 1789. Jackson complained that although voters were to meet on election
day “in the respective counties [of their residences], agreeably to the
constitution,”210 in fact, three “residents of Chatham [actually] voted in
Effingham.”211 He argued that this was contrary to “the [first]section,
[fourth] article of the constitution of Georgia,”212 which required that
electors “have resided six months within the county.”213 In response,
Wayne’s counsel argued that these voters must have “had a right to vote at
some place,” and that there was no “fraud in a citizen who happens to be
absent from his own county” voting at “any other part of the same
district.”214 The House voted unanimously to unseat Wayne,215 but split
on the question of whether to seat Jackson, with the result that the seat
remained vacant.216 The argument over whether the state constitution
prescribed the place of voting was one of many arguments made in the case,
and it is impossible to know how the argument was received by House
members; however, the point is that both contestants assumed that the state
constitution was applicable, and there is no record of any member of the
House saying otherwise.
As explained later in this Article, similar non-explicit substantive
limitations continued to appear in state constitutions during the nineteenth
210. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 460 (1792).
211. Id. at 461.
212. Id. at 463.
213. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 1, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 789.
The Ohio constitution of 1803 similarly provided that a qualified voter could only vote “in the county
or district in which he shall actually reside at the time of the election.” OH. CONST. of 1803, art. IV,
§ 1, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2907.
214. PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA RESPECTING THE CONTESTED ELECTION FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
35–36 (Phila., Parry Hall 1792).
215. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 472 (1792).
216. Id. at 479. Professor Foley attributes the House’s unanimous removal of Wayne to “clear
evidence of enough wrongdoing to affect the election’s outcome,” and goes on to describe the
subsequent debate over whether the House had the authority to seat Jackson even though he had not
been certified under state law as the winner. EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY
OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 40–43 (2016) [hereinafter BALLOT BATTLES].
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century. Moreover, it is noteworthy that when disputes over the
independent state legislature doctrine arose in the nineteenth century, they
invariably concerned state constitutional provisions which, like those
described in this section, applied to “all elections” or similar, but did not
explicitly reference federal elections.
The Substance/Procedure Thesis, ignorant and/or dismissive of the
history set forth here, posits that there should have been more substantive
regulation of “legislatures” in state constitutions of the 1790s and speculates
that the perceived dearth of such regulation occurred because the Founding
generation eschewed such regulation to remain “[c]onsistent with” the
independent state legislature doctrine.217 The reality is that several of the
original states simply had no constitutional activity during the decade after
ratification. Virginia’s constitution of 1776 remained unchanged until 1830,
New Jersey’s constitution of 1776 remained unchanged until 1844, New
York’s constitution of 1777 was first amended in 1801, and North Carolina’s
constitution of 1776 was first amended in 1835. Connecticut did not have
a constitution until 1818, and Rhode Island did not have one until 1843. Of
the states that held constitutional conventions in the decade after
ratification—Georgia (1789 and 1798), South Carolina (1790), Pennsylvania
(1790), Delaware (1792), New Hampshire (1792), Kentucky (1792 and
1799), Vermont (1793), and Tennessee (1796)—all but South Carolina
adopted constitutional provisions that regulated federal elections, either
explicitly (Delaware) or by virtue of “all elections” provisions (the rest).
Moreover, there could be any number of other, more mundane reasons
why any particular eighteenth-century constitution was not amended to
place more “time, place, and manner” restrictions on federal elections.
Perhaps no one thought of such provisions. Or perhaps they thought of
them, but did not like them, either because of their substance or because
they thought they should be implemented through ordinary legislation. Or
perhaps they thought of them, and liked them, but realized that there was
no political will to constitutionalize them.
For some questions, constitutionalization could have faced significant
headwinds from constantly shifting political strategy in the states. For the
first two presidential elections of 1789 and 1792, the manner of appointing
217. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 38. Notably, the state constitutions of the time did not always provide clear mechanisms
for amendment. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 73–75 (1998)
(discussing the avenues for constitutional change available under early state constitutions).
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presidential electors was “irrelevant and inconsequential because the
election and re-election of George Washington were foreordained.”218
However, as Alexander Keyssar has explained, increasingly after those first
elections, “states took advantage of the flexible [federal] constitutional
architecture to switch procedures from one election to the next” and this
“reflected more than an impulse to experiment with a new institution:
Similar strategic
electoral strategizing was clearly at work.”219
considerations were at work in this period when states decided whether to
elect their congressional delegations at-large or by districts.220
3.

The Ahistorical Structural Rationales Offered for the Doctrine

The Substance/Procedure Thesis also incorrectly supposes that the
Framers assigned the function of prescribing federal election law to
“legislatures”—with the understanding that those “legislatures” would
perform that function without normal restraints—because they believed
that it would promote some value important to the success of the
constitutional design. Three variations on this argument are based, in turn,
on some alleged attribute of (a) state legislatures; (b) “time, place, and
manner” legislation; or (c) state courts. There appears to be no originalist
basis for such a purpose-based or structural defense of the Doctrine.
The first variation on the structural argument arises from
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s comment in Bush v. Gore 221 that the Doctrine is
grounded in a “respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state
legislatures.”222 Although more than twenty years have passed since then,
218. Rakove, Presidential Selection: Electoral Fallacies, supra note 45; see EDWARD B. FOLEY,
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MAJORITY RULE: THE RISE, DEMISE, AND POTENTIAL
RESTORATION OF THE JEFFERSONIAN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 16–17 (2020) (explaining that the
states prepared for first election in the context that it was “foreordained that George Washington
would win”); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, WHY DO WE STILL HAVE THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?
27 (2020) (“Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, in the fall of 1787 and the spring of 1788, may have
been less focused on ‘the mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate’ because they all knew that—
however the electoral system actually worked—George Washington would be their first president.”).
219. KEYSSAR, supra note 218, at 32–34 (explaining that “a party with majority support in a state
or its legislature would gain an advantage if it utilized the general ticket or had the legislature itself
choose electors” but “a minority party had instrumental reasons for preferring district elections”).
220. David W. Houpt, Contested Election Laws: Representation, Elections, and Party Building in
Pennsylvania, 1788–1794, 79 PA. HIST.: J. MID-ATL. STUD. 257, 258 (2012) (“[A] review of the debates
surrounding the framing of elections laws [in Pennsylvania in the 1780s and 1790s] reveals that political
strategy played a decisive role in the decision to select a particular mode of electing representatives.”).
221. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
222. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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proponents of the Doctrine have yet to articulate—let alone prove with
evidence from the historical record—any reason why the Framers would
have wanted to give state legislatures the ability to legislate without restraint
with respect to the manner of selecting the President and congressmen.223
Whereas state legislatures’ exclusive power to “chuse” senators was thought
to facilitate “select appointment” of senators, and to protect state
interests,224 no such special competence of unrestrained legislatures for
regulating federal elections has been identified. Put bluntly, any argument
that unrestrained state legislatures had some special role to play is doomed
once the Elector Appointment Clause and the Elections Clause are
conflated. The latter provides that Congress is free to displace the work of
the state legislatures,225 so how special could the role of those state
legislatures have been? At the Constitutional Convention, an effort was
made to strip Congress of the power to preempt the state legislatures, but,
as is well known, it was defeated after James Madison explained that it was
“impossible to foresee all the abuses” that state legislatures might inflict
were they given “the uncontrouled right of regulating the times places &
manner of holding elections.”226
The absence of any particular respect for the constitutional role of
“legislatures” is demonstrated not only by the way that Americans imposed
substantive constitutional restraints on them, but also by the way that the
“legislatures” themselves willingly delegated away their own authority as
“legislatures” during the early years of the Republic. Mark S. Krass has
surveyed election laws passed between 1787 and 1829 in the thirteen original
colonies and found that “state legislatures aggressively delegated authority
to determine the times, places and manner of federal elections to local
government officials.”227 For example, legislatures “allowed local election
officials to pick where the polls would be located, open and close them at

223. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 34 n.1 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (answering “why” by stating that “the text of the Constitution requires [it]”).
224. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison).
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“[B]ut the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”).
226. Madison’s Notes (Aug. 9, 1787), supra note 198, at 240; see 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 265–66 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (recording James Wilson
explaining to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that Congress would use the power “to correct the
improper regulations of a particular state”).
227. Mark S. Krass, Debunking the Non-Delegation Doctrine for State Regulation of Federal Elections,
108 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 16) (summarizing evidence and conclusions).
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will, and make critical decisions about how voting would unfold.”228 It is
hard to believe this would have occurred had the Founding generation
believed that “legislatures” deserved special “respect” because of the role
they were playing.
In lieu of identifying any reason why the Framers would have had any
special “respect” for “legislatures,” a second variation of the structural
argument says that “time, place, and manner” law is a special kind of
legislation, addressing particularly thorny issues, for which legislatures need
to remain free from normal constraints. For example, when advocating for
the freedom of state legislatures in the Covid election context,
Justice Kavanaugh emphasized the need for legislatures to “[a]ssess[] the
complicated tradeoffs involved in changing or retaining election deadlines,
or other election rules.”229 In the same case, Justice Gorsuch argued that,
for election law, state legislative choices must remain from interference
because “[l]egislators can be held accountable,” “[l]egislatures . . . bring to
bear the collective wisdom of the whole people,” and “[l]egislatures
enjoy . . . resources for research and factfinding on questions of science and
safety.”230 An academic version of this argument is that election law
presents “local needs and exigencies” that can only be met by legislatures
whose “flexibility” is not “shackle[d]” by state constitutions.231
The notion that election regulations should be free of the normal
constitutional restraints did not originate in the Founding era. Many
subjects understood to fall within the concept of “time, place, and manner”
were constitutionalized during this time period. This included not only the
constitutional limitations placed on federal elections after adoption of the
Constitution (described earlier), but also more extensive regulation of state
elections. As an example, consider elections for the lower houses of state
legislatures. State constitutions adopted between 1776 and 1800 often

228. Id.
229. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 32–33 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
230. Id. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
231. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 32.
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addressed the date of election for representatives,232 the duration of the
election,233 the method of voting,234 the places for voting,235 and
232. See S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3244
(“[L]ast Monday in October . . . and the day following . . . .”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. III, reprinted in
5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2595 (“[S]econd Tuesday in October . . . .”); DEL. CONST. of
1776, art. 27, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 567 (“1st day of October . . . .”); PA.
CONST. of 1776, § 9, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3084 (“[S]econd Tuesday in
October . . . .”); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1691
(“[T]he first Monday of October . . . .”); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. II, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 35, at 778 (“[F]irst Tuesday in December . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § VIII, reprinted
in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3742 (“[F]irst Tuesday of September . . . .”); S.C. CONST. of
1778, art. XIII, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3251 (“[L]ast Monday in November . . .
and the day following . . . .”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, § III, art. V, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 34, at 1899 (“[I]n the month of May, ten days at least before the last Wednesday of that
month.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, Part II.—The Form of Government, House of Representatives,
reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2461 (setting elections annually “in the month of
March”); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § VIII, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3755
(“[F]irst Tuesday of September . . . .”); GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 6, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 35, at 786 (“[F]irst Monday in October, until such day of election be altered by law . . . .”);
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 10, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3260 (“[S]econd
Monday in October . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31,
at 3092 (“[S]econd Tuesday of October.”); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 2, reprinted in
1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 570 (“[F]irst Tuesday of October.”); N.H. CONST. of 1792, § XII,
reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2477 (“[I]n the month of March . . . .”); KY. CONST.
of 1792, art. I, § 4, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1265 (“[F]irst Tuesday in May . . . .”);
VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 8, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3765 (“[F]irst Tuesday
of September . . . .”); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, § 5, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37,
at 3415 (“[F]irst Thursday in August . . . .”); GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 7, reprinted in
2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 792 (“[F]irst Monday in November, until such day of election be
altered by law.”); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1278
(“[F]irst Monday in the month of August . . . .”).
233. See S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3244
(“[L]ast Monday in October . . . and the day following . . . .”); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. III, reprinted in
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1691 (“[W]hole election shall be concluded in four days . . . .”);
S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XIII, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3251 (“[L[ast Monday
in November . . . and the day following . . . .”); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 4, reprinted in
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1265 (“[E]lections may be continued for three days, if, in the
opinion of the presiding officer or officers, it shall be necessary, and no longer.”); TENN. CONST. of
1796, art. I, § 5, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3415 (“[F]irst Thursday in August and
terminating the succeeding day.”); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 34, at 1278 (“[P]residing officers of the several elections shall continue the same for three days, at
the request of any one of the candidates.”).
234. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 27, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 567
(“[B]y ballot . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 9, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3084
(“[B]y ballot . . . .”); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1691
(“[V]iva voce . . . .”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. III, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31,
at 2790 (“[B]y ballot . . . .”); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 35, at 780 (“[B]y ballot, and shall be taken by two or more justices of the peace in each county,
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apportionment of representation in the lower house among the state’s
counties, cities, or election districts.236
who shall provide a convenient box for receiving the said ballots: and, on closing the poll, the ballot
shall be compared in public with the list of votes that have been taken, and the majority immediately
declared . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VI, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2630
(providing for a “fair experiment” as between voting “by ballot” and “viva voce”); VT. CONST. of
1777, ch. II, §§ VIII, XXIX, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3742, 3746 (“[B]y ballot”
and “[B]y ballot, free and voluntary”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, § III, art. III, reprinted in
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1898 (“[C]hosen by written votes . . . .”); N.H. CONST. of 1784,
Part II.—The Form of Government, House of Representatives, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 152, at 2461 (“[C]hosen by ballot . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, §§ VIII, XXXI, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3755, 3759 (“[C]hosen by ballot” and “[B]y ballot, free and
voluntary”); GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 789
(“[B]y ballot . . . .”); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37,
at 3258 (“[B]y ballot . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. III, § 2, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 31, at 3096 (“[B]y ballot . . . .”); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 29, at 574 (“[B]y ballot.”); N.H. CONST. of 1792, § XIV, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 152, at 2477 (“[B]y ballot . . . .”); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 2, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 34, at 1269 (“[B]y ballot . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 8, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3765 (“[B]y ballot . . . .”); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. III, § 3,
reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3418 (“[B]y ballot.”); GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 2,
reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 800 (“[V]iva voce until the legislature shall otherwise
direct.”); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. VI, § 16, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1287
(“[V]iva voce.”).
235. See S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3245
(“churches or church wardens” or, if none, places appointed by the general assembly); MD. CONST. of
1776, art. II, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1691 (“at the court-house” in the county
“in which they offer to vote” or “at such other place as the Legislature shall direct”); N.H. CONST. of
1784, Part II.—The Form of Government, House of Representatives, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 152, at 2461 (“[W]ithin the town, district, parish, or place where they dwell . . . .”); GA.
CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 1, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 789 (“[W]ithin the
county . . . .”); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3258
(“[I]n the election district in which he offers to give his vote . . . .”); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1,
reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1269 (“[N]o person shall be entitled to vote except in
the county in which he shall actually reside at the time of the election.”); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. I,
§ 5, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1278 (“[A]t the places of holding their respective
courts, or in the several election precincts into which the legislature may think proper . . . .”).
236. See S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3245
(assigning between four and thirty representatives to each of several named parishes and districts); VA.
CONST. of 1776, The Constitution or Form of Government, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 30, at 3815–16 (assigning numbers of representatives to each county and certain districts, cities,
and boroughs); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. III, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2595
(assigning one representative per county and providing that legislature could adjust “on the principles
of more equal representation”); DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 3, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 29, at 562 (providing for seven representatives per county); PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 17–18,
reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3086 (requiring reapportionment every seven years
based on “complete lists of taxable inhabitants” in Philadelphia and the counties; and, providing that
counties could subdivide themselves into districts); MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in
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Constitutionalization was an affirmative choice to wrest control of these
issues from the state legislatures. For example, in South Carolina, the
constitution of 1778 provided that the 1776 apportionment of
representation—which had been set by the existing legislature on an
arbitrary geographic basis—would in seven years, and then every fourteen
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1691 (apportioning four delegates per county); N.C. CONST. of
1776, The Constitution, or Form of Government, &c, art. III, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 31, at 2790 (assigning two representatives per county and one each for several towns); GA.
CONST. of 1777, art. IV, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 778–79 (assigning ten
representatives per county except fourteen for Liberty county and one each for Glynn and Camden
counties); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. IV–V, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2629–30
(assigning between two and ten representatives to counties by name and providing for reapportionment
after every seven years if not “justly proportioned to the number of electors in the said counties
respectively”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XVI, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3744
(assigning two representatives to each town of “eighty taxable inhabitants” and one to “each other
inhabited town in this State”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, arts. XIII, XV, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 37, at 3251–52 (assigning between three and thirty representatives to each of several named
parishes and districts, but providing for reapportionment); MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. I, § III, art. II,
reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1898 (assigning one representative to “every corporate
town” that had “one hundred and fifty ratable polls” and another representative for each additional
two hundred and twenty-five); N.H. CONST. of 1784, Part II.—The Form of Government, House of
Representatives, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2461 (assigning one representative to
“every town, parish or place intitled to town privileges” that had “one hundred and fifty rateable male
polls” and another representative for each additional three hundred); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II,
§ VIII, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3755 (assigning two representatives to “each
town” of “eighty taxable inhabitants” and one to “each other inhabited town”); GA. CONST. of 1789,
art. I, § 6, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 786 (assigning between two and five
representatives to each of several named counties); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 3, reprinted in
6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3258 (assigning between one and fifteen representatives to each
of several named counties); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31,
at 3093 (requiring apportionment “according to the number of taxable inhabitants” as determined
every seven years); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 2, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29,
at 570 (assigning seven representatives per count until two-thirds of each branch concurs in increasing
number); N.H. CONST. of 1792, § IX, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2476–77
(similar to provision in state’s constitution of 1784); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 6, reprinted in
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1265 (providing for reapportionment every four years among the
counties “according to the number of free male inhabitants”); VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 7, reprinted
in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3765 (showing similarities to Vermont’s 1786 constitution);
TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, § 2, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3415 (requiring
reapportionment among the several counties “according to the number of taxable inhabitants in each”
every seven years); GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 7, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35,
at 791–92 (requiring apportionment every seven years by county “according to their respective
numbers of free white persons, including three-fifths of all the people of color” but “each county shall
have at least one but not more than four members”); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. I, § 6, reprinted in
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1278 (providing that representation “shall be forever regulated
and ascertained by the number of qualified electors” within counties and towns, with apportionment
every four years).
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years thereafter, be reformed and done “in the most equal and just manner,”
according to “the particular and comparative strength and taxable property
of the different parts of the [State], regard being always had to the number
of white inhabitants and such taxable property.”237 However, as historian
Rosemarie Zagarri explains, after the seven years passed, “the legislature
[in 1785] simply ignored the constitution” and “left the previous system
intact.”238 At the state’s 1790 constitutional convention, the cause of
reform backslid because “apportionment for the convention had been done
by the same inequitable process as for the assembly.”239 Subsequently,
disproportionality continued to grow, but “the legislature once again did
nothing.”240 Finally, in 1808, a constitutional amendment again called for
periodic reapportionment on the basis of population and taxes, predicated
on a decennial census.241 The amendment included another provision
designed “[t]o avoid a repetition of the legislature’s previous failure to abide
by the constitution”—the constitution now directed the governor to conduct
the required enumeration if the legislature failed to do it.242
The third and final variant of the structural argument focuses not on the
alleged virtues of unrestrained legislatures, or the uniqueness of election law,
but on the alleged vices of state courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to
avoid this theme in 2000, when he denied that the Doctrine was based on
any “disrespect for state courts,”243 but in 2020 the state court reaction to
COVID-19 brought it to the fore. Justice Gorsuch wrote in the Wisconsin
case that “[n]othing in our founding document contemplates the kind of
judicial intervention that took place here.”244 Similarly, Justice Kavanaugh
wrote that “state courts do not have a blank check to rewrite state election
laws for federal elections.”245 And in the Pennsylvania case, Justice Alito
237. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XV, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3252.
238. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1776–1850, at 48 (1987).
239. Id. at 50; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 3, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37,
at 3258 (omitting provision of 1778 constitution which had required reapportionment after seven
years).
240. ZAGARRI, supra note 238, at 52.
241. S.C. CONST. of 1790, amendment ratified Dec. 17, 1808, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 37, at 3265–66.
242. ZAGARRI, supra note 238, at 53 (citing S.C. CONST. of 1790, amendment ratified Dec. 17,
1808, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3266).
243. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
244. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legis., 141 S. Ct. 28, 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
245. Id. at 34 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/4

56

Smith: Revisiting History of the Independent State Legislature Doctrine

2022]

HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

501

complained that the state court had invoked the state constitution “to make
whatever rules it thought appropriate for the conduct of a fair election.”246
In their view, the Elector Appointment Clause and the Elections Clause
were intended to serve as structural checks on the problem of overreaching
state courts—for them, it is obvious that the use of the word “legislature”
in these clauses “requires federal courts to ensure that state courts do not
rewrite state election laws.”247 Otherwise, the references to “legislature” in
the Constitution would be rendered “meaningless.”248 An academic
version of the argument is that “the Framers’ allocation of power over
federal elections” to “legislatures” would be undermined if state
constitutions could limit “legislatures” because then “courts—particularly
state courts—would have a larger role in overseeing such elections.”249
Here again, proponents of the Doctrine have failed to identify anything
in the historical record suggesting that the Founding generation would have
understood these clauses to mean that federal courts were to cabin state
court interpretation of election law. Of course, the necessary inquiry would
be anachronistic. At the time of the Founding, the court litigation that we
246. Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2020) (Statement of
Justice Alito).
247. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 35 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
248. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. at 2.
249. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 34–35. An emerging twist on the anti-court variation of the Doctrine is to restate it as a
neutral separation-of-powers principle that neither favors “legislatures,” disfavors courts, nor discounts
the applicability of constitutional limitations on “legislatures,” but rather purports to draw a line
between appropriate and inappropriate levels of judicial review. In Justice Alito’s March 2022 dissent
from the Supreme Court’s denial of interim relief in the North Carolina redistricting case, he objected
that the lower court had “discern[ed] in the State Constitution a judicially enforceable prohibition of
partisan gerrymandering” in a manner that had “the hallmarks of legislation.” Moore v. Harper,
142 S. Ct. 1089, 1091 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting). Assuming this is a workable principle, and is not
simply one court disagreeing with another court, it is unclear whether the principle would draw its
content from the federal conception of judicial review or the state conception, and, in either case, what
vintage conception would apply. Moreover, it is also unclear why the principle would not also apply
to judicial review of “manner” legislation by federal courts. Picking up on Justice Alito’s dissent,
Professor Michael Ramsey has argued that perhaps the Constitution uses the word “legislature”
to impose on the states an eighteenth-century “classical separation of powers theory” with respect to
“manner” legislation, i.e., “to give power to the legislature and not to parts of the state government that
are not the legislature (most notably the state executive and the state judiciary).” See Michael Ramsey,
Vikram Amar on the Independent State Legislature Theory, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 17, 2022),
https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2022/03/vikram-amar-on-the-independe
nt-state-legislature-theorymichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/462U-JUVU] (arguing that “the
state’s distribution of power . . . is subject to the specific federal constraint that the power must be
exercised (as the Constitution expressly says) by the legislature”).
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see today concerning election design, such as redistricting, was just not a
thing (including because judicial review was only in its infancy), and disputes
over ballot-casting rules were apparently handled on the fly by sheriffs,
election judges, and other local officials to whom such matters had been
assigned by the legislature.250 Moreover, as to ballot-counting disputes, the
reality is that the Framers would likely have been surprised to see any
courts—state or federal—much involved. For congressional elections, the
Framers could not have been more clear that the “the Judge of the Elections
[and] Returns” would be the House and Senate themselves, not any federal
or state court.251 For presidential elections, the Framers could not have
been less clear. The Constitution did not even mandate how to appoint
presidential electors, let alone make provision for resolving disputes over
elections for elector, the appointment of electors, or the counting of
electoral votes.252 More broadly, as Professor Foley has demonstrated,
“[t]here was no paradise at the time of the Founding in terms of handling
ballot-counting disputes in important elections” as “the Founders
themselves were struggling in a condition of confusion on this topic.”253
250. See generally Krass, supra note 227 (evidencing such assignments).
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see C.H. Rammelkamp, Contested Congressional Elections, 20 POL.
SCI. Q. 421, 422–23 (1905) (explaining that this power was lodged with the House and the Senate
because “[t]o have allowed the courts, whose officers were directly or indirectly appointed by the
crown, to decide contested elections in the colonial assemblies would have invited executive
interference”).
252. See FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES, supra note 216, at 7 (noting “the hole in America’s . . .
Constitution concerning the institution for resolving a disputed presidential election”).
253. Id. at 47; id. at 25 (“[T]hey had no shared understanding of what method of resolving ballotcounting controversies was more faithful to [their] fundamental commitment to republicanism.”).
Although the Framers could not have foreseen the degree to which courts are now involved in election
law (whether that of election design, ballot-casting, or ballot-counting), it by no means follows that the
anti-court variation of the Doctrine constituted the original understanding of the word “legislature.”
Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (noting the role that federal and state court
judicial review plays in redistricting litigation even though there was not “[any] suggestion [by the
Framers] that the federal courts had a role to play” or “had ever heard of courts doing such a thing”).
Moreover, speculation that “legislature” was originally understood to require states to uniformly and
forever abide by a particular eighteenth-century “classical separation of powers theory,” see supra
note 249, is similarly unfounded. At the time of the Founding, it was understood that the states had
varying separation-of-powers arrangements, and that they would remain unaffected by adoption of the
Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (clarifying that he did not wish “to be
regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments” after
surveying the variety of state constitutions in which, in different ways, “the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct”). And it was also understood that,
after the Founding, states would be able to change their internal structures in ways that diverged from
each other and the new federal model. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining
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III. REVISITING THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY HISTORY
OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Existing Scholarship Concerning the Doctrine’s History
When reviewing the nineteenth-century history of the independent state
legislature doctrine and related scholarship, it is important to distinguish
between the historical version of the Doctrine and today’s version of the
Doctrine. Under the historical version, state courts and Congress
considered declining to observe state constitutional requirements.
By contrast, in today’s version of the Doctrine, federal courts, in the name
of protecting state “legislatures,” are considering whether to assume the role
of overseeing state court interpretation of state law, effectively federalizing
state law pertaining to federal elections.
For the modern version of the Doctrine, there is no history to review.
The first time that any federal or state court suggested that the Elector
Appointment Clause or the Elections Clause alters the normal relationship
between state legislatures, state courts, and federal courts was

why the Constitution’s requirement that the United States guarantee each state a “Republican Form of
Government” would be “no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by a majority of the
people in a legal and peaceable mode”); see also TARR, supra note 217, at 88–90 (concluding that the
federal example had a limited impact on the structure of state governments in the decade after the
Founding). In fact, since the Founding, there have been significant changes in state separation-ofpowers arrangements. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtue”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1885 (2001) (“Separation of powers is thus not a stable concept,
even within a single state.”). In particular, the power of today’s state courts to engage in judicial review
of state legislation is very different than what it was under the state constitutions existing at the
Founding. See TARR, supra, at 72 (“The notion that judges could invalidate all governmental actions
inconsistent with their interpretation of the constitution was simply unknown in the 1770s and early
1780s and would have been considered far beyond the scope of legitimate judicial power.”); see also
GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 445 (2009) (“[I]t was clear by the 1780s that legislatures in
America were bound by explicitly written constitutions in ways that the English Parliament was not.
But it was not yet clear that the courts by themselves were able to enforce those boundaries upon the
legislatures.”). The Constitution is at least agnostic as to whatever changes have occurred and arguably
prohibits the United States, including federal courts, from interfering with them. See Amar & Amar,
supra note 63, at 28–29 (arguing that the Constitution “requires the federal government to respect and
protect—not disregard and override—these state choices about how to create, divide, limit, and
implement lawmaking powers”) (citing Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988)); see also Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549,
552 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[The Constitution] does not require a state to allocate powers among the branches
of state government in the same manner in which the Constitution prescribes that allocation among
the branches of the federal government.”) (citing Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902)).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Bush.254 This was also the first
time anyone suggested that it was the job of federal courts to police the
relationship between “legislatures” and state courts.
On the other hand, the anti-constitution version of the doctrine—under
which state courts and Congress have considered not enforcing state
constitutions—does have a history in Congress and state courts.255 In my
2001 article, I found that the Doctrine gained traction during the Civil War,
when it emerged in a contested House election case (Baldwin) as a pretext
for Republicans in Congress to disregard state constitutional provisions that
would have deprived Union soldiers in the field of their votes because they
had been outside of the state when they voted.256 The doctrine was rejected
in the early twentieth century by the U.S. Supreme Court and other
courts,257 but then re-emerged briefly during World War II when the
Kentucky Supreme Court used it in the same way it had been used in the
Civil War, to preserve the votes of soldiers “absent in the defense of the
nation.”258
Since 2001, other researchers have identified several additional instances
from the second half of the nineteenth century in which political actors and
courts invoked the historical, anti-constitution version of the doctrine.259
In addition, Professor Muller identified an episode which occurred at the
Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1820 in which Supreme Court
Justice Story argued that a proposed constitutional provision requiring
election of federal representatives and presidential electors by district would
violate the Constitution by improperly cabining the “legislature” of the
state.260 It is from these historical data points that the Prevailing View
Thesis of the Doctrine’s history has been spun.

254. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that any
“significant departure” by a state court “presents a federal constitutional question”).
255. Smith, supra note 1, at 764–83.
256. Id. at 764–75.
257. Id. at 779–80.
258. See id. at 781–83 (quoting from the World War II soldier-voting case, Commonwealth ex rel.
Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1944)).
259. See Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, supra note 22, at 198–204
(discussing nineteenth-century instances of the anti-constitution version being invoked); Michael T.
Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 131,
148–51 (2015) [hereinafter Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections Clause];
Muller, supra note 22, at 725–33; Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and
State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 27–32.
260. See Muller, supra note 22, at 734 n.89 (describing Justice Story’s argument).
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B. The Failure of the “Prevailing View” Thesis of the Doctrine’s History
No objective view of the evidence supports the thesis that the Doctrine
constituted the “prevailing understanding of [the Elector and Elections
Clauses] throughout the nineteenth century.”261 It was not the “prevailing
understanding” either before, during, or after the Civil War. The evidence
includes, but is not limited to, the explicit and non-explicit limitations on
“legislatures” that were widespread throughout the 1800s, which I have
identified and catalogued below after conducting a review of every state
constitution adopted and/or amended during that century.
1. Constitutional Limitations on “Legislatures” in the Antebellum
Period
Early nineteenth-century Americans continued to believe—as they had in
the late eighteenth century—that state constitutions could properly limit
legislatures acting pursuant to the Elector and Elections Clauses. This is
demonstrated by several sources of evidence.
Beginning with Maryland in 1810, several state constitutions contained
provisions that explicitly regulated the way states, through their
“legislatures,” appointed their presidential electors or elected their
congressional representatives.
•

In 1810, Maryland amended its constitution to give “every free
white male citizen” the right to vote in elections for presidential
electors, congressmen, and certain state offices. The amendment
further specified that voting in those elections would be “by ballot,”
not viva voce.262 Notably, unlike most of the original states,
Maryland never legislatively appointed its presidential electors, but
always selected them by popular election, both before and after this
amendment.263

261. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 93; id. at 38.
262. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV (1810), reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1705
(“[E]very free white male citizen of this state . . . shall have a right of suffrage, and shall vote, by ballot,
in the election . . . for electors of the President and Vice-President of the United States, for
[r]epresentatives of this [s]tate in the Congress of the United States [and specified state offices].”).
263. See KEYSSAR, supra note 218, at 32 (documenting the elector selection method across the
states).
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•

In 1830, Virginia adopted a new constitution which specified the
state’s congressional representation “shall be apportioned as nearly
as may be amongst the several counties, cities, boroughs, and
towns . . . according to their respective numbers,” and also that
those numbers shall include “three fifths of all other persons”
(i.e., slaves).264

•

In 1831, Delaware adopted a new constitution which again provided
(as had the state’s constitution of 1792) that the state’s congressmen
would be elected “at the same places . . . and in the same manner”
as representatives in the state legislature.265

•

Florida’s constitution of 1838 provided that “[r]eturns of elections
for members of Congress and the general assembly shall be made
to the secretary of state, in manner to be prescribed by law.”266

•

In 1842, Rhode Island adopted a constitution which provided that
voting for several specified offices, including “representative[s] to
Congress, shall be by ballot.”267

•

Iowa’s constitutions of 1846 and 1857 provided that congressional
districts consisting of more than two counties could not be “entirely
separated by any county belonging to another district” and that
“no county shall be divided” in forming a congressional district.268

264. VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 6, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3823.
265. DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. VII, § 2, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 595.
266. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. VI, § 16, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 675.
The exact same provision appeared in the state’s 1865 constitution. FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. VI, § 12,
reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 697.
267. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3230.
268. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 3, Legislative Department, § 32, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 35, at 1129 (“When a Congressional, Senatorial, or Representative district shall be composed
of two or more counties, it shall not be entirely separated by any county belonging to another district;
and no county shall be divided in forming a Congressional, Senatorial, or Representative district.”).
Iowa’s constitution of 1857 contained the same provision. IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. III, Legislative
Department, § 37, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 1144. Iowa’s constitutional
regulation of congressional districts went beyond what was required by the districting statute enacted
by Congress in 1842. See Reapportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (requiring states—for the
first time—to use districts of “contiguous territory equal in number to the number of Representatives
to which said State may be entitled, no one district electing more than one Representative”). Michael
Weingartner has noted that this provision of the Iowa constitution was the subject of a House
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•

California’s constitution of 1850 provided that congressional
districts consisting of two or more counties “shall not be separated
by any county belonging to another district; and no [county] shall
be divided in forming a congressional . . . district.”269

•

The Virginia constitution of 1850 included the same “three-fifths”
clause as its 1830 constitution as well as a requirement that the state
be divided into congressional districts that “shall be formed
respectively of contiguous counties, cities, and towns, be compact,
and include, as nearly as may be, an equal number of the population,
upon is based representation in the House of Representatives of the
United States.”270

•

Oregon’s constitution of 1857 provided that qualified electors could
vote in “any county of a congressional district in which such electors
may reside for members of Congress.”271

Second, starting with Mississippi’s constitution of 1817, it was common
for new states to enter the Union with constitutions that specified the time,
place, or manner of electing the state’s first congressional
representatives.272 The House blessed this practice in 1850 when some
members challenged the election of California’s first representatives.273
Representative Abraham Watkins Venable of North Carolina, invoking the
Elections Clause, argued at length that California’s election, called by its
constitution “before the existence of [its] first Legislature,” was “under no
regulation of any Legislature as to time, place or manner, and therefore
contested election in 1850, and no one then suggested that it was irrelevant by virtue of the independent
state legislature doctrine. See Michael Weingartner, Liquidating the Independent State Legislature Theory 58
(Sept. 25, 2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4044138 [https://perma.cc/
4SZ5-DDSL] (discussing the 1850 contested election case of Miller v. Thompson); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 31-400 (1850) (reproducing the majority and minority reports in Miller v. Thompson).
269. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 30, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 396.
270. VA. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, §§ 13–14, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30,
at 3839.
271. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 17, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3002.
272. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. VI, Schedule, § 7, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152,
at 2047. Such provisions also appeared in the first constitutions of Alabama (1819), Missouri (1820),
Michigan (1835), Florida (1838), Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), Minnesota (1857), Oregon (1857),
Kansas (1859), Nevada (1864), Nebraska (1867), Arkansas (1868), South Dakota (1889), Montana
(1889), Washington (1889), Wyoming (1889), and North Dakota (1889).
273. See Muller, supra note 22, at 729 (describing House proceedings relating to the challenge).
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utterly void.”274 In response, Representative John Larne Robinson of
Indiana pointed out the history of new states sending representatives who
“were admitted to seats on this floor, without any law having been
previously passed by the Legislature of such State designating the time,
place, and manner of holding elections.”275 The House voted to seat the
new California members by a vote of 109–59.276
Third, state constitutions in this period frequently contained “all
elections” provisions that, by their terms, would have applied to federal
elections (even though federal elections were not explicitly mentioned). For
example, a non-exhaustive list of constitutions adopted by new states during
this period that required “all elections” to be “by ballot” includes Ohio
(1803), Louisiana (1812), Alabama (1819), Michigan (1835), Texas (1845),
California (1849), and Minnesota (1857).277 The same was true of new
constitutions adopted by older states during this period, as evidenced by
New York (1821) and Pennsylvania (1838).278 In contrast, Kentucky’s 1850
constitution, like its predecessor, continued to specify viva voce voting for all
elections, which is also what the Virginia constitution of 1830 did.279 Such
“all elections” provisions regulated other aspects of elections as well.
The Kentucky constitution of 1850 required “[a]ll elections by the people
shall be held between the hours of six o’clock in the morning and seven
o’clock in the evening,”280 while the California constitution of 1849
provided “[a] plurality of the votes given at an election shall constitute a
choice, where not otherwise directed in this constitution.”281
The broad “all elections” language was intentional. The original “all
elections” proposal at the Virginia convention of 1830 would have applied
274. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1779, 789–91, 1795, app. at 1253–55 (1850).
275. Id. at 1790.
276. Id. at 1795.
277. OH. CONST. of 1803, art. IV, § 2, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2907; LA.
CONST. of 1812, art. VI, § 13, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1389; ALA. CONST. of
1819, art. III, § 7, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 99; MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II,
§ 2, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 1932; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 6, reprinted
in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3560; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 6, reprinted in
1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 393; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VII, § 6, reprinted in
4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2008.
278. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. II, § 4, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2643;
PA. CONST. of 1838, art. III, § 2, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3108.
279. KY. CONST. of 1850, art. VIII, § 15, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1308;
VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 15, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3826.
280. Id. at § 16.
281. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 20, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 404.
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only to “all elections for members of either branch of the General
Assembly” and elections by the legislature, but this was modified to “all
elections in this Commonwealth.”282 By contrast, Connecticut chose to
limit its by ballot requirement to “all elections of officers of the State, or
members of the General Assembly.”283
Fourth, as Professor Levitt has explained, Congress passed a law in 1845
that contemplated that when presidential electors were appointed in certain
situations, it would be “in such manner as the State shall by law provide.”284
Professor Levitt found no indication in the legislative history that anyone
believed this improperly circumscribed legislative power under the Elector
Appointment Clause, even though “had the Constitution reserved special
power to the state legislature to act outside of the legislative process in
fulfilling an Article II role, the 1845 delegation to the state to act ‘by law’
would have been unconstitutional.”285
Finally, in 1861, in Shiel v. Thayer, the House considered the independent
legislature doctrine and rejected it. Oregon held its congressional election
in June 1860 in accordance with its constitution, which provided that
“[g]eneral elections shall be held on the first Monday of June
bienn[i]ally.”286 The Democratic candidate, George Shiel, defeated the
Republican candidate. However, in November of that year, at the time of
the presidential election, some citizens voted for a second Democratic
candidate, Andrew Thayer. Thayer argued that Shiel’s election in June—
held under the state constitution—was invalid, based on the independent
state legislature doctrine:
[The Elections Clause] provides that the times, places, and manner of holding
elections in the several States for Representatives in Congress, shall be
prescribed by the Legislature of each State. There is no provision in the
Constitution[] that a constitutional convention has the power or the right to
fix the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives. I hold . . . that this clause of the Constitution is imperative,
and that a convention . . . for a State has no power to fix the time and place

282. DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION, supra note 170, at 455–56.
283. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 7, reprinted in 1 Constitutions, supra note 29, at 544.
284. Levitt, Failed Elections and the Legislative Selection of Presidential Electors, supra note 22, at 1078
(quoting Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721).
285. Id. Congress’s assumption that “legislatures” had to prescribe “manner” regulation
“by law” persisted after 1845. Weingartner, supra note 268, at 50–52.
286. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 14, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3002.
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for holding elections for Representatives and Senators, but that they must be
prescribed by the Legislature of the State.287

Thayer also argued that the Constitution’s provision for holding general
elections biennially did not expressly apply to congressional elections, and,
indeed, that “nowhere in the constitution of the State is there any provision
for the reelection of a Representative in Congress.”288
The Committee of Elections, in a report authored by its chairman, Henry
L. Dawes of Massachusetts, unanimously recommended that Shiel be given
the contested seat.289 First, the Committee concluded that the Oregon
constitution’s provision for biennial “general elections” in June “was
designed to embrace at least all such officers as were to be voted for by the
people of the whole State, including a Representative in Congress.”290
Second, the Committee noted that the state legislature, by considering
legislation that would have changed the date of the congressional election
from that outlined in the constitution “seems to have believed that it had
the power to [make such a change].”291 The Committee made clear that it
disagreed with the legislature. In its words, the Committee had “no doubt
that the constitution of [Oregon] has fixed [the election date] beyond the
control of the legislature.”292
During the floor debate, Representative Thaddeus Stevens of
Pennsylvania announced that he agreed with the Committee’s conclusion
that Thayer had no right to the seat, but he argued that Shiel should not get
the seat either.293 Stevens argued Shiel’s election was invalid because, under
the Elections Clause, “no [] power in a State[, besides the legislature,] has a
right to prescribe” the time, place, and manner of a congressional election,
including “the convention to frame the constitution.”294 Dawes responded
that Stevens’ argument flew “in the face of all the precedents of this
House,”295 and that, in his view, the Elections Clause,
287. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1861).
288. Id.
289. H.R. REP. NO. 37-4 at 3 (1861) (reproducing the committee’s report in Shiel v. Thayer).
290. Id. at 2. This finding was bolstered by the fact that the constitution had expressly set the
time for the state’s first congressional election as “the first Monday in June, 1858.” OR. CONST. of
1857, Schedule, § 6, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3018.
291. H.R. REP. NO. 37-4, at 3; see CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1861).
292. H.R. REP. NO. 37-4, at 3.
293. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1861).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 356–57.
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[M]eant simply that [the time and place] should be fixed by the constituted
authority of the State until Congress itself should fix a time for the election in
all the States. As Congress has not fixed that time, it has said to every State
“you may, by your constituted authorities, through whom you choose to speak
in your law, fix the time.”296

Ultimately, the House sided with Dawes and the Elections Committee.
Stevens proposed a resolution that neither Shiel nor Thayer was entitled to
the seat, but this motion was defeated by a vote of 77–37.297 The House
then voted to seat Shiel, though it did not record the vote tally.298
The Prevailing View Thesis fails to account for any of this pre-Civil War
evidence. Of the many constitutional provisions which regulated
“legislatures,” Professor Morley mentions only the Maryland constitutional
amendment of 1810, which he discounts, erroneously, as relating only to
“voter qualification issues . . . outside the scope of both the Elections Clause
and the independent state legislature doctrine.”299 While Professor Morley
notes the existence of Shiel, he fails to appreciate its relevance because of his
mistaken belief that “[n]either the [Elections] Committee nor the [House]
floor debate” considered the doctrine in that matter.300

296. Id. at 356.
297. Id. at 357.
298. Id.
299. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 39 n.169. Professor Morley’s comment is ignorant of the fact that the Maryland amendment
explicitly regulated both the manner of appointing electors (by mandating popular elections) and the
manner of electing both presidential electors and representatives (by specifying that voting in both
kinds of elections would be “by ballot”). MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV (1810), reprinted in
3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1705.
300. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 52; see id. at 53 (incorrectly asserting that “the Elections Clause was not even discussed”);
id. at 53 (“Had the [Elections] Clause been raised, the House would have had to explicitly grapple with
its language and meaning.”). References to the debate over the doctrine in Shiel appear in several places
in the historical record. See CHESTER H. ROWELL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL DIGEST OF ALL THE
CONTESTED ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE FIRST TO THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, 1789–1901, at 172 (1901) (quoting U.S. Const.
art. I, § 4, cl. 1) (recounting how “[i]n the House it was claimed [in Shiel] that under the Constitution
of the United States the time for an election (at least after the first election) can only be fixed by the
legislature or by Congress” but a “resolution based on this principle was defeated by a vote of 37 to
77” after Representative Dawes “argued that the words of the Constitution, ‘by the legislature thereof,’
meant by the people, through any constituted authority”); H.R. REP. NO. 39–14, at 4 (1866) (dissenting
report in Baldwin v. Trowbridge relying on Dawes’s argument during Shiel v. Thayer); In re Op. to the
Governor, 103 A. 513, 515 (R.I. 1918) (referencing the debate in Shiel v. Thayer).
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For this antebellum period, the Prevailing View Thesis appears to rely for
support entirely on comments made at the Massachusetts constitutional
convention of 1820 during a debate over whether the state constitution
should require presidential electors and representatives to be chosen on a
district basis.301 Professor Morley’s lead is that “Justice Joseph Story and
Daniel Webster invoked the doctrine at the [convention], convincing
delegates that including restrictions on congressional redistricting in the
Massachusetts Constitution would violate the U.S. Constitution.”302 While
there is some truth to this statement (Justice Story did invoke the doctrine),
the rest is erroneous (Daniel Webster did not) or entirely speculative (the
delegates had good reasons to reject the provision other than belief in the
doctrine).
At the convention, the issue came up after the delegates voted to remove
the outdated constitutional provision dating from 1780 which, prior to the
adoption of the United States Constitution, had governed the appointment
of the state’s representatives to Congress.303 At that juncture, James T.
Austin (a future Attorney General of Massachusetts and the son-in-law of
Elbridge Gerry) proposed a new constitutional provision that would have
required representatives and electors for president and vice president to be
chosen by the people on a district basis, with reapportionment after every
decennial census.304 Austin argued to the convention that election by
districts was the best method, as “[i]t is only by dividing the state into small
portions that there can be a fair expression of public opinion.”305 On the
other hand, with larger, presumably statewide districts, “the rights of the
minority are destroyed.”306
301. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 38 (“As early as the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1820, it was
understood that state constitutions were legally incapable of limiting the state legislature’s power over
congressional and presidential elections.”); id. at 39 (identifying the 1820 convention as “among the
earliest examples of the independent state legislature doctrine being expressly applied” without
identifying any other examples from that period).
302. Id. at 14. Similarly, Professor Morley says that this episode “provides a stark example of
how the independent state legislature doctrine was regarded when the issue was affirmatively raised
and debated.” Id. at 40.
303. See JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES 57
(Bos. Daily Advertiser 1821) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820] (“[T]he . . . part of
the [c]onstitution of this Commonwealth, having become inapplicable to the existing condition of . . .
Massachusetts, ought to be expunged therefrom.”).
304. Id. at 57–58.
305. Id. at 59.
306. Id.
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Austin wanted to constitutionalize district elections so as to “decide
finally an important question” which was “continually occurring in the
legislature,” each time causing “some degree of embarrassment and
confusion.”307 Austin undoubtedly thought Massachusetts had, since the
beginning of the Republic, repeatedly switched back and forth between the
legislative appointment of presidential electors and district-based
elections.308 He wanted to avoid constant “propositions . . . to change the
mode of election”:
[Austin explained that he] did not wish to see these propositions renewed.
Important elections of themselves afforded grounds enough of excitement,
without that which arose from a difference of opinion about the mode of
election. The commonwealth had been at times agitated by contending
parties. There was now a calm—but the storm might burst out again. Let us
take advantage of the favorable moment to settle an important principle. Let
it be understood that representatives and electors are to be chosen by districts.
When districts are settled let it be for ten years. Let there be no room for
suspicion that the mode of election is determined upon from party
motives.309

Austin also addressed Justice Story’s argument (detailed below) that the
state constitution could not limit the power assigned to legislatures by the
Elector Appointment Clause and the Elections Clause.
Austin
acknowledged that his proposed amendment would “limit [the legislature]
in the manner of exercising their discretion,” but he saw that as perfectly
appropriate because “[t]he Legislature [is] bound to exercise all [its] powers
under the direction of the [state] constitution.”310 Under constitutional first
principles, “[t]he people possess the supreme power—they have a right to
impose this restriction upon the Legislature, and the Legislature will have
no right to question their authority.”311 Austin disagreed that limiting the
307. Id. at 58.
308. See EDWARD B. FOLEY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MAJORITY RULE: THE RISE,
DEMISE, AND POTENTIAL RESTORATION OF THE JEFFERSONIAN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 18, 20,
22–23, 56, 58 (2020); KEYSSAR, supra note 218, at 32 tbl.1.1 (documenting states’ historical method of
electing presidential electors); id. at 66 (“[In 1812,] Massachusetts, continuing a dispute that had begun
in 1808, found itself with a Republican senate and a Federalist lower house that could not agree on
either a method of choosing electors or a map for congressional districts; in the end, an extra legislative
session had to be convened to save the state from losing its electoral votes altogether.”).
309. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820, supra note 303, at 59.
310. Id. at 58.
311. Id.
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discretion of the state legislature in the manner he suggested would violate
the command of the United States Constitution; as he pointed out,
“the Legislature will continue to direct.”312 However, Austin conceded that
it would “unquestionably be a violation” if the state constitution gave “to
the Governor and Council the power of regulating the elections.”313
Justice Story opposed Austin’s proposal for two reasons. First, “it was
contrary to the [C]onstitution of the United States,” and, second, even if
constitutional, “its adoption [would be] wholly inexpedient.”314 As to the
first point—a version of the anti-constitution independent state legislature
doctrine—Justice Story argued that the Elections Clause was an “express
provision” for “the manner of choosing Representatives” for which state
legislatures had “unlimited discretion . . . . They may provide for an election
in single districts, in districts sending more than one, or by a general ticket
for the whole state.”315 Similarly, the Elector Appointment Clause gave
“discretion as to the choice of Electors” to “the Legislature thereof,” which
was “unlimited.”316 According to Justice Story, Austin’s proposed
amendment would improperly require the legislature to “surrender all
discretion” in violation of its duty “to exercise its authority according to its
own views of public policy and principle.”317
Justice Story turned to his second point, the inadvisable “policy of the
measure, even supposing it were constitutional.”318 He did not want a
constitutional pre-commitment to “limit us to a particular mode of choice,
leaving all the rest of the United States free to adopt any other.”319
Pre-committing to election by district, which would divide the state’s power,
while other states reserved the right to use a general-ticket, winner-take-all
approach, would mean that, “on the most important occasions we might be
312. Id. at 61.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 59.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 60. Historian Merrill Jensen criticized “the technique of argument” employed by
Justice Story and others when they argued a different point: that the pre-Constitution Congress
“represented the people of the United States as a whole, not the people of the several as represented
in their state governments.” JENSEN, supra note 70, at 162. As Jensen described it, the “technique of
argument” then employed by Justice Story and others was to “state their contention, or reiterate it, and
by the use of italics to place undue emphasis on the portions of the documents which seemed to prove
their arguments.” Id. Jensen disparaged this as “the technique of argument used by small boys.”
Id. at 162–63.
317. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820, supra note 303, at 60.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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deprived of all the influence to which our talents and character, and
numbers, justly entitle us.”320 Justice Story warned against “bind[ing]
ourselves to a mode of choice which would neutralize our votes and place
us in the same situation as if we had no vote.”321
Daniel Webster agreed with Justice Story’s policy argument.322 While
Webster was in favor of election by district, for it to work, that mode
required universal adoption, which was unlikely in the absence of an
amendment to the United States Constitution because “it is in the interest
of every state, that every other state should be restrained to District elections
of Electors, and herself left free.”323 Therefore, to protect “all the just and
right power of our constituents,” Webster argued that Massachusetts “ought
to retain the right of giving an undivided electoral vote, until others also

320. See id. (“The direct and necessary consequence of the measure now proposed is to
perpetuate our own humiliation. Why does Virginia . . . choose her Electors for President by general
ticket? Because she is determined that her Electors shall move in a solid column in the direction of
the majority of the state.”).
321. Id. When Justice Story later wrote his Commentaries, he revisited this debate, but focused
exclusively on the policy argument, without saying anything about the independent state legislature
doctrine. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1466 (1833). Noting that two states continued to elect electors by district, Justice Story wrote that
he was “surprise[d]” that the approach “should not long since have been wholly abandoned.” Id.
Absent the practice of election by district “becom[ing] general throughout the Union,” the problem
was that “[i]n case of any party divisions in a state, [electing by district] may neutralize its whole vote,
while all the other states give an unbroken electoral vote.” Id.
322. Professor Morley incorrectly states that Daniel Webster “agreed” with Justice Story’s
articulation of the independent state legislature doctrine. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature
Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 40. In fact, Webster began his speech
by declining “to enter into the argument on the question of our right to make such a provision.”
MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820, supra note 303, at 60. Instead, it was “the expediency of it
which had weight with him.” Id. At most, Webster thought there was a “general inexpediency of
connecting the state Constitution with provisions of the national constitution” and that it would “tend[]
to no good consequence” for a state constitution to regulate a power conferred on it by another
constitution. Id.
323. See MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820, supra note 303, at 61. (“When we, therefore,
tie up our own hands in this particular, by our own constitution, we do that, precisely, which those
who wish a relative increase of their own power, would desire.”).
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should agree to give up the same right.”324 To do otherwise would not
“entitle ourselves to much character for foresight or sagacity.”325
The convention rejected Austin’s amendment, but it did not record the
vote.326 The only three delegates who stated their position for the record
on the independent legislature doctrine were Austin (who rejected the
doctrine), Justice Story (who embraced it), and Webster (who declined to
debate the point).
2.

Constitutional Limitations on “Legislatures” During the Civil War

Because it provided a way to evade state constitutional limitations on
soldier-voting in federal elections, the independent state legislature doctrine
reached its high-water mark during the Civil War. However, the tide did not
rise as high as the Prevailing View Thesis would have it. Even during the
Civil War period, state constitutions continued to impose substantive
limitations on state legislatures. Moreover, the Civil War soldier-voting
cases were not nearly as strong an endorsement of the independent
legislature doctrine as has been portrayed.
a.

State Constitutions

When the Civil War threatened to disenfranchise Union soldiers who
were absent from their home states fighting the war, several states amended
their constitutions to prevent that from happening. Three of the
amendments applied expressly to federal elections:

324. Id. Justice Story and Webster met before the convention to discuss tactics to resist
constitutional change. Harlow Walker Sheidley, Preserving “The Old Fabrick”: The Massachusetts
Conservative Elite and the Constitutional Convention of 1820–1821, 103 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 114, 128
(1991). It was “not at all unusual for [them] to speak in support of each other at the climactic point of
a debate.” Id. at 134. The alliance between Justice Story and Webster has been described by
Justice Story’s biographer as “one of the most extraordinary in American law and politics.” R. KENT
NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 176
(1986). In 1820, while preventing Massachusetts from dividing its future electoral votes, the duo may
have had their sights set on greater things. In the wake of their successes at the convention,
conservatives like Justice Story and Webster “hoped to transfer their success to national politics, [with
Justice Story] naively dreaming of the day when the ‘popularity’ Webster had earned at the convention
would ‘carry him . . . to the presidency.’” Sheidley, supra, at 137 (quoting letter from Joseph Story to
Jeremiah Mason (Jan. 21, 1821), in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 396 (William W. Story ed.,
1851)).
325. MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820, supra note 303, at 61.
326. See id. at 57, 61 (“The question was then taken on Mr. Austin’s amendment and decided in
the negative.”).
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•

Connecticut amended its constitution to guarantee that any
qualified voter “absent from this state” because of service in the
United States military would “have the same right to vote in an
election of state officers, representatives in congress, and electors
of president and vice president of the United States,” as he would
have if he was present in the town of his residence at the time of
the election.327

•

Maryland’s new constitution of 1864 mandated that “[a]ny qualified
voter . . . who shall be absent . . . by reason of being in the military
service of the United States” was eligible to vote in the November
1864 elections, including elections “for presidential electors and for
members of Congress.”328

•

Rhode Island amended its constitution to guarantee that any
qualified voter “absent from the State[] In the actual military service
of the United States” would have the “right to vote in all elections
in the State,” including “for electors of President and Vice-President
of the United States [and] Representatives in Congress.”329

These constitutional amendments would have been unnecessary if the
prevailing view in these states had been that state constitutions could not
regulate federal elections.
Moreover, other states adopted soldier-voting constitutional
amendments that did not contain explicit references to federal elections but
were broad enough to encompass federal elections. This was so in New
York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Kansas.330 By contrast, Maine and
327. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. XIII (1864), reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29,
at 550. By its terms, the amendment was to expire “upon the termination of the present war.” Id.
328. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. XII, § 11, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34,
at 1777–78.
329. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. IV (1864), reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37,
at 3235–36.
330. See N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 1, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2675
(providing “in time of war no elector in the actual military service . . . shall be deprived of his vote by
reason of his absence from such election district; and the [l]egislature shall have power to provide the
manner in which and the time and place at which such absent electors may vote, and for the return
and canvass of their votes in the election districts in which they respectively reside”); PA. CONST. of
1873, art. VIII, § 6, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3139 (“[S]uch [soldier-voters] may
exercise the right of suffrage in all elections by the citizens, under such regulations as are or shall be
prescribed by law, as fully as if they were present at their usual place of election.”); MICH. Const. of
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Missouri’s soldier-voting amendments were limited to specified state
elections but apparently this was because the state constitutional obstacles
to soldier-voting in those states applied only to specified state elections.331
West Virginia and Nevada both entered the Union during the Civil War.
Both of their constitutions contained substantive limitations on how
legislatures were to conduct federal elections, both explicit and implicit.
West Virginia’s constitution required congressional election by district and
specified that each district “shall be formed of continuous counties, and be
compact,”332 and that “all elections” must be conducted “by ballot.”333
Nevada’s constitution specified the applicable manner of “all elections for
United States Senators,” including that “such elections shall be held in joint
convention of both houses of the Legislature.”334 It also specified election
“by ballot” in “all elections,”335 and further provided that “[a] plurality of
votes given at an election by the people shall constitute a choice, where not
otherwise provided by this Constitution.”336
b.

Soldier-Voting Cases

The foundation of the Prevailing View Thesis consists of the Civil War
soldier-voting cases arising in New Hampshire (1864) and the House of
Representatives (Baldwin v. Trowbridge in 1866). Professor Morley describes
1850, art. VII, § 1, reprinted in 4 Constitutions, supra note 152, at 1975 (providing “in time of war,
insurrection, or rebellion, no elector shall be deprived of his right to vote by reason of his service in
the army or navy at such time, in this [s]tate or the United States”); KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. 5, § 3,
reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 1251 (“[T]he legislature may make provision for taking
the votes of electors who may be absent from their townships or wards, in the volunteer military service
of the United States, or the militia service of this state.”).
331. The requirement in Maine that electors vote “in the town or plantation where his residence
is so established,” applied only to electors “for Governor, Senators, and Representatives.” ME. CONST.
of 1819, art. II, § 1, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1649. The 1864 soldier-voting
amendment was framed accordingly. Id. at art. II, § 4, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34,
at 1649. Missouri was similar. See MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, §§ 18, 21, reprinted in
4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2198 (stating electors for “all officers, State, county, or
municipal . . . shall not vote elsewhere than in the election district of which he is at that time a resident,”
yet a “qualified voter . . . absent from the place of his residen[ce] by reason of being in the volunteer
army of the United States, or in the militia force of this State, in the service thereof, or of the United
States, whether within or without the State, shall, without registration, be entitled to vote in any election
occurring during such absence”).
332. W.V. CONST. of 1863, art. XI, § 6, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 4031.
333. Id. at art. III, § 2, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 4016.
334. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 34, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2409.
335. Id. at art. II, § 5, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2405.
336. Id. at art. XV, § 14, reprinted in 4 Constitutions, supra note 152, at 2423.
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the New Hampshire case as “one of the nineteenth century’s clearest, most
emphatic endorsements” of the doctrine,337 and the result in Baldwin as
“powerfully support[ing]” the doctrine.338 These matters were also credited
in similar fashion by some historical commentators,339 but not others,340
and, more recently, Chief Justice Roberts cited Baldwin in his dissenting
opinion in Arizona State Legislature.341 In fact, the New Hampshire matter
likely had nothing to do with the doctrine, and Baldwin was hardly as
enthusiastic an endorsement as has been assumed.
i. The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s Soldier-Voting
Opinion
The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s 1864 opinion advised the New
Hampshire Senate that a soldier-voting bill allowing soldiers to vote for
presidential electors and congressional representatives would be
constitutional if enacted.342 However, the opinion should not be read as
an endorsement of the independent state legislature doctrine.
337. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra
note 15, at 42.
338. Id. at 51.
339. See JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, VOTING IN THE FIELD, A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF THE
CIVIL WAR 11–12 (1915) (stating the view that constitutional amendments permitting soldier-voting
were required for state but not federal elections, but noting that the distinction “does not appear to
have been generally recognized at the time of the Civil War”); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 599 & n.3 (2d ed. 1872) (relying on the Vermont
and New Hampshire soldier-voting cases to suggest a solder-voting statute in violation of a state
constitution would be valid for federal elections). Notably, the first edition of Cooley’s treatise,
published in 1868, had not mentioned the doctrine; rather, Cooley’s understanding then was that if a
state constitution required a voter to participate at the place of his residence, then “any statute
permitting voters to deposit their ballots elsewhere must necessarily be void.” THOMAS M. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 600 & n.1 (1st ed. 1868). In 1880, a different
Cooley treatise stated that a state legislature’s statute “must control” over a conflicting state
constitution. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 250–51 (1880) (citing Baldwin but omitting any discussion of the
soldier-voting cases cited in his earlier treatise).
340. In 1875, George W. McCrary of Iowa, former chairman of the Committee on Elections
(42nd Congress), published an election law treatise that included a description of the soldier-voting
issue and the House of Representative’s decisions in Baldwin and Shiel. See GEORGE W. MCCRARY,
A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS §§ 109–111 (1875). McCrary declined to opine
on whether “the reasoning in Baldwin vs. Trowbridge . . . [was] sound or not.” Id. at § 112.
341. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 837–38 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
342. In re Op. of the Justs., 45 N.H. 595, 596 (1864).
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A close examination of the New Hampshire matter reveals that no one
involved identified any state constitutional provision that would even
arguably conflict with the legislative proposal to permit soldiers to vote in
the field for presidential elections and representatives in Congress.343 The
year before, the court had opined that there were state constitutional
provisions requiring votes to be cast at certain places that would preclude
absentee voting in state elections, but those provisions applied to specifically
enumerated state elections and did not, by their terms, apply to federal
elections.344 In 1864, the question that the court struggled with was
whether the federal Constitution prohibited soldier-voting in congressional
elections by specifying that voters in congressional elections “shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislature.”345 If the state constitutional provisions requiring votes
to be cast at certain places in state elections were “qualifications,” then by
operation of the federal Constitution they would apply to congressional
elections even though those state constitutional provisions did not, by their
own terms, apply to congressional elections.346 The court ultimately
concluded that the state constitutional requirements were not federal
“qualifications,” and therefore that the state legislature could authorize
soldier-voting in the field “untrammeled by the provision of the State
constitution, which requires the elector of State representatives to give his

343. See generally id. (identifying no such conflict).
344. See In re Op. of the Justices, 44 N.H. 633, 635–36 (1863). The state constitutional
provisions that might block soldier-voting by requiring voting “within the district” or “in the town or
parish wherein he dwells” were not “all elections” provisions, but rather were limited by their terms to
elections for specific state officials. See N.H. CONST. of 1792, § XIII (providing the structure for
elections for state representative), reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2477; id. § XXVIII
(providing the structure for elections for state senators), reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152,
at 2479. This opinion was similar to the opinion issued in the Vermont soldier-voting case, in which
the Vermont Supreme Court found the state constitution was “entirely silent” on federal elections.
See Op. of the Judges, 37 Vt. 665, 676 (1864). But see Morley, The Independent State Legislature, supra
note 62, at 536 n.284. (citing, erroneously, the Vermont soldier-voting case as an example of a state
court applying the doctrine).
345. Op. of the Justices, 45 N.H. at 601 (quoting U.S CONST. art. I, § 2).
346. See id. at 602 (“If the provisions of the [s]tate [c]onstitution make it a qualification of the
voter for senators, within the meaning of the word qualifications as used in the Constitution of the
United States, that the vote should be cast in the place where the voter resides, then the legislature have
not constitutional power to authorize votes for [r]epresentatives to be given in other places than those
where the voters dwell.”).
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vote in the town or place wherein he resides.”347 Tellingly, the court’s
discussion about the potential applicability of the federal qualifications
clause did not apply to presidential elections, for the simple reason that the
qualifications clause does not apply to presidential elections.348
The conclusion that neither the New Hampshire legislature nor the New
Hampshire Supreme Court believed the state constitution was irrelevant by
virtue of the Doctrine is confirmed by two additional facts. First, in the
1864 soldier-voting statute, which was solely purposed to permit soldiervoting in federal elections, the legislature specified the act “shall be of no
effect, but shall become inoperative and void, if a majority of the supreme
court shall determine it unconstitutional.”349 This requirement is what
prompted the court’s review of the law’s constitutionality.
Second, the legislature also went to the court to confirm the law had been
passed in accordance with the state constitution’s gubernatorial veto
provision. Under that provision, no bill would become law unless it was
either (a) approved by the governor or (b) not returned by the governor with
his objections within five days after presented to him.350 The governor
argued he returned the bill with his objections within the five-day period,
but the court disagreed, explaining he had blown the deadline and, in accord
with the constitution, the bill had therefore become law without his
approval.351
347. Id. at 605. But see Morley, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 41–42
(assuming the court’s “untrammeled” language was an invocation of the independent legislature
doctrine).
348. See In re Op. of the Justs., 45 N.H. 595, 601 (posing the question of “[w]hether the
Constitution of the United States authorizes the State legislature to prescribe such places for holding
elections of Representatives in Congress as are provided for in this bill”). In 1921, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court revisited the question of whether the state constitutional place of voting restrictions
were “qualifications” and expressed doubt about the conclusion it reached in 1864. However, the
court again made clear that its concern did not extend to presidential elections, for which the
qualifications clause had no potential application. See In re Op. of the Justs., 113 A. 293, 299 (1921)
(“The manner of voting prescribed by the bill is contrary to the state Constitution . . . they would be
valid as to the election of presidential electors; we are unable to say the provisions would be held valid
as to the election of the Senators and Representatives in Congress.”).
349. An Act to enable the qualified voters of this State engaged in the military service of the
county to vote for electors of President and Vice President of the United States, and for
Representatives in Congress, § 8, reprinted in LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE PASSED JUNE
SESSION 3063 (Concord 1864). The act also required the governor “to obtain an opinion upon the
constitutionality of the bill.” Id.
350. N.H. CONST. of 1792, § XLIV, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2482.
351. See In re Op. of the Justs., 45 N.H. at 613–14; BENTON, supra note 339, at 208–12
(describing the governor’s attempt to veto the bill).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

77

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

522

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:445

ii. The House Contested Election Case of Baldwin v.
Trowbridge
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, the contested election case arising out of Michigan’s
1864 congressional election, was not as strong an endorsement of the
Doctrine as has been commonly thought.352 In fact, it is incorrect to
assume (as Chief Justice Roberts did in Arizona State Legislature and as others
have as well) that all members of the House who voted in favor of
Trowbridge did so because they agreed with the Doctrine.353
In the election, Rowland E. Trowbridge received more votes than
Augustus C. Baldwin but only when counting the soldier vote cast outside
of Michigan. Soldier-voting outside the state had been authorized by the
Michigan legislature, but Baldwin argued the soldier-voting statue was
unconstitutional because the Michigan state constitution prohibited such
voting (as the Michigan Supreme Court had recently held in a dispute over
a state election).354 The majority report of the Elections Committee,
favoring Trowbridge, invoked the independent legislature doctrine and
argued that the state constitutional requirement could not constrain the
legislature’s action in a federal election.355 The minority report rejected the
Doctrine.356 After floor debate, a majority of the House voted in favor of

352. In this section, I take at face value the legal arguments made by various congressmen
explaining their votes in Baldwin. Later in this Article, see infra Part.IV.B.1.b.iii, I examine the partisan
motivations at work in that and other House contested election cases from the 1860s.
353. See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 838, (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (assuming “[t]he Committee decided, and the full House agreed” with the majority report’s
reasoning) (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg’s opinion also conflated the committee majority’s
report, which she described as its “ruling,” with the House’s vote including by describing the committee
majority, as opposed to the House majority, as being “responsible for the decision.” Id. at 818 (majority
opinion). Professor Morley also assumes without basis that “[a] decisive majority of the House
concluded that the Elections Clause required it to follow the state statute rather than the contrary state
constitutional provision.” Morley, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 51.
354. People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 160 (1865).
355. See H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 3 (1866) (reproducing the majority report in Baldwin v.
Trowbridge).
356. See H.R. REP. NO. 39-14, at 4–5 (1866) (reproducing the minority report in Baldwin v.
Trowbridge). Among other things, the minority report recounted that the House had rejected the
Doctrine a few years before in Shiel v. Thayer, and that Americans had “everywhere supposed that they
had the power to fix a limitation upon the action of their legislature, in determining the times, places,
and manner of holding elections for all offices.” Id. at 3. Baldwin himself argued during debate in the
House that “for three fourths of a century during which our Government has existed under the
Constitution, no attempt has been made by any State Legislature, I believe, to make a distinction
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Trowbridge, who retained his seat.357
Contrary to what has been assumed, support for the Doctrine was not
“the only issue” upon which congressmen could have voted in Trowbridge’s
favor.358 The majority report which advanced the Doctrine itself
recognized it was not necessary to rely on the Doctrine because some House
members might see no conflict between the Michigan soldier-voting law and
the constitution.359 The best example of a House member voting for
Trowbridge but rejecting the Doctrine was Representative Henry Dawes,
who was the chairman of the Elections Committee. Dawes rose during the
floor debate to make clear that while he agreed with the committee majority
that Trowbridge was entitled to his seat, he did not “concur fully in the views
set forth in the report . . . by which they arrive at that conclusion.”360
Dawes went on to explain that, contrary to the premise of both the majority
and minority reports of the Committee, as well as the Michigan Supreme
Court decision, the Michigan constitution did not require a voter to be
“personally present” to vote.361 Therefore, the soldier-voting law Baldwin
alleged to be unconstitutional was “not in conflict with the constitution,”
and the “whole argument . . . taken by [Baldwin and] the minority, fails.”362
Moreover, this meant the majority report’s “idea that a Legislature can
disregard the limitations of the State constitution” was not “necessary for
the support of this case”; thus, Dawes could vote in favor of Trowbridge
retaining his seat.363 Dawes made clear he rejected the “dangerous”
doctrine articulated in the majority report and that, if he “entertained any
doubt that the [Michigan soldier-voting] was constitutional,” he would vote
in favor of seating Baldwin.364
between the two classes of electors [one for state and for federal elections].” CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 827 (1866).
357. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 845.
358. Morley, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 51 (stating Baldwin involved
a “direct and dispositive conflict between a state constitutional provision and a state statute regulating
a federal election”).
359. See H.R. REP. NO. 39-13, at 3 (1866) (“Now, the constitution of Michigan either fixes the
place of holding the election or it does not. If it does not, there is no conflict between the law and the
constitution, and the argument is at an end.”).
360. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1St Sess. 821.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 821–22.
364. Id. at 822. Dawes lent further support to Trowbridge by stating that the Baldwin majority
report did not conflict with the report Dawes authored in Shiel. Id. Although Dawes’s report in Shiel
stated that a state constitution would override conflicting “manner” legislation, Dawes allowed that the
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Dawes was not the only Trowbridge supporter to offer an alternative
to the legal rationale articulated in the majority report.
Representative Trowbridge himself argued there was no conflict between
the soldier-voting law and the state constitution because the constitutional
provision applied “[m]anifestly to the election of officers created by that
constitution, and to no others.”365 This was not a frivolous argument, if
only because the constitutional provision in question did not explicitly apply
to federal elections,366 and the Michigan court decision recognizing the
supposed conflict involved an election for “prosecuting attorney for the
county of Washtenaw,” not a federal election.367 Representative Thomas
Davis of New York explained he would be voting in favor of Trowbridge
because he saw “no conflict” between the Michigan’s soldier-voting statue
and the Michigan constitution, though he was less clear about his reasoning
than Dawes or Trowbridge.368
The difficulty in discerning the legal “holding” of the House’s decision in
Baldwin is highlighted by the reaction of the New York newspaper,
The World. On February 20, 1866, The World decried the “utter
shamelessness and illegality of the vote” in favor of Trowbridge. The paper
asserted that there was “not a member of the House who voted to unseat
Baldwin for any other reason than to sustain the decision of a partisan
committee,” and that the majority’s “pretext[ual]” invocation of the
independent state legislature doctrine was an “unspeakable effrontery” by
“shameless partisans” that was “contrived to conceal a crime.” The paper
reserved special disapprobation for “Cockchafer Dawes, Chairman of the
Committee,” who had in “numerous cases of the same sort . . . recognized
the correct legal principles” but now, in Baldwin, exhibited “corrupt
inconsistency.”369
Six days later, having read the transcript of the debate, The World admitted
it had done an “injustice to Mr. Dawes” by “suppos[ing] he [voted for
Trowbridge] on the grounds [of the Committee’s majority report authored]
by Mr. Scofield.” The transcript revealed “Mr. Dawes regarded the
argument of Mr. Scofield as [an] absurdity.” It was clear Dawes voted for
language had been unnecessary because, in Shiel, the Oregon legislature had not passed any “manner”
legislation at all, let alone conflicting “manner” legislation. Id. at 821.
365. Id. at 840.
366. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 1, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 1956.
367. People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 135 (1865).
368. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 844.
369. The Case of Representative Baldwin, WORLD, Feb. 20, 1866, at A4.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/4

80

Smith: Revisiting History of the Independent State Legislature Doctrine

2022]

HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

525

Trowbridge because “he did not think the State constitution in conflict with
the provisions of the soldiers’ voting act of the Legislature.” The World
found this argument “just a little less preposterous” but admitted it had done
“Mr. Dawes the injustice of overlooking this difference, and he is entitled
to have the distinction made in his behalf.”370
In one important respect, the majority report in Baldwin actually undercuts
the Prevailing View Thesis. The very premise of the report’s invocation of
the Doctrine was the assumption that the people of Michigan, in adopting
their constitution of 1850, believed it was appropriate for state constitutions
to regulate federal elections.
3. Constitutional Limitations on “Legislatures” in the Post-War
Period
After the Civil War, Americans continued to adopt state constitutional
provisions evidencing their belief that state constitutions could properly
limit “legislatures” acting pursuant to the Elector Appointment and
Elections Clauses. In the wake of the soldier-voting cases, the Doctrine
existed as an argument that was invoked in state courts or House contested
election cases. However, the argument did not gain traction in either forum,
and it faded over time, as it was rejected by courts and seemingly forgotten
by the House.
a.

State Constitutions

The following state constitutional provisions adopted during this time
period explicitly regulated “legislatures” with respect to federal elections.
•

The Alabama constitution of 1867 provided that, after each new
congressional apportionment, “the General Assembly shall divide
the State into as many districts as it is allowed Representatives in

370. Mr. Dawes and the Case of Baldwin, of Michigan, WORLD, Feb. 26, 1866, at A4.
The newspaper in Dawes’s home district in Massachusetts correctly recognized that Dawes voted with
the majority “because he did not think the State constitution in conflict with the provisions of the
soldiers’ voting act” but was dismissive of Dawes’s “no-conflict” argument and asked, “Would not
Mr. Dawes be ashamed to use such logic as this before any Police Court in Berkshire?” The Michigan
Contested Election, PITTSFIELD SUN, Mar. 1, 1866. I made the same mistaken assumption as The World
in my 2001 article. See Smith, supra note 1, at 774 n.293 (reporting incorrectly that Dawes “sign[ed] on
to the majority report in the Baldwin case”).
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Congress, making such congressional districts as nearly equal in the
number of inhabitants as may be.”371
•

In 1868, South Carolina’s new constitution provided that
“Presidential electors shall be elected by the people.”372

•

The Virginia constitution of 1870 required the state legislature to
divide the state into congressional districts “which shall be formed,
respectively, of contiguous counties, cities, and towns, be compact,
and include, as nearly as may be, an equal number of
population.”373

•

Tennessee’s constitution of 1870 provided that citizens “included
in any new county” established by the state would vote for members
of Congress “with the county or counties from which they may have
been stricken off.”374

•

In 1873, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution, which provided
that “[t]he trial and determination of contested elections of electors
of President and Vice President [as well as certain state offices] shall
be by the courts of law.”375

371. ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. VIII, § 6, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 147.
372. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 9, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3298.
373. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 13, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3885.
This provision was similar to those contained in the Virginia constitutions of 1830 and 1850, but
without the “three-fifths” clause that had appeared in the earlier versions of the constitution. It also
appeared in the Virginia constitution of 1902. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. IV, § 55, reprinted in
7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3914.
374. TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. X, § 5, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3467.
375. PA. CONST. of 1873, art. VIII, § 17, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31,
at 3140–41. When this provision was debated at the state constitutional convention in 1873,
Delegate William Darlington sought to limit it to contested elections for state officers on the grounds
that it was Congress, not a state court, who was supposed to address contested elections of electors
and that, if courts were involved, it “would be very easy to protract the investigation and inquiry” such
that “it might be put over beyond the time when [the electors] are to discharge their duties.”
5 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA:
CONVENED AT HARRISBURG, NOVEMBER 12, 1872; ADJOURNED NOVEMBER 27, TO MEET AT
PHILADELPHIA, JANUARY 7, 1873, at 196 (Harrisburg, Benjamin Singerly 1873). Darlington’s motion
to limit the provision was defeated after another delegate, C.R. Buckalew, argued the Elector
Appointment Clause made the appointment of electors “a subject for State regulation, and for State
regulation alone”; hence, Congress had “no power over the subject of the appointment or election of
electors . . . the manner in which they shall be chosen, how returns shall be made, or how contests in
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•

In 1876, Colorado entered the Union with a constitution which
required the state’s presidential electors to be chosen by the
legislature in 1876 but “by direct vote of the people” in future
presidential elections.376

•

California’ s constitution of 1879 regulated the manner in which the
legislature could divide the state’s counties and cities into
congressional districts, imposing requirements of contiguousness
and compactness.377

•

In 1879, Louisiana adopted a constitution which provided that
“Presidential electors and member of Congress shall be chosen or
elected in the manner at the time prescribed by law.”378

•

Montana’s constitution of 1889 required the legislature to divide the
state into congressional districts after each apportionment by
Congress.379

regard to votes cast for them shall be tried.” Id. Buckalew also argued for the adoption of such
provisions in every state because in any future presidential election, a “dispute in any one State with
reference to the choice of electors may precipitate the people of the United States into a revolution.”
Id. Just before the convention voted to approve the provision, a third delegate, Wayne MacVeagh,
rose to explain why he was voting against it. Id. at 199–200. MacVeagh said he would have been
“disposed to vote for it” if “the judges could have been made non-partisan,” but he disapproved of
giving the “entire power of [the people’s] political action” into the hands of an “elective judiciary.” Id.
at 200. MacVeagh went on to argue that the Constitution was “very specific” that electors “shall be
appointed in such manner as the Legislature shall appoint,” and that this was because the Framers
contemplated a “division of the powers of government between the legislative and the judicial
branches” and sought to put the appointment power “into the legislative department as . . . a political
question to be kept away from the judiciary.” Id. Samuel Wherry replied that the purpose of the
proposed provision was not to “hand the political power of the government over to the judiciary” but
to recognize “the principle that the right to hold office is a right to be determined by law, as any other
right is to be determined.” Id.
376. COLO. CONST. of 1876, art XIX, Schedule, §§ 19–20, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 29, at 512. For the 1876 election, the constitution specified that the legislature would provide for
legislative appointment of electors “by act or joint resolution” and that “the approval of the governor
thereto shall not be required.” Id. at 512.
377. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. IV, § 27, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 29, at 421.
378. LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 191, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1502.
The same provision appeared in Louisiana’s constitution of 1898. LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 206,
reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1566.
379. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 1, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2310.
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•

The constitutions of both South Dakota and North Dakota of 1889
provided that the state’s congressmen would be “elected by the state
at large” until “otherwise provided by law.”380

•

The Wyoming constitution of 1889 required the state legislature to
divide the state into congressional districts, mandated congressional
districts composed of two or more counties be “contiguous” and
“as compact as may be,” and stated “[n]o county shall be divided”
in the formation of the districts.381

•

In 1890, the Mississippi constitution stated the legislature “shall not
elect any other than its own officers, State librarian, and United
States senators” but clarified that “this section shall not prohibit the
legislature from appointing presidential electors.”382

In addition, many of the constitutions from the late nineteenth century
contained “all elections” provisions, which regulated federal elections
without specifically referring to them. Examples of such clauses requiring
elections “by ballot” can be found in the constitutions of Virginia (1870),
Pennsylvania (1873), Georgia (1868 and 1877), and Kentucky (1890).383

380. S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. XIX, § 1, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3388;
N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 18, § 214, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 2885.
381. WYO. CONST. of 1889, art. III, Apportionment, §§ 1, 3, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 30, at 4126; WYO. CONST. OF 1889, art. VI, § 17, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 30, at 4134 (providing that Congressional elections were part of the “general elections” to be
“held on the Tuesday next following the first Monday in November of each even year.”).
382. MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. iv, § 99, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 2101.
383. VA. CONST. of 1870, art. III, § 2, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 3876;
PA. CONST. of 1873, art. VIII, § 4, reprinted in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 31, at 3139, 3152
(specifying other procedures as well, such as mandating that “[e]very ballot shall be numbered in the
order in which it shall be received, and the number recorded by the election officers on the list of
voters, opposite the name of the elector who presents the ballot”); GA. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 1,
reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 825; GA. CONST. of 1877, art. II, § 1, par. 1, reprinted in
2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 845; KY. CONST. of 1890, § 147, reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 34, at 1336 (“[A]ll elections by the people shall be by secret official ballot, furnished by public
authority to the voters at the polls, and marked by each voter in private at the polls, and then and there
deposited.”). As Michael Weingartner has documented, when debating reconstruction legislation in
1867, several senators, including Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, discussed requiring re-admitted
states to include in their post-War constitutions requirements that all elections, including congressional
elections, be “by ballot,” without anyone suggesting this would violate the Elections Clause.
Weingartner, supra note 268, at 53–55, 54 nn.413–414.
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Judicial Opinions

For the post-War period, the Prevailing View Thesis again ignores the
existence of contrary state constitutional provisions, claiming instead that
the state courts which “squarely confronted” the Doctrine in the nineteenth
century “invariably accepted” it.384 This is incorrect. The cases
Professor Morley cites do not support the argument, and he disregards the
many cases that contravene it, in which state courts explicitly rejected the
Doctrine.
Professor Morley cites three state court opinions in support of this
argument. The first is the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s soldier-voting
opinion (1864), which, as already discussed, very likely had nothing to do
with the Doctrine. His reliance on the other two cases—from Mississippi
(1873) and Rhode Island (1887)385—is similarly misplaced.
Although Professor Morley states the Mississippi Supreme Court
“applied the doctrine” in 1873,386 that case plainly had nothing to do with
the Doctrine.387 The case concerned who had been rightfully elected
treasurer of Hinds County. All the court did was reject an argument that
the constitution’s requirement that “all general elections . . . be holden every
two years” (Article IV, Section 7) was violated when the state legislature
effectively required the state to hold a general election every year by
designating 1871 as the first year for resumed state elections and 1872 as the
first year for congressional elections resumed after the state’s readmission
to the Union.388 In rejecting the argument, the court reasoned that the state
constitutional requirement applied to elections for state officers, not
Congress, and, in any event, both sets of elections would, in fact, be
biennial.389
Professor Morley also mischaracterizes the 1887 matter from Rhode
Island. The Doctrine was not an “essential component” of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court’s opinion,390 and the law in question did not
“squarely violate[]” the state constitution.391 Rather, the state House of
Representatives requested the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinion on
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Morley, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 45.
Id. at 42–44.
Id. at 42.
State v. Williams, 49 Miss. 640, 664–65 (1873).
Id. at 665–66.
Id. at 666–67.
Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections Clause, supra note 259, at 149.
Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, supra note 22, at 200.
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whether the constitution’s majority vote requirement for all elections “under
this constitution”392 applied to congressional, presidential, and certain local
elections, or whether such elections could be conducted on a plurality basis,
as had been the practice.393 The court advised that the majority vote
requirement did not apply to any of the identified elections, explaining that
elections “under this constitution” were limited to certain specified state
elections “particularly provided for” in the constitution (e.g., governor, state
legislature, and attorney general).394 The court also stated the state
constitution could not in any event constrain the legislature’s approach by
virtue of the Elections Clause and the Elector Appointment Clause.395
The truth of the matter is, in these and subsequent cases described below,
state courts were asked to entertain—and did entertain—the potential
applicability of state constitutional provisions to federal elections. Doing so
would have been unnecessary if the courts were adherents of the
independent state legislature doctrine.
In 1892, in McPherson v. Blacker,396 the Michigan Supreme Court upheld
the state legislature’s decision to elect presidential electors using a district
system instead of the general ticket.397 The court not only rejected the
argument that the Federal Constitution somehow precluded the district
system398 but also the argument that passage of the statute had violated the
state constitutional requirement that “no law shall embrace more than one
object.”399 No one suggested that the Elector Appointment Clause gave
the state legislature the right to disregard the state constitutional
requirement.400
392. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. VIII, § 10, reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 37, at 3231.
393. In re Plurality Elections, 8 A. 881, 881 (R.I. 1887).
394. Id. at 883.
395. Id. at 882 (“We think it doubtful . . . section 10 was intended to extend to elections of
representatives to [C]ongress; but, if it was, to that extent it is, in our opinion, of no effect . . . .”).
396. McPherson v. Blacker, 52 N.W. 469 (Mich. 1892), aff’d, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
397. McPherson v. Blacker, 52 N.W. 469, 472 (Mich. 1892), aff’d, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); see generally
Peter H. Argersinger, Electoral Reform and Partisan Jugglery, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 499 (2004) (describing the
partisan calculations that gave rise to the Michigan legislature’s adoption of the district-based system
and the subsequent litigation aimed at undoing the legislation); KEYSSAR, supra note 218, at 141 (“What
transpired was not a debate regarding the merits of different modes of choosing electors but partisan
warfare grounded in assessments of the electoral impact of abandoning the general ticket.”).
398. McPherson, 52 N.W. at 470–73.
399. Id. at 470. For the state constitutional provision at issue, see MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. 4,
§ 20, reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 152, at 1948.
400. As is now well known, in rejecting the subsequent appeal of the federal questions, the
Supreme Court block-quoted from an 1874 report by Senator Oliver P. Morton, including language in
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In 1910, in State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley, the South Dakota Supreme Court
rejected the argument that a state legislature could prescribe congressional
“manner” regulations without abiding by the state constitutional
referendum requirement.401 The court held, notwithstanding the use of the
word “legislature” in the Elections Clause, if the state constitution “has fixed
limits, the Legislature cannot transcend them, but must act within the limits
prescribed, and if it goes beyond them its action is to that extent absolutely
void.”402
In 1918, the Rhode Island Supreme Court gave two advisory opinions to
the state’s governor relating to the 1864 state constitutional amendment that
gave soldiers absent from the state the right to vote for President and
Congress.403 First, the court opined the amendment—dating from before
the Seventeenth Amendment—could not be construed to give soldiers the
right to vote in elections for U.S. Senators.404 Second, the court told the
Governor that, given the history of the independent state legislature
doctrine, it was “impossible to predict” how the Senate, acting as the judge
of its own elections, might act if a senator was elected by absent soldiers in
violation of the state constitution.405
In 1919, the Maine Supreme Court advised the governor of Maine that
an act of the state legislature giving women the right to vote for President
was subject to the state constitution’s referendum requirement.406
The court rejected the independent state legislature doctrine, concluding
that the Electors Clause did not give the legislation “any superiority over or
independence from the organic law of the state.”407

the report stating that the Article II powers of state legislatures “cannot be taken from them or
modified by their State constitutions.” McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892); see also Smith,
supra note 1, at 775–77 (describing the dicta at length). Professor Morley argues the Supreme Court
“enthusiastically endorsed” the independent legislature doctrine in McPherson, see Morley, Federal
Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 70, but this is not supported by any reasonable reading
of the case. The circumstances of Senator Morton’s report have been discussed at length elsewhere,
and I will not beat that dead horse any further. Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, supra note 44,
at 1836–37; Smith, supra note 1, at 777–79.
401. State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley, 127 N.W. 848, 849 (S.D. 1910).
402. Id. at 851–52.
403. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. IV (adopted Aug. 1864), reprinted in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 37, at 3235–36.
404. In re Op. to the Governor , 102 A. 913, 914 (R.I. 1918).
405. In re Op. to the Governor, 103 A. 513, 516 (R.I. 1918).
406. In re Op. of the Justs., 107 A. 705, 705 (Me. 1919).
407. Id. at 706.
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This brings down the state court decisions to the time of the Supreme
Court’s 1920 decision in Hawke v. Smith.408 Hawke was the first of several
Supreme Court decisions, described in more detail below, that together
rejected the Doctrine.409
c.

House Contested Election Cases

Professor Morley is also incorrect when he argues that, in contested
election cases after Baldwin v. Trowbridge, the House “consistently embraced
and applied” the Doctrine. In reality, the Doctrine did not carry the day in
any contested election case after Baldwin.
In the first instance the Doctrine was invoked after Baldwin, the House
voted against the contestant who would have benefited from the Doctrine.
In 1874, the House considered whether to seat two congressional candidates
from West Virginia elected in October 1872 (pursuant to an existing state
statute specifying October as the time for electing congressmen) or two
others who claimed to have been elected in August 1872 (pursuant to the
state’s 1872 constitution, which specified August as the time for electing
“all officers, executive, judicial, county, or district, required by this
constitution to be elected by the people”).410 In the Elections Committee,
three positions were staked out. First, the majority pointed out the new
constitution did not, by its terms, purport to mandate congressional
elections in August.411 Second, Representative R.M. Speer submitted a
separate opinion in which he argued that, even if the new constitution called
for congressional elections in August, this would have been a violation of
408. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
409. See infra, Part IV.A. The frequency with which state courts had occasion to apply state
constitutions to “manner” legislation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should not be
overstated. It is true that there were numerous cases during that era in which state courts entertained
state constitutional claims in the context of state elections. See Weingartner, supra note 268, at 42–43,
43 n.320 (identifying such state court cases from the 1860s to the 1920s); see also Samuel S.-H. Wang,
Richard F. Ober, Jr., & Ben Williams, Laboratories of Democracy Reform: State Constitutions and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 22 J. CONST. L. 203, 253–57 (2019) (identifying such state court cases from the 1910s
and 1920s). However, apart from the matters that I have summarized in the text, I am not aware of
any other state court matters from the 1920s or earlier in which state constitutions were applied
specifically to “manner” legislation. There were a number of such cases in the 1930s (see infra note 453)
and subsequent to the 1930s (which are summarized in the two articles cited in this footnote).
410. See H.R. REP. NO. 43-7, at 1 (1874) (reproducing the majority report, concurring report,
and minority report in West Virginia Contested Elections).
411. See id. at 5 (reproducing the majority report and explaining that the constitutional language
specifying an August election “excludes, because it does not include, Representatives in Congress, who
are not ‘required by this constitution to be elected by the people’”).
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the state legislature’s power to determine the timing of the election pursuant
to the Elections Clause.412 Speer cited Baldwin as well as Justice Story’s
arguments at the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention.413 Third,
Representative G.W. Hazeltine dissented, arguing that the state statute did
not adequately prescribe an October election but that the new constitution
somehow did prescribe an August election and “[i]t makes no difference
whatever, so far as the construction of the term ‘prescribe’ is concerned,
whether the power making the prescription be the constitutional convention
or the legislature.”414 The House rejected the committee majority’s view
and upheld the August election allegedly conducted pursuant to the state
constitution.415 Professor Morley attempts to spin this matter as somehow
supporting the Prevailing View Thesis, but the argument does not make
sense.416
The most that can be said in favor of the Prevailing View Thesis is that,
on two occasions in 1880, the contestant on whose behalf the Doctrine was
invoked did not lose. First, in Donnelly v. Washburn, the party invoking the
Doctrine prevailed by default when the House never acted. Dueling reports
of the House Committee on Elections discussed a number of issues arising
out of the Minnesota congressional election, including whether to count
ballots that were “numbered.”417 The report in favor of the challenger,
412. Id. at 17 (reproducing the concurring report by Speer arguing that “The State constitution
had not given to the legislature the power to say when Congressmen shall be elected, (for it did not
have it to give,) and neither State constitution nor State convention could take it away”).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 23; see also id. at 24 (reproducing the minority report by Hazeltine arguing that the
“constitutional convention had authority to prescribe a time, after its ratification, for the election of
Representatives”).
415. See Muller, supra note 22, at 730 (citing ASHER C. HINDS ,1 HIND’S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 522, at 660 (1907) [hereinafter HIND’S
PRECEDENTS]). Professor Muller identified a similar matter (Patterson v. Belford) in which the House
upheld an 1876 election held in Colorado pursuant to the state constitution. See id. at 730 (citing 1
HIND’S PRECEDENTS §§ 523–24, at 660–67); H.R. REP. NO. 45-15 (1877) (displaying majority and
minority reports in Patterson v. Belford).
416. Professor Morley mischaracterizes this matter as one in which the House “expressly relied
upon the [Doctrine] in resolving a dispute,” Morley, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15,
at 55, and exhibited a “general consensus” in favor of the Doctrine. Id. at 59. While it is certainly true
that during the debate several Congressmen agreed with Representative Speer’s articulation of the
Doctrine, see id. at 57–58 (citing comments made during floor debate), that position did not carry the
day, and those elected in August—as allegedly required by the new state constitution—were the ones
who were seated.
417. See H.R. REP. NO. 46-1791, at 17–18 (1880) (reproducing committee reports in Donnelly v.
Washburn).
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Ignatius Donnelly, argued numbered ballots should be thrown out because
they vitiated secrecy, were tainted by intimidation against the Donnelly
voters, and violated the state constitution’s “all elections shall be by ballot”
requirement (the state’s supreme court had so held).418 The other report
favored the sitting member, William Washburn. Citing Baldwin, this report
argued it did not matter if the numbered ballots violated the Minnesota
constitution because, under the Elections Clause, the constitution had no
applicability to congressional elections.419 The committee could not reach
a conclusion on the matter, and the House never voted on it; as a result,
Washburn retained his seat.420
Second, in Iowa Contested Election Cases, the committee majority whose
recommendation later prevailed in the full House invoked the Doctrine in
its report—but only in passing to rebut an irrelevant collateral argument.
That majority report concluded that Iowa had correctly applied a federal
“manner” statute when the state held its 1878 congressional elections in
October (as required by the applicable state statute) instead of
November.421 The federal statute required congressional elections in
November unless—as the committee found with respect to Iowa—this
would force a state to amend its constitution with respect to the election of
“State officers” if the state wanted them to be elected at the same time as

418. Id. at 17–18 (reproducing report by Congressman Manning).
419. Id. at 58–59 (reproducing report by Congressman Keifer). Earlier in his career, Donnelly
served three terms as a Republican member of Congress, first elected in 1862 by a margin attributed
to the Minnesota soldier vote. Lynwood G. Downs, The Soldier Vote and Minnesota Politics, 1862–65,
26 MINN. HIST. 187, 197–98 (1945); Donnelly, Ignatius 1831–1901, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
U.S. CONG., https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/D000417 [https://perma.cc/KZL7-N5LW].
In 1866, during Donnelly’s second term, he voted in favor of Trowbridge in Baldwin v. Trowbridge.
39th Congress, House, Vote 68, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0390068 [https://perma.
cc/H7P7-A8RK]. Now, fourteen years later, in a contested election case to regain a seat in Congress,
he found himself on the receiving end of the independent state legislature doctrine.
420. Muller, supra note 22, at 728. Evidence suggests that the Democratic majority in the House
would have wanted to side with Donnelly (once a Republican but now a Greenbacker), over Washburn
(a Republican), but Donnelly’s effort before the Elections Committee was derailed at the last minute
when an anonymous letter was unearthed which purported to be an attempt to bribe the chairman of
the election committee (William Springer of Illinois) to vote in favor of Washburn in return for $5,000.
John D. Hicks, The Political Career of Ignatius Donnelly, 8 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 80, 99–100 (1921).
Although Donnelly denied any involvement in a false flag operation, “the suspicion settled into belief
that Donnelly’s chief counsel had taken this dishonorable means to show Springer that Washburn was
really capable of offering a bribe,” with the result that Washburn held his seat. Id.
421. See H.R. REP. NO. 46-19, at 2 (1880) (reproducing the majority and minority reports in Iowa
Contested Election Cases).
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congressmen.422 For some reason, the majority felt compelled to explain
that its blessing of the October date had nothing to do with what appears
to be an irrelevant provision in the Iowa Constitution which had specified
that the state’s “first” congressional election after adoption in 1857 was to
occur in the month of October.423 As the majority explained, in
determining the correct date under the federal statute, the only relevant state
constitutional provision was one that (a) concerned the election of “State
officers” and (b) would have to be amended in order to achieve a uniform
November election date. Moreover, the constitutional provision applied
only to the “first” federal election after adoption in 1857, not to an election
occurring in 1878.424 And, as if it needed another reason, the majority
added “the time of electing members of Congress cannot be prescribed by
the constitution of a State, as against an act of the legislature of a State or an
act of Congress.”425
More often during the late nineteenth century, the House considered state
constitutional arguments without reference to the Doctrine, as if the
Doctrine did not exist:
•

In 1880, in Curtin v. Yocum, the House Elections Committee
considered a bid to vacate Seth Yocum’s election to Congress
predicated on allegations that he received a number of votes from
unregistered voters.426 Both the majority report in favor of
vacating the election and the minority report supporting the election
made arguments based on the Pennsylvania constitution.427 Both

422. Id. at 8–9, 17–18.
423. Id. at 18.
424. Id. at 15.
425. Id. at 18. Based on this last comment, Professor Morley describes Iowa Contested Election
Cases as a matter in which the “House relied on the independent state legislature doctrine.” Morley,
Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 60; see also Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right
to Vote Under State Constitutions, supra note 22, at 203 (stating that the House’s decision in Iowa Contested
Election Cases “reaffirmed” the independent state legislature doctrine). Professor Morley also identified
a 1904 contested election case in which the committee report declined to address the contestants’
arguments over the Doctrine because it was unnecessary to do so. See Morley, The Independent State
Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 46 n.228 (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 58-1382 (1904) (reproducing the committee report in Davis v. Sims)).
426. See H.R. REP. NO. 46-345, at 1 (1880) (reproducing the majority report and minority report
in Curtin v. Yocum).
427. See id. at 10 (reproducing the majority report, arguing that the election should be thrown
out because Yocum’s win was obtained “in violation of the constitution and mandatory statues of
Pennsylvania”); id. at 13 (reproducing the minority report, arguing that, by virtue of the state
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sides assumed constitutional requirements applicable generally to
“elections” applied to congressional elections.428
•

In 1885, in McLean v. Broadhead, the House Elections Committee
considered the validity of Missouri’s voter registration law under the
Missouri constitution.429 The majority argued that the state
legislature’s registration law was appropriate: “[t]he legislature, we
think, had the right to go that far under the mandatory provisions
of the constitution of Missouri requiring the passage of a registry
law.”430 The minority argued the legislature’s registration law was
an “attempt to add to the qualifications of a voter” that was
“obnoxious to the constitution.”431

•

In 1886, in California Contested-Election Cases, the House Elections
Committee rejected an argument that the California legislature’s
“manner” statute for congressional elections was invalid because an
amendment to it had not been read three times before enactment as
required by the state constitution.432 The committee explained
that, per a decision of the California Supreme Court, that
constitutional requirement did not apply to amendments.433
The committee further explained that its deference to the state

constitution, the legislature could not “pass a registry law whereby a voter shall be deprived of suffrage,
if otherwise qualified, by reason of non-registration”).
428. In particular, both reports argued over the Pennsylvania constitution’s requirements that
“[a]ll laws regulating the holding of elections by the citizens or for the registration of electors shall be
uniform throughout the State, but no elector shall be deprived of the privilege of voting by reason of
his name not being registered.” PA. CONST. of 1873, art. VIII, § 7, reprinted in 2 JOURNAL OF THE
CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA: CONVENED AT HARRISBURG,
NOVEMBER 12, 1872; ADJOURNED NOVEMBER 27, TO MEET AT PHILADELPHIA, JANUARY 7, 1873,
at 1322 (Harrisburg, Benjamin Singerly 1873). The House followed the minority report’s
recommendation in Curtin v. Yocum. See 2 HIND’S PRECEDENTS, supra note 415, § 941, at 223 (“[T]he
minority views prevailed.”).
429. See H.R. REP. NO. 48-2613, at 2 (1885) (reproducing the majority report and minority
report in McLean v. Broadhead).
430. Id. at 4.
431. Id. at 14. The House did not take any action in McLean v. Broadhead. See 2 HIND’S
PRECEDENTS, supra note 415, § 996 at 381 (“The report was not acted on by the House.”).
432. See H.R. REP. NO. 49-2338 (1886) (reproducing committee report in California ContestedElection Cases).
433. Id. at 1–4.
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court’s construction of its own state’s constitution was in line with
the past practices of the Supreme Court and the committee itself.434
•

In 1888, in Frank v. Glover, the House Elections Committee rejected
an argument that the Missouri voter registration statute violated the
Missouri constitution.435

•

In 1896, in Johnston v. Stokes, the House Elections Committee
concluded that South Carolina’s voter registration statute violated
the South Carolina state constitution.436

•

In 1901, in Davison v. Gilbert, the House Elections Committee
rejected arguments that the Kentucky congressional redistricting
statute violated the Kentucky constitution and was not passed in the
manner required by the Kentucky constitution.437

•

In 1919, in Gerling v. Dunn, the House Elections Committee rejected
various arguments that the “manner and method of conducting” a
congressional election had violated New York statutory and
constitutional law.438 The committee was of the view that the
allegations were meritless, and also that the issues raised were better

434. Id. at 4. The House followed the committee’s recommendation in California ContestedElection Cases. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 46 n.226 (citing 17 CONG. REC. 4381 (1886)).
435. See H.R. REP. NO. 50-1887 (1888) (committee report in Frank v. Glover). The House
followed the committee’s recommendation in Frank v. Glover. See 2 HIND’S PRECEDENTS, supra
note 415, § 1011, at 427.
436. See H.R. REP. NO. 54-1229 (1896) (majority report and minority report in Johnston v. Stokes).
The House followed the committee majority’s recommendation in Johnston v. Stokes. See Morley,
The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 67 (citing
28 CONG. REC. 5952 (1896)). Also in 1896, the House Election Committee considered whether the
Virginia constitution’s secret ballot requirement was violated by certain provisions of the state’s
election law. See Weingartner, supra note 268, at 60 & n.448 (discussing H.R. REP. NO. 54-1473 (1896)
(reproducing the majority and minority reports in Cornett v. Swanson)).
437. See H.R. REP. NO. 56-3000 (1901) (committee report in Davison v. Gilbert). The committee’s
report expressed doubt that the Elections Clause gave Congress the power to overrule the manner in
which a state chose to divide its representation in Congress. See id. at 2 (arguing that Congress has only
“the power to provide the means whereby a State should be represented in Congress when the State
itself, for some reason, has failed or refused to make such provision itself”). The full House took no
action in Davison v. Gilbert. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State
Constitutions, supra note 15, at 45 n.219.
438. H.R. REP. NO. 65-1074 (1919) (committee report in Gerling v. Dunn).
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left to the legislature or “to be determined and adjudicated by the
courts of New York State and not by Congress.”439
•

In 1922, in Paul v. Harrison,440 the House Elections Committee
found that “there was such an utter, complete and reckless disregard
of the mandatory provisions of the fundamental law of the State of
Virginia involving the essentials of a valid election, that . . . there
was no legal election in those precincts.”441

No one in any of these cases suggested that the state constitution was
irrelevant because of the independent state legislature doctrine. Professor
Morley attempts to spin each of these matters as somehow supporting his
argument that the Doctrine was the “prevailing view” in the nineteenth
century, but, in each instance, his commentary is post-hoc lawyer argument
bereft of any basis in the historical record.442
439. Id. at 2 (“It has not been and should never be the policy of the House of Representatives
to pass upon the validity of State laws under which elections are held when the complaint is that the
legislative enactment is contrary to the provisions of the State constitution.”). The House followed
the committee’s recommendation in Gerling v. Dunn. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine,
Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15, at 47 n.231 (citing 57 CONG. REC. 3578 (1919)).
440. H.R. REP. NO. 67-1101 (1922) (reproducing the majority report and minority report in Paul
v. Harrison).
441. Id. at 9. The House followed the committee’s recommendation in Paul v. Harrison.
See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, supra note 15,
at 48 n.233 (citing 64 CONG. REC. 545-47 (1922)).
442. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 67 (describing Curtin v. Yocum as having “recognized and enforced [a] restriction on
the [Doctrine]” that distinguishes between state constitutional limits on voter registration statutes that
effectively add to voter qualifications (which Professor Morley says are permissible) and other state
constitutional limitations on “manner” legislation (which Professor Morley says are impermissible)); id.
at 46 & n.229 (suggesting that in McLean v. Broadhead, “rather than invoking the doctrine” to avoid the
state constitutional question, the House instead decided to “simply reject[] a state constitutional
challenge on the merits”); id. at 46 (arguing that California Contested-Election Cases is “[c]onsistent with”
the Doctrine because it is an example of the House “enforc[ing] state constitutions’ procedural
requirements concerning the legislative process that legislatures had to follow,” which is different than
the House “declin[ing] to enforce state constitutions’ substantive restrictions on the scope of
legislatures’ authority over federal elections”); id. at 46 & n.229 (suggesting that in Frank v. Glover,
“rather than invoking the doctrine” to avoid the state constitutional question, the House instead
decided to “simply reject[] a state constitutional challenge on the merits”); id. at 67 (describing Johnston
v. Stokes as an instance in which the House “observed” the “limitation” that Professor Morley sees on
the Doctrine, pursuant to which it would be permissible for state constitutions to constrain voter
registration statutes if they effectively add voter qualifications beyond those contained in the
constitution); id. at 46 & n.229 (arguing that Davison v. Gilbert is an example of the House deciding to
“simply reject[] a state constitutional challenge on the merits” instead of relying on the Doctrine);

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/4

94

Smith: Revisiting History of the Independent State Legislature Doctrine

2022]

HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

539

***

In sum, the argument that the independent state legislature doctrine was
widely accepted in the late nineteenth century is belied by the evidence that
the Doctrine was more often either unknown, disregarded, or rejected.
In Baldwin in 1866, at least some Republican members of Congress justified
their vote based on the Doctrine, but it is not clear how widely that view
was shared among that caucus. After Baldwin, the Doctrine never
subsequently gained traction in either the House contested election cases or
state courts.
IV. THE IRRELEVANCE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY INVOCATIONS
OF THE DOCTRINE
With a proper understanding of the history, we can now ask how, if at all,
the nineteen-century invocations of the Doctrine are relevant to
constitutional interpretation? In other words, why are we even talking about
it? Professor Balkin has noted that history often appears in legal arguments
as an enthymeme, that is, “an argument with a suppressed premise.”443
The suppressed premise is “the theory of argument that justifies the use of
history, or that makes the use of history salient and relevant.”444 Is there
some unstated theory of how the Doctrine’s nineteenth-century history is
relevant that we should be evaluating? When the suppressed premise that
allegedly “bestow[s] authority on history” is identified, it “helps us better
understand how to criticize and evaluate historical arguments on their own
terms,” and determine whether the use of history is “good or bad,
competent or incompetent.”445
The most famous constitutional “argument from history” is originalism.
However, the Doctrine’s nineteenth-century history does not even tend to
establish the Doctrine as the original understanding, and no one could
seriously make that claim. As Justice Thomas once explained in similar
circumstances, “[a]ctions taken by a single House of Congress in
id. at 47–48 (characterizing Gerling v. Dunn as an example of how, in the twentieth century, the House
“reformulated” the Doctrine into a “discretionary refusal to consider state constitutional challenges”
except for “extreme cases of pervasive, structural unfairness”); id. at 47–48 & n.233 (characterizing
Paul v. Harrison as an “extreme case[] of pervasive, structural unfairness” in which the House enforced
state constitutional provisions).
443. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 664
(2013) (citing Laura Kalman, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 114 (1997)).
444. Id.
445. Id. at 666, 668.
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1887 . . . shed little light on the original understanding of the
Constitution.”446
Is the unstated argument that emergence of the Doctrine somehow
“liquidated” the meaning of the Constitution,447 or that its subsequent
cameos amounted to a “longstanding and seldom questioned practice” that
now constitutes a post-Founding “gloss” on constitutional meaning?448
If so, the argument is meritless as a factual matter. The Doctrine did not
exist at the Founding, it was never subsequently the “prevailing view,” it was
invariably challenged when invoked, and, in the long run, it was rejected by
the courts. If anything, the post-Founding history has confirmed the
original understanding against the Doctrine.

446. United States Terms Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 915 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
447. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1775 (2015) (“[A]ll agree that historical inquiries are necessary and
appropriate to determine whether historical practice has ‘liquidated’ the meaning of otherwise vague
or ambiguous constitutional provisions . . . .”); see generally William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation,
71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (exploring the historical importance of constitutional liquidation).
448. Fallon, supra note 447, at 1775, 1778 (“longstanding historical practice can at least
sometimes constitute a ‘gloss’ on constitutional language”; “glosses need not necessarily originate in
the near aftermath of the Founding”). Michael Weingartner argues that the nineteenth and twentiethcentury history has “liquidated” the meaning of the Elector Appointment and Elections Clauses against
the independent state legislature doctrine. Weingartner, supra note 268. Putting aside questions about
the “exact mechanics” of liquidation theory, see William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 49 (2019) (outlining the “harder questions” that will need to be answered if “if liquidation is to
become or remain a part of constitutional interpretation today”), I would say that resort to liquidation
theory is inapposite because the meaning of these clauses was clear to Americans at the Founding, at
least with respect to whether laws created by “legislatures” were to be treated differently than other
laws. See id. at 66–67 (discussing how liquidation theory can apply only when there is a “constitutional
indeterminacy” remaining after “resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the nation” (quoting James Madison) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, as
explained later in the next section, the original understanding against the Doctrine has been reflected
in Supreme Court precedent for about a century, such that subsequent consistent practice by other
actors is not as constitutionally meaningful as it might otherwise be. See Joseph Blocher & Margaret
H. Lemos, Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss Games, 106 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2016) (explaining
that constitutional interpretation based on historical practice is most significant in areas where judicial
review is most limited, such as separation of powers, because, once the Supreme Court speaks on an
issue, its “precedent is what governs—the practices no longer have the same independent
significance”). Nevertheless, the historical consensus—that “manner” legislation should be treated no
differently than any other legislation—is historical wisdom that should warn the Supreme Court away
from disregarding the original understanding or jettisoning its own precedent. Moreover, the history
is a red flag to the extent it suggests that the typical invocation of the Doctrine is motivated by base
political purposes.
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The last potentially relevant “argument from history” is stare decisis, the
legal argument “for fidelity to precedent,” even if it is wrong.449 Most of
the history reviewed previously concerned unsuccessful invocations of the
Doctrine. The one nineteenth-century matter that somewhat resembles a
judicial precedent, and is not an advisory opinion, is the House’s decision in
the 1866 case of Baldwin v. Trowbridge. However, Baldwin should not be
followed as precedent by a court, for two reasons. First, Baldwin was long
ago overtaken by controlling Supreme Court precedent rejecting the
independent state legislature doctrine. Second, Baldwin was the product of
a decision-making system that lacked the process and judicial integrity that
normally justifies and demands reliance on the decisions of past courts
under the doctrine of stare decisis.
A. The Modern Supreme Court Precedent That Answers the Question
Baldwin cannot serve as precedent because it has been overtaken by
Supreme Court precedent. That precedent begins in 1920, in Hawke, in
which the Court held that, under Article V, a state legislature’s decision to
ratify a proposed constitutional amendment did not have to be submitted
to the people pursuant to the state constitution’s referendum
mechanism.450 In so holding, the Court made clear that “the expression of
assent or dissent to a proposed amendment” pursuant to Article V, for
which “no legislative action is authorized or required,” is “entirely different”
than the “legislative action” of passing “manner” legislation pursuant to the
Elections Clause.451 In 1932, in Smiley v. Holm,452 the Court confirmed
what it suggested in Hawke—the Elections Clause does not confer any
authority on a state legislature to enact “manner” legislation “independently

449. June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
450. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (holding that a state does not have “authority
to require the submission of the ratification to a referendum under the state constitution”); see also Leser
v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1922) (rejecting the argument that legislative ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment was invalid because of failure to comply with state constitutional
requirements). In 1916, the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected arguments that Congress’s own
“manner” legislation could not recognize the Ohio constitutional referendum mechanism as part of
the state’s legislative power for purposes of creating congressional districts pursuant to the Elections
Clause. Ohio ex. rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1916). The Court also rejected as
non-justiciable the argument that the presence of a constitutional referendum requirement “causes a
State . . . to be not republican in form.” Id. at 569.
451. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230.
452. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
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of the participation of the Governor as required by the state constitution
with respect to the enactment of laws.”453
More than eighty years after Smiley, in Arizona State Legislature, the Court
upheld an Arizona constitutional provision that could not be more contrary
to the independent state legislature doctrine. The provision at issue—which
was made part of the constitution through the citizen initiative process
without any involvement of the “legislature”—“remove[d] redistricting
authority from the Arizona Legislature and vest[ed] that authority in an
independent commission” which is required to redistrict without any
involvement of the “legislature.”454 In her opinion for the majority, Justice
Ginsburg wrote, among other things, that “[n]othing in [the Elections]
Clause instructs, nor has this Court ever held, that a state legislature may
prescribe regulations . . . in defiance of provisions of the State’s
constitution.”455
453. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 373. In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 373 (1932), the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court, which had held, citing Hawke, that a state legislature
prescribing “manner” regulations pursuant to the Elections Clause should enjoy the same freedom
from constitutional restraint as a state legislature deciding whether to ratify a constitutional amendment
pursuant to Article V. Minnesota v. Holm, 238 N.W. 494, 499 (Minn. 1931). By contrast, the highest
courts of Missouri and New York had held in January 1932 that the distinction that Hawke drew
between “assent or dissent” under Article V and “legislative action” under Article I, Section 4
precluded the argument that the Elections Clause created independent legislatures, and those decisions
were affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court at the same time it reversed in Smiley. State ex. rel. Carroll v.
Becker, 45 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Mo. 1932), aff’d, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 179 N.E. 705,
707–08 (N.Y. 1932), aff’d, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); see also Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 107 (Va. 1932)
(following Smiley). Also, just before Smiley, the Illinois Supreme Court had struck down that state
legislature’s Congressional redistricting plan as inconsistent with the requirements of “manner”
legislation passed by Congress. Moran v. Bowley, 179 N.E. 526, 531 (Ill. 1932). The Illinois court
added that the legislature had also violated the Illinois constitution’s requirement that all elections be
“free and equal” by “giving every voter a voice approximately equal to that of every other voter.”
Id. at 531–32. In response, a dissenting judge invoked the Doctrine, arguing that, because the state
legislature was acting under the Elections Clause, it was “not limited by local constitutional provisions.”
Id. at 534 (DeYoung, J., dissenting).
454. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015).
455. Id. at 817–18. This renders obsolete not only Baldwin and the other nineteenth-century
invocations of the Doctrine, but also the twentieth-century court cases which relied on the Doctrine,
Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1944), and State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh,
34 N.W.2d 279 (Neb. 1948). Those seeking a precedent to which we should return seem to prefer the
nineteenth-century “precedent” of Baldwin to those more modern cases. As for the Kentucky case—
the World War II soldier-voting case—it may have something to do with the Kentucky court’s
acceptance of the proposition that “legislature” means a state’s “legislative authority,” including a
referendum, see O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d at 695, or perhaps it is because the case—which contains the
first articulation of the substance/procedure distinction—highlights that the distinction did not arise
at the Founding, see supra note 17. As for the nineteenth-century case, it is likely considered too
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Chief Justice Roberts wrote the dissent in Arizona State Legislature.
He acknowledged that the Court’s precedent required “manner” legislation
to be enacted “in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking,
which may include the referendum and the Governor’s veto,” but
emphasized that this was true only “so far as it goes.”456 He explained that
there is “a critical difference between allowing a State to supplement the
legislature’s role in the legislative process and permitting the State to supplant
the legislature altogether” and that “imposing some restraints on the
legislature” does not “justif[y] deposing it entirely.”457 As to the
constitutionality of a variety of existing state constitutional restrictions on
“legislatures,” such as provisions requiring voting to be “by ballot,” the
Chief Justice commented that they were “well outside the scope of this
case” and that “none of them purports to do what the Arizona Constitution
does here: set up an unelected, unaccountable institution that permanently
and totally displaces the legislature from the redistricting process.”458
Finally, in Rucho v. Common Cause, Chief Justice Roberts, now writing for
a majority of the Court, held that partisan gerrymandering claims are not
justiciable in federal court.459 However, he took pains to point out that this
holding did not “condemn complaints about [gerrymandering] to echo into
a void.”460 He explained that the “States . . . are actively addressing the
issue on a number of fronts,” and then listed specific state constitutional
limitations on partisan gerrymandering by “legislatures,” including the
Florida Supreme Court’s 2015 decision striking down the Florida
“legislature’s” congressional districting plan as a violation of the Florida
constitution, as well as constitutional amendments in Colorado and
Michigan creating “multimember commissions that will be responsible in

insubstantial to serve as the precedent. See Marsh, 34 N.W.2d at 287 (stating that the Elector
Appointment Clause made it unnecessary to consider whether a statute prohibiting nomination of
candidates for elector not affiliated with any party conflicted with the state constitution’s requirement
that “all elections shall be free”).
456. Ariz. State Legis., 576 U.S. at 841 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
457. Id. (“Under the Elections Clause, ‘the Legislature’ is a representative body that, when it
prescribes election regulations, may be required to do so within the ordinary lawmaking process, but
may not be cut out of that process.”).
458. Id. at 848.
459. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
460. Id. at 2507.
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whole or in part for creating and approving district maps for
congressional . . . districts.”461
B. The Failure as Precedent of Nineteenth-Century House Contested Election
Decisions, Including Baldwin v. Trowbridge
The fact that the Supreme Court has rejected Baldwin’s articulation of the
Doctrine is not the end of the story. Proponents of the Doctrine have made
clear that, if they were Supreme Court Justices, they would overrule Arizona
State Legislature and ignore the Rucho commentary.462 This would clear the
way for them to argue that (a) pre-Arizona State Legislature Supreme Court
cases permitting state constitutional regulation of “legislatures” never
extended to constitutional regulation of the “substance” of election law (but
rather only procedure),463 and (b) the relevant precedent on the
“substance” question is therefore Baldwin v. Trowbridge, the 1866 House
contested election case which (at least in the minds of some participants)

461. Id. (citing League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (2015)).
The majority in Rucho included all four Justices who recently expressed support for the independent
legislature doctrine (Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh). It is not clear how these four
Justices would reconcile the Rucho opinion with support for the Doctrine. Derek Muller has suggested
that they might attempt to draw a distinction between state courts enforcing “specific
antigerrymandering or districting provision[s]” and “more open-ended state judicial involvement.”
Derek Muller, Rucho v. Common Cause and a Weak Version of the Claims in the North Carolina Partisan
Gerrymandering Dispute, ELECTION L. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2022), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=128045
[https://perma.cc/9GHY-Y84L].
462. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 92 (arguing that the best “compromise approach” to implementing the Doctrine
would involve the “reversal” of Arizona State Legislature); id. at 7 (dismissing Rucho’s embrace of state
constitutional limitations on gerrymandering as “dicta” that did “not consider possible objections
under the U.S. Constitution”); Rappaport, LAW & LIBERTY, supra note 15 (“While the Supreme Court’s
[decision in Arizona State Legislature] allows states to combat gerrymandering through popular referenda
and redistricting commissions, it does so in an unconstitutional manner.”).
463. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 78 (arguing that Supreme Court cases before Arizona State Legislature merely required
a legislature to “follow the legislative process set forth in its state constitution when regulating federal
elections” but did not address “whether a state constitution may impose substantive limits on the
content of [such] measures”); see also Ariz. State Legis., 576 U.S. at 808, 841 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that the Court’s precedent required “manner” legislation to be enacted “in accordance
with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the Governor’s
veto,” but emphasizing that this description of prior cases was true only “so far as it goes,” and insisting
that the legislature “may not be cut out of that process”).
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overrode a substantive state constitutional regulation as violative of the
“legislature’s” rights under the Elections Clause.464
At least some members of the Supreme Court might give precedential
effect to Baldwin v. Trowbridge.465 The dissenting opinion in Arizona State
Legislature, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, would have done exactly
that.466 Extending stare decisis to a House contested election decision like
Baldwin would be novel,467 but commentators have suggested similar
without giving it much thought.468
Giving precedential effect to the House’s nineteenth-century decisions as
if they were judicial decisions would be a mistake. The approach is based
on the assumption that the House “[took] on a judicial function and act[ed]
in a judicial manner”469 when it decided these cases pursuant to its
constitutionally prescribed role as “the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
464. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 92 n.551. If the Court went down this route, it might also make the mistake of
characterizing the House’s decision in Baldwin as a reflection of the alleged nineteenth-century
“prevailing view” portrayed in Professor Morley’s work.
465. See Ariz. State Legis., 576 U.S. at 837 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing the majority report
in Baldwin as “precedent . . . from Congress” reinforcing that “‘the Legislature’ refers to a representative
body”).
466. Id. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion cited to Shiel v. Taylor as precedent. Id.
at 818–19.
467. In some cases before Arizona State Legislature, the Supreme Court referred to similar House
contested election decisions as “precedent,” but on the basis that the House’s actions might reflect
“the draftsmen’s intent” at the Founding. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (“[T[he
precedential value of these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proximity to the Convention
in 1787.”) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)); see also United States Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 51 U.S. 779, 816–817 (1995) (emphasizing the relevance of “the first 100 years” of
the House’s practices, particularly its1807 debate over whether to seat William McCreery of Maryland);
id. at 915 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (characterizing early House actions as potentially relevant to
“the original understanding of the Constitution,” but dismissing the relevance of more recent House
actions). By contrast, in Arizona State Legislature, Chief Justice Roberts cited the House’s decision in
Baldwin, not as evidence of original intent, but as “precedent” in the stare decisis sense. He argued
that, as the more recent precedent, Baldwin should control over the earlier precedent of Shiel v. Thayer.
See Ariz, State Legis., 576 U.S. at 839 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]o the degree that the two precedents
are inconsistent, the later decision in Baldwin should govern.”).
468. See Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions,
supra note 15, at 51 (“[T]he precedent powerfully supports the independent state legislature doctrine.”);
Muller, supra note 22, at 736.
469. See Muller, supra note 22, at 736 (“Congress is acting as judge in these election disputes; it
takes evidence, holds hearings, and issues opinions, often citing its own precedents.”).
Chief Justice Roberts also argued that Baldwin was “precedent” because the House was “[a]cting under
its authority to serve as ‘Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.’”
Ariz. State Legis., 576 U.S. at 837 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1).
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Qualifications of its own Members.”470 However, upon examination, the
historical evidence is contrary to the assumption that the House was acting
in a “judicial manner” when it considered contested elections in the late
nineteenth century, particularly the 1860s. The reality was much different.
Deferring to such decisions as if they were judicial precedent would not
promote the goals underlying the doctrine of stare decisis.471
1. The Non-Judicial Character of the House’s Contested Election
Decisions
a.

The House Contested Election Procedure

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, there were several aspects of
the House’s approach to deciding contested election cases that would have
made it difficult for the House to act in a judicial manner.
First, the House lacked any meaningful procedure for litigating and
deciding these matters. The only law governing the process was an 1851
statute which required the contestant, within thirty days after determination
of the election, to give notice of “the grounds upon which he relies in the
contest,” and the contestee to respond within another thirty days with an
answer “admitting or denying the facts alleged therein” and “stating
specifically any other grounds upon which he rests the validity of his
election.”472 Otherwise, the statute merely provided for document
subpoenas and depositions “confined to the proof or disproof of the facts
alleged or denied” and to be completed within sixty days of the answer.473
An 1873 amendment allowed for more time and better notice for
depositions,474 and an 1887 amendment gave each contestant the right to
470. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
471. Chief Justice Roberts was dismissive of acknowledging partisanship in Baldwin because it
would require one to “regard as tainted every decision in favor of a candidate from the same party as
a majority of the Elections Committee.” Ariz. State Legis., 576 U.S. at 839 n.3.
472. An Act to prescribe the Mode of obtaining Evidence in Cases of Contested Elections,
§§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 568 (1851).
473. Id. § 9, 9 Stat. at 570; see also Rammelkamp, supra note 251, at 423, 426; DEALVA
STANWOOD ALEXANDER, HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 313
(1916) (“There is neither appeal nor review.”). Rammelkamp describes the pre-1851 process as “fifty
years of chaotic irregularity” and quotes from an argument made in Congress when the 1851 law was
debated, in which a member described the then-existing process as “the greatest of all humbugs in this
age of humbugs.” Rammelkamp, supra, at 425 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 109
(1850)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
474. An Act supplemental to and amendatory of an Act entitled “An Act to prescribe the Mode
of obtaining Evidence in Cases of contested Elections,” 17 Stat. 408 (1873).
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file a “a brief of the facts and authorities relied on to establish his case,”
which was then provided to the Elections Committee along with a printed
record of the deposition testimony adduced by the parties.475 Beyond that,
all questions of process were left to the unfettered discretion of the
Elections Committee and, ultimately, the full House. There were no pretrial proceedings, no trial, and no appeal.
Second, the limited process which did exist was not mandatory. As Israel
Washburn of Maine explained on the House floor in 1858, “[t]he law of
Congress of 1851 is nothing but the advice or suggestion of reasonable and
intelligent and just men, as to the proper course to be taken . . . . It is
nothing more. The law is not binding upon us.”476 Or, as Henry Dawes
explained it in 1869, each iteration of the House “could dispense with any
part [of any procedure previously adopted], or the whole of it, at
pleasure.”477
Regulated by no law and bound by no precedent, each House takes up the
investigation of each case, at full liberty to pursue it in the way then deemed
most expedient or just, and conscious as it proceeds that all its decisions,
interlocutory as well as final, are absolutely within its own control. It is at
every step a law unto itself.478

According to Dawes, the result was “seldom in conformity to any of the
rules and forms found by experience in ordinary courts best calculated to
develop facts and secure justice.”479
Third, the House’s decision-making in any given case—both as to
factfinding and applying the law—was largely opaque. Sometimes, the
House effectively decided in favor of the sitting member by taking no action
on a matter, or simply by postponing any decision until the end of the
congressional term. And when a contested election came up for a House
475. An act relating to contested elections, 24 Stat. 445 (1887).
476. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 562 (1858); see also Rammelkamp, supra note 251,
at 427 (describing House’s view that it “may at any time constitutionally disregard both law and
precedent” in deciding contested elections).
477. Henry L. Dawes, The Mode of Procedure In Cases of Contested Elections, 2 J. SOC. SCI. 56, 6 (1870)
(“A Paper Read at the General Meeting of the American Social Science Association, at New York,
October 26, 1869.”).
478. Id. at 1; see also Rammelkamp, supra note 251, at 427 (“[T]he most that can be said for the
laws regulating the procedure is that they will not be disregarded ‘without good cause’.”); ALEXANDER,
supra note 473, at 322 (“[A] disposition to ignore the act has long controlled the House.”) (providing
examples).
479. Dawes, supra note 477, at 5.
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vote, the vote was simply whether to seat the sitting member or the
challenger, not whether the factual findings or legal reasoning of a particular
committee report should be adopted. Only the committee members who
signed the committee reports, and perhaps some others who spoke on the
floor, went on the record with their reasoning. “If more than one issue
[was] raised . . . one can never be sure on what basis the action was
predicated.”480
Finally, congressmen were hardly in a position to act like judges. These
were elected officials in the most political branch of government, tasked
with adjudicating disputes that were inseparably intertwined with the spread
between majority and minority parties in the House and thus the members’
own political power. The Committee of Elections could perhaps have been
constructed in such a way as to temper the political pressures, but this was
not the case. As Dawes explained, the “committee [was] appointed by the
Speaker, under the same usage which govern[ed] the selection of all the
other committees,” resulting in “a political committee . . . infected with an
incurable disease” from its inception.481 Moreover, many congressmen did
not have the time, training or inclination to act like judges.482
b.

The Experience of Henry Dawes in the 1860s

Was the House able to overcome the headwinds of this system—in which
inherently political actors reached opaque decisions with minimal

480. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546 n.85 (1969) (quoting Note, The Power of a House of
Congress to Judge the Qualifications of its Members, 81 HARV. L. REV. 673, 679 (1968) [hereinafter The Power
of a House of Congress] (noting the difficulty in “[d]etermining the basis for a congressional action,” which,
“unlike a reported judicial decision, contains no statement of the reasons for the disposition,” thus
requiring “fall back on the debates and the committee reports”)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
481. Dawes, supra note 477, at 11; see also Thomas B. Reed, Contested Elections, 151 N. AM. REV.
112, 114 (1890) (noting that because “the party which organizes the House . . . appoints the majority
of the Committee on Elections” there was “[p]robably . . . not a single instance on record where the
minority was increased by the decision of contested cases”).
482. Reed, supra note 481, at 113 (“Men have no time to examine evidence, and no inclination.”);
id. at 114 (opining that House members were “utterly unqualified . . . [and] utterly incapable” of acting
“as ‘judges and not as partisans’”), id. at 115 (“[T]he incoming of an election case is a leave-of-absence
for three-quarters of the House.”); SAMUEL W. MCCALL, THADDEUS STEVENS 106 (1899) (opining
as to “obvious impossibility” of “the semblance of judicial fairness” from a body “composed of
hundreds of members, of whom many were not lawyers, and of whom also not one in twenty would
ordinarily have any knowledge of the evidence”); ALEXANDER, supra note 473, at 326 (“[M]embers
often find it physically impossible, with their other duties, to give to the many cases the study necessary
to their proper disposition.”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/4

104

Smith: Revisiting History of the Independent State Legislature Doctrine

2022]

HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

549

procedure—to act in a “judicial manner?” The experience of Henry L.
Dawes in the 1860s suggests not.
Dawes served as a Representative from Massachusetts from 1857 to 1875,
and then as a Senator from 1875–1893. During the 37th through 40th
Congresses (1861–1869), Dawes was the chairman of the Committee on
Elections.483 He was a Republican, and a partisan, but had a reputation for
independence and fairness which he attempted to fulfill in his role as
chairman of that committee.484
In late 1869, after moving on from his role as Elections Committee
chairman, Dawes authored a paper that was read at the general meeting of
the American Social Science Association in October 1869, and then later
published in the Journal of Social Science.485 The paper, entitled
“The Mode of Procedure in Contested Elections,” has been described as
“the wail of a chairman whose hands were tied behind his back by party
dictation.”486 Dawes wrote:
All traces of a judicial character in [House contested election] proceedings are
fast fading away, and the precedents are losing all sanction. Each case is
coming to be a mere partisan struggle. At the dictate of party majorities the
committee must fight, not follow, the law and the evidence; and he will best
meet the expectations of his appointment who can put upon the record the
best reasons for the course thus pursued. This tendency is so manifest to
those in a situation to observe, that it has ceased to be questioned, and is now
but little resisted. There is no tyranny like that of majorities, and efforts in
the past to resist them, and to hold the judgments of the Committee of
Elections up above the dirty pool of party politics, have encountered such
bitter and unsparing denunciation, and such rebuke for treason to party fealty,
that they are not likely often to be repeated. The fruit that follows such seed

483. Dawes, Henry Laurens 1816–1903, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG.,
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/D000148 [https://perma.cc/8K3K-S5J6].
484. Fred Herbert Nicklason, The Early Career of Henry L. Dawes, 1816–1871, at 291–92 (1967)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author) (“[P]artisan as [Dawes] was on many issues,
the majority of his decisions [in election cases] were informed by a fairness that frequently transcended
both party affiliation and personal friendship.”); see also Bruce Tap, “Union Men to the Polls, and Rebels to
Their Holes”: The Contested Election Between John P. Bruce and Benjamin F. Loan, 1862, 46 CIV. WAR HIST.
24, 33 (2000) (“Although a Republican, [Dawes] was fiercely independent on some issues and was not
afraid to challenge others within the Republican party.”); The Committee of Elections, SPRINGFIELD DAILY
REPUBLICAN, Mar. 23, 1866 (describing Dawes as “about half the time . . . at loggerheads with the
extremists of his party just because he won’t go contrary to right”).
485. Dawes, supra note 477, at 1.
486. Rammelkamp, supra note 251, at 435.
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is too certain for doubt. The whole proceeding must sink into contempt.
Self-respect, as well as legal attainment, will soon retire from service upon a
committee required, in the name of law and under the cloak of judicial
sanction, to do the work of partisans.487

Dawes concluded that the process had become “an engine of political
parties working out their ends.”488
What Dawes described in his paper in 1869 reflected his lived experience
in contested election cases in the 1860s. In the pages that follow, this Article
pulls back the curtain on the House’s treatment of three issues that recurred
during that decade: (i) application of the Incompatibility Clause to
congressmen who held commissions as military officers, (ii) the effect of
electoral improprieties in Missouri, and (iii) the independent state legislature
doctrine. On these issues, it appears that the House’s determinations
depended, not on the outcome of anything resembling a judicial process,
but on the partisan bona fides of the “judges” and contestants.
i.

The Incompatibility Clause

In 1860, William Vandever was re-elected as a Republican to the 37th
Congress.489 After the war began, Vandever offered to furnish a regiment
of Iowa volunteer infantry to the Union war effort, which President Lincoln
accepted.490 In September 1861, Vandever and his forces were “mustered
into in the service of the United States.”491 This appointment created an
issue under the Incompatibility Clause, which provides that “no person
holding an office under the United States shall be a member of either House
during his continuance in office.”492
Dawes’s Elections Committee, in a unanimous report, wrote that,
“[h]owever much [the members of the committee] might honor Colonel
Vandever for his noble conduct, they must judge his rights by the same law
that is applicable to the most undeserving member of the House.”493
The Committee therefore “felt compelled to” recommended that Vandever
487. Dawes, supra note 477, at 9.
488. Id. at 68.
489. Vandever, William 1817–1893, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG.,
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/V000031 [https://perma.cc/9LMR-JDAA].
490. H.R. REP. NO. 37-68 (1862), at 1–2 (reproducing the committee report in Byington v.
Vandever).
491. Id. at 2.
492. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
493. H.R. REP. NO. 37-68, at 5.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/4

106

Smith: Revisiting History of the Independent State Legislature Doctrine

2022]

HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE

551

was not entitled to his seat as of the day he was mustered into service.494
The Committee rejected Vandever’s argument that he was simply an Iowa
militia officer, not an officer of the United States, not least because the
argument was contrary to two House precedents.495
Following receipt of the committee’s report in April 1862, the House
voted to postpone debate until the next session of Congress, effectively
allowing Vandever to continue in both offices.496 Dawes reluctantly
acceded to the postponement, noting his “apprehension” that the House’s
“appreciation and admiration for [Vandever’s] patriotism and self-sacrifice”
might lead it to “sacrifice a great important constitutional principle.”497
However, Dawes allowed that the question might better be decided closer
to the end of the term “under those circumstances which will secure for it
the calmest deliberation and the fairest consideration.”498
When the matter finally came up for debate in late January 1863—with
only a couple of months remaining in the Thirty-Seventh Congress—Dawes
presented the report of his committee. However, Elihu Washburne, the
Radical Republican from Illinois, immediately sought a further one-month
postponement, ostensibly as a courtesy to Vandever, who was absent
fighting in the war.499 Dawes responded that nothing better illustrated the
“incompatibility of the two offices” than the fact that Vandever could not
“get a furlough from his commanding officer” in order to argue his own
case in Congress.500 Dawes insisted that it was incumbent upon the House
to affirmatively address the matter without further delay, no matter how
unappealing. Washburne’s motion to postpone was defeated, and the
House, at Dawes’s urging, voted to adopt the committee’s resolution against
Vandever.501 The vote in favor of the resolution against Vandever was not
recorded, but the immediately preceding vote rejecting Washburne’s bid to
delay had been 53–74. All thirty-four participating Democrats voted to
proceed along with a number of Unionists, but the seventy-four
Republicans split their vote, forty-eight to delay, twenty-six to proceed.502
494. Id.
495. Id. at 4.
496. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2023 (1862).
497. Id. at 2022.
498. Id.
499. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 404 (1863).
500. Id.
501. Id. at 404–05.
502. 37th Congress, House, Vote 433, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0370433
[https://perma.cc/6G2U-PT4E]. The fifty-three voting to delay consisted of forty-eight Republicans
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But that was not the end of the matter. The next day Washburne rose
again and asked the House to reconsider its prior vote against Vandever.
To Dawes’s surprise and dismay, the House, without any debate, reversed
itself and voted 70–64 to reconsider the matter.503 Overnight, the
Republicans had found sixteen more Republican votes—nine apparently
switched their votes, seven who had not voted now did.504 Washburne
then sought to postpone reconsideration on the merits until the last day of
the congressional term and attempted to prevent Dawes from even speaking
to the point.505
When Dawes regained the floor, he was furious. He lectured his fellow
Republicans that there had been “no word from anyone questioning the
soundness” of the principle that prevented Vandever from holding two
offices at once. “The only question upon which I find myself . . . differing
with my friends here is [whether] with the positive conviction in all our
minds that such is the [correct principle] founded upon the strict law and
the Constitution, it is of no such importance as requires us to adopt it.”506
Dawes went on to say that he had delayed bringing the matter forward for
“as long as I could consistently with my duty,” and acknowledged that it had
been “a hard vote” for everyone, but then he asked, “[a]re we to take it back
to-day because of some mysterious influence which has been set to work in
the last twenty-four hours[?]”507
Dawes’s appeal to the law and principle was unavailing. The House voted
with Washburne to postpone consideration of Vandever’s status as
congressman until the last day of the 37th Congress (March 3, 1863),
and five Unionists. Id. The seventy-four voting to proceed consisted of twenty-six Republicans,
thirty-four Democrats, fourteen Unionists, two Constitutional Unionists, and one Independent
Democrat. Id.
503. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 427–28 (1863)
504. 37th Congress, House, Vote 437, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0370437
[https://perma.cc/53TQ-GR3B]. The seventy voting to reconsider consisted of sixty-four
Republicans, four Unionists, one Democrat, and one Constitutional Unionist. Id. The sixty-four
voting against reconsideration consisted of thirty-two Democrats, seventeen Republicans, and fifteen
Unionists. Id.
505. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 428 (1863). Washburne had “refused [Dawes] the
floor at a time when, by parliamentary courtesy, he was entitled to it”; moreover, “the decision of the
speaker to that effect was practically sustained by sixty of [Dawes’s] republican brethren.” General News
Summary, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN WEEKLY, Jan. 31, 1863.
506. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 428 (1863)
507. Id. Washburne feigned that he had “no desire . . . . to shirk any issue or any vote,” that he
would “very likely” vote with Dawes, but that he wanted “all the time possible to consider this great
constitutional question.” Id. at 429.
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effectively mooting the matter, rejecting the Election Committee’s
recommendation, and avoiding any impact on Vandever’s tenure as a
congressman.508 In fact, even on March 3, the last day of the term, the
House did not act on the matter.509
This event upset Dawes. The following week, “Van,” the Washington
correspondent of The Springfield Republican, reported “rumors” that
“Mr. Dawes will resign his place as chairman of the committee on elections,”
explaining:
He was badly treated in the House the other day, his own political friends
refusing him an opportunity to speak on the Vandever case. He was
compelled to receive the help of democrats to give him his rights [to speak].
The fact is, too many of the republican members demand his services on the
difficult election cases for their side, and them, after he has given them, they
are not willing to give him the generous treatment to which he is entitled,
whenever he disagrees with the majority of the republicans. To say the least,
a man who does the party such eminent service as Mr. Dawes does at times—
whenever party and principle agree—is at all times entitled to the most
courteous treatment from his political friends.510

“Van” had special insight into what was going on, as he was D.W. Bartlett,
the clerk of the Elections Committee.511 In fact, Dawes did tender his
resignation, but the House rejected it,512 and Dawes continued as chairman
of the committee.513
By contrast to how Vandever was treated in the 37th Congress, in the
38th Congress, the Republican majority in the House did not hesitate to
apply—indeed, relished applying—the Incompatibility Clause to a different
508. Id. at 434. The vote was 78-68 and broke along party lines similar to Washburne’s vote to
reconsider, with the majority of 78 consisting of 70 Republicans, six Unionists, and two Democrats.
37th Congress, House, Vote 438, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0370438 [https://
perma.cc/AG2U-Y5XE]. The Springfield Republican’s view was that the House, “by postponing the
resolution till the last day of the session, ha[d] virtually declared that a man can hold a civil and military
office at the same time.” News from Washington, Miscellaneous, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN, Jan. 24, 1863.
509. “[I]n the pressure of business on the last day of the session, it was not called up.” H.R.
REP. NO. 38-110 (1864) (reproducing the committee report regarding the “Military Appointment of
Hon. F.P. Blair, Jr.”), at 6.
510. From Washington, Mr. Conway—Mr. Dawes, SPRINGFIELD DAILY REPUBLICAN,
Jan. 30, 1863.
511. Steven J. Arcanti, To Secure the Party: Henry L. Dawes and the Politics of Reconstruction, 5 HIST.
J. MASS. 33, 37 n.22 (1977).
512. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 491 (1863).
513. See id. (recording the motion to reject the resignation of Mr. Dawes).
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congressmen, Francis P. Blair, Jr. As described in the next section, the
difference appears to have been, in contrast to Vandever, that Blair was
despised by the Radical Republicans for his conservative views and actions.
ii. Electoral Improprieties in Missouri and the
Incompatibility Clause Again
Missouri’s congressional election for the 38th Congress, held on
November 4, 1862, generated four disputed elections, all of which came to
a head in the House in the spring of 1864. In three of the cases, the
candidate who was more appealing (or less loathsome) to radicals in the
House had been the apparent winner and was defending his seat:
(1) Benjamin F. Loan (an “increasingly radical” Unconditional Unionist who
had been serving as a brigadier general in the Missouri State Militia)514 was
defending against John P. Bruce (a “conservative Democrat” and
“conditional unionist”);515 (2) John W. McClurg (Unconditional
Unionist)516 was defending against Thomas L. Price (a Democrat);517 and
(3) Austin A. King (Democrat turned Unionist)518 was defending against
James H. Birch (formerly of the “proslavery wing of the Missouri
Democratic party”).519 In the fourth case, it was the more conservative
candidate, Francis P. Blair, Jr., who was defending his seat against the
514. Tap, supra note 484, at 25, 31; see also Loan, Benjamin Franklin 1819–1881, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/L000384 [https://
perma.cc/GWS8-QR7X] (noting that Loan was elected as an Unconditional Unionist to the 38th
Congress and a Republican to the 39th and 40th Congresses).
515. Tap, supra note 484, at 25.
516. McClurg, Joseph Washington 1818–1900, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG.,
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/M000347
[https://perma.cc/MT43-2D7P]
(noting
McClurg was elected as an “Unconditional Unionist” to the 38th Congress and as a “Republican”
to the 39th and 40th Congresses).
517. Price, Thomas Lawson 1809–1870, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG,
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/P000532 [https://perma.cc/RL49-ENM4] (noting Price
was elected as a Democrat in the 37th Congress and was a delegate to the Democratic National
Convention in 1864 and 1868).
518. King, Austin Augustus 1802–1870, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG,
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/K000194 [https://perma.cc/5YFX-33Z3] (noting that
while King attended the Democratic National Convention in 1860 he was elected as a Unionist to the
38th Congress).
519. Mark M. Carroll, “All for Keeping His Own Negro Wench”: Birch v. Benton (1858) and the Politics
of Slander and Free Speech in Antebellum Missouri, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 835, 844-45 (2011). Birch’s
opponent, Austin King, exclaimed on the House floor that “God only knows” what party Birch
belonged to, as “he has belonged to every party known in Missouri” and “never belonged to one but
to betray it.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2649 (1864).
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candidate favored by radicals, Samuel Knox, who was running as an
Unconditional Unionist.520
Dawes’s nine-member Elections Committee took up the first three cases
(Loan, McClurg, and King) at the same time in March 1864, as they raised
broadly similar issues of alleged interference in the elections by the state
militia in favor of the more radical-friendly candidates.521 Although a
Republican, Dawes joined all three Democrats on the committee, and one
other Republican, to create a 5–4 majority in favor of nullifying all three
elections. The committee minority, which would have ruled in favor of the
sitting members, consisted of three Republicans and a Unionist.522
Dawes described the fallout from the committee vote in a letter to his
wife the next day. “All of a sudden your husband’s popularity here has
gone,” he wrote. “His vote in Com. of Elections yesterday decided a case
by one majority against two of our friends in Missouri, and such a heap of
indignation, vituperation and general cursing as was piled upon his poor
head by our side of the House—was perfectly terrific.”523 The Springfield
Republican’s “Van” reported similarly that there was a “bitter feeling among
some of the radicals . . . against the republicans on the committee,” and that
Dawes, in particular, had been “condemned [by the radicals] . . . with
severity,” because he had voted “to send back to Missouri Loan and
McClurg, radical republicans.”524
Following the committee votes, Loan was the first of the three cases
brought to the full House for debate, and it became a test case for the other
520. See ALLAN G. BOGUE, THE CONGRESSMAN’S CIVIL WAR, 94 (Robert Fogel et al.
eds.,1989) (“The Missouri radicals reviled Blair for his abandonment of Fremont and supported one
of their own against him when he sought reelection to the House of Representatives from the St. Louis
congressional district.”); see also Knox, Samuel 1815–1905, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
U.S. CONG, https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/K000297 [https://perma.cc/B26S-W43Y]
(noting that Knox contested Blair’s seat as an Unconditional Unionist).
521. The contestants’ allegations are reproduced in H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 38-13, at 2-3 (1863),
H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 38-16, at 2-3 (1863), and H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 38-20, at 1-2 (1864).
522. See Tap, supra note 484, at 33. The majority of five consisted of Dawes (Republican,
Massachusetts), Portus Baxter (Republican, Vermont), Daniel Voorhees (Democrat, Indiana),
John Ganson (Democrat, New York), and James Spoak Brown (Democrat, Wisconsin). The minority
of four consisted of Charles Upson (Republican, Michigan), Glenni Scofield (Republican,
Pennsylvania), Nathaniel Smithers (Republican, Delaware), and Green Clay Smith (Unionist,
Kentucky). Id.
523. Nicklason, supra note 484, at 292 (quoting Henry Dawes to Electa Dawes, Mar. 3, 1864)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
524. From Washington, Mr. Dawes in Trouble, SPRINGFIELD WEEKLY REPUBLICAN, Mar. 8, 1864.
Van’s report also made clear that the committee had voted the same way in all “three Missouri cases,”
not just those involving the “radical republicans,” Loan and McClurg. Id.
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two. The committee majority’s report in Loan, authored not by Dawes but
by New York Democrat John Ganson, pasted a series of excerpts from the
challenger Bruce’s evidence, credited all of it without analysis, and
concluded that it amounted to “ample proof” that “a portion of the militia
in certain localities,” by “threats, violence, and by various modes of
intimidation, so far interfered with the election as . . . to render [it] a
nullity.”525
At the other pole, the minority report, authorized by Republican Charles
Upson of Michigan, dismissed all of Bruce’s evidence as “hearsay
statements, or vague rumors, or irrelevant and immaterial evidence,” none
of which was believable because it came from Bruce’s “partisan supporters,”
many of whom were “confessedly disloyal or in sympathy with [the]
rebels.”526 Loan should retain his seat because, at worst, some “loyal
voters” may have gotten “somewhat excited and indignant” when they saw
men at the polls who had “recently been imbruing their hands in the blood
of their neighbors,” “destroying or plundering their property,” or giving “aid
and comfort to those who had been thus engaged.”527 Neither report
articulated any legal standard against which to judge the disputed evidence.
During the floor debate, Upson spoke first, for the committee minority.
He contrasted Dawes and the committee majority—“these croakers and
complainers, these libelers of our soldiers”—with the “citizen soldiery” who
prized more than anyone “the freedom of elections” and the “purity of the
ballot-box.”528
When it was Dawes’s turn to speak for the committee majority, he argued
that it was the House’s “duty to see to it that the election of its members is
free.”529 Dawes said that he understood the need for troops to protect
elections in troubled places like Missouri, and he was “prepared to find
abuses” by such troops and “look upon them as necessities.”530 However,
he could not countenance the “terror created by glittering bayonets and
official orders and arrests,” which had “pervaded every branch of business”
during the election in question.531 Moreover, Dawes was frank that he
525. H.R. REP. NO. 38-44, at 6-26, 29 (1864) (reproducing the majority report in Bruce v. Loan
setting forth snippets of Bruce’s evidence).
526. Id. at 43 (reproducing the minority report in Bruce v. Loan).
527. Id. at 44.
528. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2163 (1864).
529. Id. at 2167.
530. Id.
531. Id.
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wanted to send a broader message about the integrity of President Lincoln
and the Republicans, and thereby deny a talking point to “the gentlemen on
the other side.”532 By removing the Republican-favored candidate from
the seat, the House would “bear testimony to the purity of purpose on the
part of the Administration.”533 The purpose in having troops present was
“not to secure the election of particular men, but . . . [to] keep[] treason
away from the life and vitals of the Republic;” it was “not to carry an
election, but to secure freedom of election.”534
After Dawes spoke, the radicals pounced.535 Kellian Whaley from West
Virginia described the committee majority’s recommendation as a proposal
“to ignore and disfranchise the loyal people of the border States of the South
as well as two hundred thousand of their brave heroes now fighting in the
field,” which was especially appalling coming from Dawes, who had a
“reputation for talent, but none for gunpowder.”536 Thomas Eliot from
Massachusetts said that the “terror” perceived by Dawes was in his
“imagination.”537 Henry Winter Davis of Maryland would not accept either
“maudlin lectures from the Democratic party” nor “Puritan lectures” from
Dawes,538 and suggested that Dawes would have a tough timing explaining
to his Massachusetts constituents why he had voted “to crush their friends,
discredit their cause and weaken the hands of loyal men on the burning
borders of the rebellion.”539
Loan himself launched a “venomous attack” on Dawes (perhaps in part
because Dawes was absent when Loan spoke).540 Loan accused Dawes of
putting Ganson up to write the majority report, instead of writing it himself,
because Dawes knew the report would have to “disregard all pretense to
honesty or fairness” in order to find against Loan.541 Loan also called out
Dawes for considering what was best for “the Administration” instead of
“the law as applicable to the facts.”542 Loan concluded that Dawes was “[a]
532. Id. at 2167.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 2167–68
535. See Nicklason, supra note 484, at 293 (“In the Loan case partisan Republicans severely
differed with Dawes. Evading the issues, they attacked him directly.”).
536. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2169 (1864).
537. Id. at 2186.
538. Id. at 2191.
539. Id. at 2189.
540. Tap, supra note 484, at 37; Nicklason, supra note 484, at 293–94.
541. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2211.
542. Id. at 2212.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

113

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 4

558

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:445

political guerrilla who flies a friendly flag that thereby he may the more safely
and surely strike a fatal blow.”543 Did Loan later regret going too far in the
heat of the moment? Apparently not, as he later had the Globe’s printer
include a footnote in the Globe calling Dawes a “great liar and a dirty
dog.”544
In the end, on May 10, 1864, the House decided that Loan should retain
his seat, voting 59–71 against the Election Committee’s
recommendation.545 With Dawes absent, only one member of the
Republican Party voted in support of the committee majority’s
recommendation to unseat Loan.546 By contrast, every Democratic vote
was to unseat Loan.547
Historian Bruce Tap summarized the press reaction to the Loan case as
being “highly critical of the Republican majority’s decision”:
The New York Times wondered why a report was needed, since the House
seemed predisposed to award the seat to the sitting member. The Missouri
Republican described the entire proceeding as a farcical event characterized by
pure partisanship. Despite evidence of electoral tampering, the dominant
party would not allow itself to be deprived of a seat. “A report from a regular
standing committee of the House . . . though based upon a full and impartial
examination of all the facts, has been thrown aside by a set of drilled partisans
who mock the very name of fairness.”548

The result in Loan carried over to both King and McClurg. On June 1,
1864, Dawes informed the House that he and the Committee had accepted
the House’s decision in Loan as “instruction” in King or “at least they look
upon it as a res adjudicata.”549 The challenger, Birch, still tried to argue his
case but was shortly cut off when it was observed that “there are not a dozen
543. Id.
544. Id. at 2212, 2360.
545. Id. at 2214.
546. 38th Congress, House, Vote 255, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0380255
[https://perma.cc/B5XY-EBEA]. As Dawes was absent, the sole Republican vote was from Porteus
Baxter of Maine, who was on the Elections Committee and had provided Dawes with the second
Republican vote in committee. Id. The fifty-nine “yea” votes consisted of Baxter, forty-nine
Democrats, four Unconditional Unionists, and five Unionists. Id. The seventy-one “nay” votes
consisted of sixty-one Republicans, two Independent Republicans, and eight Unconditional Unionists.
Id.
547. Id.
548. Tap, supra note 484, at 38 (alteration in original).
549. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2639.
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gentlemen listening to this speech.”550 The sitting member, King, then
spoke briefly. He focused less on the merits of the dispute than on making
clear to the House that, although he was a former slaveholder and “southern
man,” he supported “carrying on this war vigorously” until the “traitors lay
down their arms and acknowledge the supremacy of the Constitution.”551
The House took no action other than to discharge the Elections Committee
from further consideration of the matter.552 The same happened in
McClurg, but with no debate.553
While the House was overruling Dawes and the Elections Committee in
Loan, McClurg, and King, the stage was being set for a very different outcome
in the fourth Missouri contested election case, Knox v. Blair.
By the spring of 1864, Frank Blair, a conservative Republican, was in an
all-out political war with the radical wing of the party. Blair, whose
prominent father was a close Lincoln adviser and whose brother was
Lincoln’s Postmaster General, had first “won the enmity of Republican
radicals” in 1861 when he was part of the effort to have General Fremont
relieved as commander of the Western Department.554 In the November
1862 election, the radicals supported Blair’s opponent, Samuel Knox, but
Blair was narrowly re-elected by a small margin.555 The 38th Congress did
not begin until December 1863, and as that time approached “members of
the Blair family were exploring the possibility of political realignment [and]
running [Frank Blair] for Speaker on a conservative, border state
platform.”556 In fact, Schuyler Colfax, aligned with the radicals, was elected
Speaker, but only after the Republicans put down an attempt by the acting
clerk of the House (Emerson Etheridge, a Unionist from Tennessee) to
“place a conservative coalition of Democrats and border state Unionists in
control of the House by invalidating the credentials of several Republican
congressmen.”557 Although Blair did not come back to Washington until
January 1864558—after the House was organized—Blair’s “enemies

550. Id. at 2640–45.
551. Id. at 2649.
552. Id. at 2650.
553. Id. at 2881.
554. BOGUE, supra note 520, at 93.
555. Id. at 94.
556. Herman Belz, The Etheridge Conspiracy of 1863: A Projected Conservative Coup, 36 J. SOUTHERN
HIST. 549, 552 (1970).
557. Id. at 549.
558. WILLIAM E. PARRISH, FRANK BLAIR: LINCOLN’S CONSERVATIVE 186 (1998).
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accused him of plotting with the Democrats to win the speakership”
through this failed conspiracy.559
Blair’s conservative views on reconstruction and involvement in intraparty presidential politics deepened the rift between him and congressional
Republicans.560 When the Treasury Secretary, radical Samuel P. Chase, was
maneuvering to supplant President Lincoln as the party’s1864 presidential
candidate, Blair functioned as “‘hatchet man’ for the Administration.”561
On February 1, Blair unsuccessfully introduced a resolution calling for a
special committee to investigate the Treasury Department’s regulation of
commerce with insurrectionist states.562 On February 27, Blair followed
up with a “blistering anti-Chase speech in the House that among other
things charged widespread Treasury corruption in the issuance of cottontrading permits.”563 “Many radical Republicans never forgave the Blair
family for this climactic event in a series of intraparty dogfights which found
the Blairs leading the conservative faction.”564
Meanwhile, Knox’s contested election case against Blair was percolating
in the Elections Committee. The case turned on various alleged election
improprieties, many involving soldiers, but none as alarming as those made
in Loan, McClurg, and King.565 The allegations were almost beside the point.
As Dawes explained to his wife, “Frank is very unpopular with our
people . . . and they are resolved to turn him out right or wrong. I am
expected by his friends to save him, and by ours to hoist him. And either
way will create a storm.”566 Blair apparently had a false sense of security
about the outcome of the case. He met with Dawes and the committee on
March 3 and, according to his sister, showed very little concern as to the
result.567
559. BOGUE, supra note 520, at 94.
560. See id. at 93–98 (describing the growing rift); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF
FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 714–715 (1988) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF
FREEDOM]; Nicklason, supra note 484, at 296 (“[Blair] gave wide publicity to his conservative views on
reconstruction and to his opposition to Salmon P. Chase, a prominent radical contender with Lincoln
for the Republican presidential candidacy.”).
561. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 560, at 714 (1988).
562. BOGUE, supra note 520, at 94.
563. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 560, at 714.
564. Id. at 714–15.
565. See H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 38-15 (1863) (reproducing Knox’s allegations); H.R. REP.
NO. 38-66 (1864).
566. Nicklason, supra note 484, at 297 (quoting Henry Dawes to Electa Dawes, Mar. 21, 1864)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
567. PARRISH, supra note 558, at 191, 195–96.
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In addition to the contested election case brought by Knox, by late April
the Elections Committee had also begun considering whether Blair should
be unseated for violating the Incompatibility Clause. There were indications
Blair was preparing to resume his post as major general in the army, which
he had resigned to take his seat in Congress. On April 25, at Dawes’s urging,
the House requested the President to disclose whether Blair “now holds any
appointment or commission in the military service of the United States,”
and, if so, when Blair accepted such office and whether he was now “acting
under [its] authority.”568 On April 28, President Lincoln responded that
when Blair had returned from the field to resign as major general and assume
his seat in the 38th Congress, the President and the Secretary of War had
promised Blair that he could, at any time during the congressional session,
“at his own pleasure, withdraw said resignation and return to the field.”569
Lincoln further explained to the House that Blair had, in fact, “withdrawn”
his resignation on April 23 so that he could be assigned the command of a
corps.570
The House promptly requested copies of documents relating to Blair’s
circumstances, which the President produced on May 2.571 Among the
documents was a letter that Lincoln had sent to Blair’s brother Montgomery
(the Postmaster General) in November 1863, the month before the 38th
Congress began.572 In that letter, Lincoln had made clear his preference
that Frank Blair should come to Washington for commencement of the 38th
Congress, “put his military commission in my hands,” “take his seat,” and
“aid to organize a House of Representatives which will really support the
government in the war.”573 Lincoln continued: “If the result shall be the
election of [Blair] as Speaker, let him serve in that position; if not, let him
retake his commission and return to the army.”574 The revelation of Blair’s
“secret arrangement” with the President, “by which he was Member of
568. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1859–60 (1864); H.R. EX. DOC. NO. 38-77, at 1
(1864).
569. H.R. EX. DOC. NO. 38-77, at 1 (1864).
570. Id. In fact, when Lincoln in late April ordered the War Department to give Blair command
of a corps in Sherman’s army, he was initially told by Adjutant General E.D. Townsend that Blair could
not resume his military office because he had previously resigned it. However, Lincoln persisted,
whereupon Townsend proposed that, based on precedent, Blair could “withdraw” his resignation.
PARRISH, supra note 558, at 192–93.
571. H.R. EX. DOC. NO. 38-80, at 7 (1864).
572. Id. at 1–2.
573. Id. at 2.
574. Id. (reproducing a letter from Abraham Lincoln to Montgomery Blair, Nov. 2, 1863).
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Congress or Major-General, whichever he wished,” only increased the
radicals’ suspicion of Blair.575
On May 5, Dawes reported to the House that the Elections Committee
had voted in favor of Knox and against Blair.576 As in the recent Loan case,
Dawes was again in a majority recommending that a sitting member be
ejected from his seat because of election improprieties in Missouri.
However, this time the sitting member was the conservative (and
increasingly unpopular) Blair instead of the radical Loan, and the committee
members re-aligned themselves accordingly. Dawes was now joined by all
of the committee Republicans instead of the committee Democrats.577
The committee Republicans who had recently discounted all of the evidence
of election improprieties in Missouri when used against Loan now credited
such evidence when used against Blair, while the committee Democrats who
had credited such evidence when used against Loan, now rejected it when
used against Blair.578
The partisan split in the committee continued when the matter was
perfunctorily debated in the full House on June 10. Dawes briefly
recapitulated the majority report.579 The radicals who had excoriated
Dawes a few weeks previously for suggesting that Loan be unseated were
now silent. Indeed, not a single Republican spoke in defense of Blair.
Democrat James S. Brown from Wisconsin (a member of the Elections
Committee) pretended that he would “not undertake to interfere with
[Republicans’] decision” to decide a contested election case based on “minor
divisions which they have among themselves,” before briefly criticizing the
majority’s decision to shift the burden of proof onto Blair to prove the
validity of the disputed votes.580 Brown concluded by wondering aloud
what “strange prejudice must have influenced the minds of the majority,”
and suggesting that the committee had improperly decided to unseat Blair
on the basis of the contested election instead of the dual office-holder issue
because the former resulted in the seat being awarded to Knox, while the

575. Our Washington Correspondence, NATIONAL ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, May 14, 1864
(reporting that “the feeling against Frank Blair [in the House] intensified” after he delivered “a most
violent attack upon Mr. Chase and the Radicals of Missouri” and that revelation of his “secret
arrangement” with the President “had added to his unpopularity”).
576. H.R. REP. NO. 38-66 (1864) (reproducing the majority and minority reports in Knox v. Blair).
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2856–57 (1864).
580. Id. at 2858.
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latter would have resulted in a new election in which voters would get to
decide who their new representative would be.581 Another one of the
Committee’s Democrats, John Ganson of New York, made a show of
refusing to argue the merits of the matter because he had been forewarned
that the Republican “side of the House had already made up its mind, before
any discussion was had, that the sitting member was not entitled to his seat,”
and Ganson had “too much respect for [him]self” to participate in such a
phony debate.582
The final vote was 82–32 against Blair, and he did not get the support of
a single Republican.583 In a companion vote to decide whether Knox was
now entitled to the seat, every Republican vote was in favor of Knox, and
every Democratic vote was against him.584 Dawes wrote to his wife: “Frank
Blair was executed in the House . . . and I was obliged to perform the
ceremony. I hope the Missouri Radicals will now let me be.”585
Just a few days later, on June 13, Dawes and the Elections Committee
issued a second, seemingly redundant report against Blair.586
The committee again called for Blair to be dis-entitled from the seat, but
now on the basis of the incompatible office issue.587 On this issue, the
House adopted the committee’s recommendation without any debate or
recorded vote.588 The specific violation that the committee found was not
the obvious one presented by Blair’s recent resumption of duties as a major
general. Instead, the committee found that Blair had disqualified himself
from ever assuming his seat in Congress by not resigning his position in the
army until January 1864, which was a few weeks after the 38th Congress
convened in December 1863.589 Evidently, the Republican majority had
581. Id. (“[T]he committee, instead of . . . vacating the seat and referring the matter back to the
people, have attempted to deprive the people of St. Louis of the right of electing their own member,
and by the action of the House to substitute a member who never received a majority of the votes of
that district.”).
582. Id.
583. 38th Congress, House, Vote 327, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0380327
[https://perma.cc/77JL-DYGR].
584. 38th Congress, House, Vote 328, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0380328
[https://perma.cc/8XN2-BNPS].
585. Nicklason, supra note 484, at 298 (quoting Henry Dawes to Electa Dawes, June 11, 1864)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
586. H.R. REP. NO. 38-110, at 1 (1864).
587. H.R. REP. NO. 38-110, at 1–3 (reproducing the committee report regarding the “Military
Appointment of Hon. F.P. Blair, Jr.”).
588. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3389 (1864).
589. H.R. REP. NO. 38-110, at 10.
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overcome the squeamishness they had in the prior Congress about
enforcing the Incompatibility Clause (when the Representative holding an
incompatible office had been Colonel Vandever instead of Blair).590
Even then, the Republicans in Congress were not done with Blair.
By basing his disqualification from Congress on his failure to resign the
military office before the Congress began—instead of his recent resumption
of the military office—the Committee avoided any acknowledgement that
he was entitled to resume the military office. This made it possible for
spiteful Republicans in the Senate to pile on. In a report dated June 15, the
Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that Blair could not even resume his
military office. They found that Blair had given up that office, irrevocably,
when he resigned in order to take his seat in Congress.591 Per historian
Allan Bogue, the Republicans had “worked out their own formula of double
jeopardy for Frank Blair.”592
The House’s treatment of Blair was far from the judicial application of
law to facts. Rather, in the words of one historian, the Elections Committee
was used “to punish a recalcitrant member of the dominant party.”593 More
than one newspaper described a radical republican “war” against Blair.594
It was clear that Blair had “no advocates and defenders among the
republicans, his friends belonging exclusively to the opposition.”595
Simultaneous with Blair’s ejection from the House, the Republican
convention met in Baltimore and voted overwhelmingly to exclude the
conservative (pro-Blair) delegation from Missouri in favor of the radical
(anti-Blair) delegation.596 The New York Herald observed, “the exclusion of

590. See supra Part IV.B.1.b.i.
591. SEN. REP. NO. 38-84, at 3 (1864).
592. BOGUE, supra note 520, at 99–100. As Bogue notes, Lincoln “found no reason to accept
the Congressional position” and Blair “did not retire from the army until well after the Thirty-eighth
Congress had adjourned for the last time.” Id.
593. Tap, supra note 484, at 33 n.19.
594. Our Washington Correspondence, BOSTON HERALD, May 5, 1864 (“A decided war is being
inaugurated against Frank Blair. The House Election Committee will report against his seat in the
House, and the Senate Military Committee are questioning the validity of his Major Generalship.”);
News from Washington, The Blair Case Ended, WORLD, June 11, 1864 (“The war on the Blair interest
achieved a decided success to-day. In the House, General Frank Blair was ousted from his seat, it
being declared by the committee and the House that he held it illegally. In the Senate, it was decided
by the Judiciary Committee at the same time, that his commission in the army was illegal and void.”).
595. News from Washington, NEW YORK HERALD, June 11, 1864.
596. PARRISH, supra note 558, at 197; see also MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra
note 560, at 717 (“[W]ith the president’s covert sanction the convention made a gesture of conciliation
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his delegation from the Baltimore Convention, and his own exclusion from
Congress by republican votes, indicates that [Blair] has been formally read
out of the republican party.”597
iii. The Independent State Legislature Doctrine
When the House of the 39th Congress took up Baldwin v. Trowbridge in
early 1866, Dawes faced several competing considerations. Politically, the
preferred outcome for Dawes and his fellow Republicans was clear, for two
reinforcing reasons. First, the sitting member (Trowbridge) was a
Republican, while his opponent (Baldwin) was a Democrat. Ruling against
Trowbridge would effectively decrease the Republican majority by two.
Second, Trowbridge’s margin of victory arose from the Michigan soldier
vote, so undoing his victory as requested by Baldwin would be tantamount
to disenfranchising the soldiers, which would have been anathema to any
politician, but particularly Republicans in the wake of the Civil War.
Legally speaking, however, there was no clear path for Dawes to rule in
Trowbridge’s favor.
Trowbridge was arguing that the Michigan
constitution’s place of voting provision was neutered by the independent
state legislature doctrine, and, alternatively, that the provision was never
intended to apply to federal elections because it did not expressly mention
them. But five years earlier, Dawes had authored the Election Committee’s
unanimous report in Shiel.598 In that case, Dawes had not only rejected the
independent state legislature doctrine, but had also insisted that the Oregon
constitution’s “general election” provision (which like the Michigan
constitution did not mention federal elections) was intended to govern
federal elections.599 Moreover, a third potential legal path to supporting
Trowbridge, saying that the Michigan constitutional provision did not
prevent soldier-voting, was seemingly foreclosed by the fact that the
Michigan Supreme Court had held that it did prevent soldier-voting.600
Dawes ultimately decided to vote in favor of Trowbridge on the ground
that the Michigan Supreme Court had gotten it wrong—the Michigan

to radicals by seating an anti-Blair delegation from Missouri which cast a token ballot for Grant before
changing its vote to make Lincoln’s nomination unanimous.”).
597. News from Washington, NEW YORK HERALD, June 11, 1864.
598. See supra Part III.B.1; H.R. REP. NO. 37-4 (1861) (reproducing the committee’s report in
Shiel v. Thayer).
599. H.R. REP. NO. 37-4 (1861).
600. People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127 (1865).
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constitution did not prevent soldier-voting.601 This allowed Dawes to
maintain a principled stand against the independent state legislature doctrine
and in favor of applying non-explicit state constitutional provisions to
federal elections. Representative Marshall of Illinois attempted to call out
Dawes on how he could disregard the Michigan Supreme Court’s
interpretation of its own constitution, but unfortunately cut Dawes off
before Dawes could attempt to explain himself on that point.602
Dawes was not the only Republican who had voted against Thaddeus
Stevens’s invocation of the independent legislature doctrine in Shiel. Nine
of the Republicans who had voted with Dawes in Shiel were still in Congress
five years later and participated when the House decided Baldwin, and every
one of them now supported Trowbridge.603 Other than Dawes, only three
of them explained their positions, but each of those three now affirmatively
embraced the independent legislature doctrine on the floor of the House,
with little or no regard for reconciling that embrace with their prior vote in
Shiel.
Of the three who explained themselves, the most bald-faced was perhaps
Trowbridge himself, the Michigan contestee who was defending his seat.
In Shiel, Trowbridge had voted “nay” when Thaddeus Stevens argued that
Shiel’s election was invalid because the time of his election had been set by
the Oregon constitutional convention, not, as required by the Elections
Clause, the state legislature.604 Now, with his own congressional seat on
the line, Trowbridge made the same argument that Stevens had made:
Can language be plainer than this? The constitution of the State is not the
Legislature of the State. The people, in convention by delegated forming their
State constitution, are not the Legislature of the State. And I claim that under
601. See supra Part III.B.2.b.ii; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 821 (1866).
602. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 822 (1866).
603. Compare 37th Congress, House, Vote 40, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/
RH0370040 [https://perma.cc/RH8F-HSAK] (showing the Shiel vote), with 39th Congress, House, Vote
68, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0390068 [https://perma.cc/5EB6-TDB5]
(reproducing the Baldwin vote). The nine Congressmen who voted against the Stevens resolution in
Shiel in the 37th Congress but later supported Trowbridge in the 39th Congress were: John Bassett
Alley (Massachusetts), Portus Baxter (Vermont), Samuel Beaman (Michigan), Henry Dawes
(Massachusetts), Thomas Dawes Eliot (Massachusetts), Rowland Trowbridge (Michigan), John Rice
(Maine), Samuel Shellabarger (Ohio), and Elihu Washburne (Illinois). Id.
604. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1861) (reflecting Stevens arguing that Shiel’s
election was invalid because the Elections Clause “prevents any action” by a state constitutional
convention by “expressly provid[ing] who shall fix the times and places of holding elections for
Members of Congress”); id. at 357 (reflecting Trowbridge’s “nay” vote against Stevens’s resolution).
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this clause of the Constitution of the United States no power in the State had
any right to touch this subject at all except “the Legislature thereof.”605

Trowbridge claimed that he voted differently in Shiel because in that case
the state legislature had performed its plenary role under the Elections
Clause by “accept[ing] and acquiesc[ing]” to the constitutional provision and
“pass[ing] no conflicting law.”606
Fernando Cortez Beaman of Michigan was another Republican who had
voted against the independent state legislature doctrine in Shiel.607 Now, in
Baldwin, he carried the torch for Trowbridge, his fellow Michigander,
explaining that “when [the] framers used the word Legislature, they meant
by that term precisely what it imports,” in “no latitudinarian sense,” and that
it would do “great injustice to their intelligence and discrimination to
suppose that when they used the word Legislature, they intended to imply
constitutional convention, or people of the State.”608 Beaman—who
conveniently made no reference to his contrary vote in Shiel—claimed that
he was “not aware of any respectable writer or authority who [had] ever
doubted” his construction of the Elections Clause.609
The third Republican in this group—Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio610—
argued that it was incorrect to say that the state legislature was “overrid[ing]”
the state constitution “because the provision of the Federal Constitutions
names the Legislatures of the States simply as the mere instrumentality for
fixing the places for elections of Federal officers.”611
The other Republicans who had voted against the Stevens resolution, but
now voted in favor Trowbridge, did not explain the basis for their votes.
Therefore, we can only speculate as to whether, and on what basis, they
reconciled their support of Trowbridge with their past vote in Shiel.

605. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 840.
606. Id. Dawes had opened the door to Trowbridge’s argument by admitting that the absence
of a “conflicting law” was a distinction between the two cases, though Dawes maintained that it was a
distinction without a difference because in no event could a legislature prescribe a time for an election
in conflict with the time set forth in the state constitution. Id. at 821.
607. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1861) (recording Beaman’s “nay” vote against
the Stevens resolution in Shiel).
608. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 817.
609. Id.
610. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (documenting Shellbarger’s “nay” vote against
the Stevens resolution in Shiel ).
611. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 845.
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The final vote in Baldwin was 30–108.612 All of the Democratic votes
were for Baldwin, and all of the Republican votes were for Trowbridge.613
By contrast, in 1861 when the House rejected Thaddeus Stevens’ invocation
of the Doctrine in Shiel, the Democrats had voted along party lines but the
Republicans split their vote roughly in half.614 Given the voting reversals
and the positional flip-flopping, it is hard not to conclude that the difference
in outcomes resulted from the fact that, in Shiel, the House was deciding
whether to kick a Democrat out of his seat—leaving it open—whereas, in
Baldwin, the House was deciding whether to replace a Republican with a
Democrat. Moreover, it is equally hard to believe that the partisan breakdown of the vote in Baldwin reflected genuinely held legal views that were
100% correlated with a member’s partisan affiliation. Rather, what
happened in Baldwin appears to be something approaching “tribal
partisanship.”615
The press perceived lawless partisanship. After the Elections Committee
voted in favor of Trowbridge, The World reported that, although “justice and
equity were on Mr. Baldwin’s side,” he “was a Democrat, and the committee
went with their party” on a “strict party vote”;616 the same paper later called
the full House’s vote an “illegal act” that was “justifiable by nothing better
than an unscrupulous party necessity.”617 The Crisis noted simply that “of
course the Democrat was ousted and the Abolitionist retained by a strict
party vote.”618 The New York Atlas reported that although Baldwin was
“the legally elected representative,” Trowbridge was “a disciple of

612. 39th Congress, House, Vote 68, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0390068
[https://perma.cc/78FG-TMN6].
613. Id.
614. 37th Congress, House, Vote 40, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.com/rollcall/RH0370040
[https://perma.cc/5XS8-KCJW].
615. See Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, supra note 44, at 1798 (explaining “tribal partisanship”
as politicians’ favoring of policies purely because they benefit other members of their own party or
harm political opponents).
616. The Contested Seats, WORLD, Feb. 1, 1866, at 6. Another paper complained that the
committee was “going to give the seat to Trowbridge, [R]epublican, against Baldwin, Democrat” even
though Baldwin “had a clear majority excluding the illegal soldier vote,” because “[p]arty with
[the Republicans] is above law.” Party Above Law, DAILY E. ARGUS, Feb. 15, 1866.
617. The Case of Representative Baldwin, WORLD, Feb. 20, 1866, at 4. Similarly, the NORWICH
AURORA called the House’s decision “a gross violation of law . . . committed to enable the republican
claimant to retain his seat.” Depriving Democratic Representatives of Their Seats, NORWICH AURORA,
Mar. 3, 1866. The Patriot concluded that “[n]othing, really, seems to be too mean, despicable and
unlawful for modern ‘Republicans’ to perform.” PATRIOT, Feb. 19, 1866.
618. News of the Week, Congressional Proceedings, CRISIS, Feb. 21, 1866.
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Thad[deus] Stevens,” and “for that reason only, he is thrust into
Mr. Baldwin’s seat.”619 The Pittsfield Sun was more sarcastic, reporting that
the Elections Committee, led by Henry Dawes (Pittsfield’s own
representative), was “acting as a ‘Committee for Increasing the Radical
Majority in the House by all means, fair or foul,’” and “merely carrying out
the directions of the Radical leader in the House, Thad[deus] Stevens, and
endeavoring to thwart the wishes of President Johnson.”620 The opposing,
Republican, viewpoint was articulated by the Detroit Tribune, which noted
that “[e]very person voting for Mr. Baldwin belonged to the Democratic
Party, and would, of course, vote for him law or no law.”621 The sense of
partisan hypocrisy was heightened in Baldwin because it concerned soldiervoting: the Republican House majority’s decision to count the votes of
Michigan soldiers appeared at odds with the prior decision of Republican
judges on the Michigan Supreme Court that the soldier-voting law was
unconstitutional,622 and because support for soldier-voting broke along
party lines.623
The newspaper references to Thaddeus Stevens are notable. Stevens had
invoked the independent legislature doctrine in Shiel in hopes of denying
either Democrat the seat in question.624 At about the time of Baldwin, he
619. The Michigan Contested Election, N.Y. ATLAS, Feb. 17, 1866, at 4.
620. The Unseating of Mr. Voorhees, PITTSFIELD SUN, Mar. 15, 1866.
621. The Michigan Contested Election Case Decided, DETROIT TRIB., Feb. 27, 1866 (“If there was any
voting blindly and from partisan motives, it must have been on the Democratic side . . . .”).
The Springfield Republican made a similar point. See The Committee of Elections, SPRINGFIELD DAILY
REPUBLICAN, Mar. 23, 1866 (“But it is amusing to hear the allegation that the republicans on the
committee are actuated by their party feeling solely” when the Democrats cannot name “a single case
in this Congress where the democratic members of the committee have voted with the republicans[.]”).
622. The House’s alleged disregard of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People ex rel.
Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127 (1865), was frequently cited as evidence that the Republican majority
was acting in an egregiously partisan manner. See The Case of Representative Baldwin, WORLD, Feb. 20,
1866 (noting that the House Republicans disregarded the court’s decision even though “the Supreme
Judges are all Republicans” and had been “unanimous with but one exception . . . .”);
A Strange Decision, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 27, 1866 (“It is well to observe that the Supreme Court of
Michigan—which decided the vote to be unconstitutional—is composed of Republicans . . . .”);
Congress Wiping Out States, CRISIS, Mar. 28, 1866 (stressing that the court was “composed of Republican
Judges”).
623. See DONALD S. INBODY, THE SOLDIER VOTE: WAR, POLITICS, AND THE BALLOT IN
AMERICA 14 (2016) (“[T]he debate . . . always fell along political party lines. Republicans, assuming
that soldiers would vote for Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party, were in favor of such
measures, while Democrats opposed the measures on the same assumption. Throughout the war,
northern state legislatures that were dominated by Republicans passed soldier absentee voting of some
sort while legislatures dominated by Democrats did not.”)
624. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1861).
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was heard to remark, in relation to another contested election case that
unseated a Democrat, that “[t]his question may seem to some gentlemen to
be a small matter, but in view of thick-coming events, one vote may prove to be
of great value here.”625 This resonates with an oft-repeated anecdote about
Stevens. In his autobiography, George F. Hoar recounted that Stevens,
upon entering an Election Committee hearing, asked a Republican colleague
“what was the point in the case,” and was told that there was “not much
point to it” because both contestants were “damned scoundrels.” Stevens
responded, “Well . . . which is the Republican damned scoundrel? I want to
go for the Republican damned scoundrel.”626 Carl Schurz recounted the
same anecdote in his autobiography, though in his version the contestants
were “rascals” instead of “scoundrels.”627 According to Schurz, Stevens
made the comment “not in jest, but with perfect seriousness,” as Stevens
“would have seated Beelzebub in preference to the angel Gabriel, had he
believed Beelzebub to be more certain than Gabriel to aid him in beating
[President Johnson’s] reconstruction policy.”628
c.

Other Experiences and Perceptions

The partisanship that Dawes experienced in the 1860s and described in
his 1869 paper was also experienced by subsequent congressional leaders.
In 1890, the incumbent Speaker of the House, Republican Thomas B. Reed
of Maine, authored an article that appeared in The North American Review.629
Reed was more circumspect than Dawes, but similarly saw “but little to
restrain partisanship,” complaining that contested election decisions
“invariably increase[d] the majority of the party which organizes the House”
and that there was “probably . . . not a single instance . . . where the minority
was increased.”630 He concluded that the process as it then existed “is
625. The Unseating of Mr. Voorhees, supra note 620.
626. 2 GEORGE F. HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 268 (1903). According to
Hoar, up until the time that he served on the Committee on Elections under the chairmanship of
George W. McCrary, election cases were “determined entirely by party feeling,” as “[w]henever there
was a plausible reason for making a contest the dominant party in the House almost always awarded
the seat to the man of its own side.” Id. However, when Hoar was on the committee, it “determined
to settle all the questions before it as they would if they were judges in a court of justice.” Id. Hoar
himself claimed to have acted “with the same freedom from bias or prejudice with which it would have
been my duty . . . if I had been sitting on the Bench of the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id.
at 269.
627. 3 CARL SCHURZ, THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ 1863–69, at 216 (1908).
628. Id.; see also MCCALL, supra note 482, at 107 (recounting a version of this anecdote).
629. Reed, supra note 481, at 112.
630. Id. at 114–15.
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unsatisfactory in results, unjust to members and contestants, and fails to
secure the representation which the people have chosen.”631
In 1895, Republican Samuel W. McCall from Massachusetts, the
chairman of one of the three elections committees then in existence,
authored a report in support of a bill that would have had the federal courts
determine, subject to reversal by the House, who were the prima facie
members of the House.632 McCall’s report complained that the House’s
system for deciding contested elections “barely maintains the form of a
judicial inquiry” and is “thoroughly tainted with the grossest
partisanship.”633 McCall continued:
There can be no question in the mind of anyone who carefully considers the
recent history of contests in this House that they are generally decided on
partisan grounds. The members of the majority of a committee and also of
the House will be found voting, usually, on one side and the members of the
minority on the other. That side is right which has the most votes, and the
record of the last ten Congresses, which shows that 45 seats have been taken
from the minority, and substantially none from the majority, is conclusive
evidence that the decision is made by numbers and not according to law and
justice.634

McCall submitted a similar report in 1896.635
Congressmen’s epigrams and anecdotes exhibit that it was conventional
wisdom that House contested election cases were decide on a partisan basis.
When Massachusetts Congressman George D. Robinson was asked what
were “party questions,” he reportedly responded, “I know of none except
election cases.”636 Similarly, Speaker Reed is said to have quipped that
“[t]he House never divides on strictly partisan lines except when it is acting
judicially.”637 John H. Rogers, a Democratic Representative from
Arkansas, provoked laughter in the House when he said he would only
631. Id. at 117.
632. Rammelkamp, supra note 251, at 439–40.
633. H.R. REP. NO. 53-1669, at 2 (1895).
634. Id. at 3–4.
635. H.R. REP. NO. 54-2234, at 2–3 (1896) (quoting from the 1895 report);
see also Rammelkamp, supra note 251, at 435 (arguing that these reports were not “partisan
denunciations made in the heat of a debate” but rather “frank confessions of wrong-doing . . . [by] a
Republican committee twice officially confessing to a Republic Congress”).
636. ALEXANDER, supra note 473, at 323.
637. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES: THEIR FRAMEWORK, MAKE-UP,
CHARACTER, CHARACTERISTICS, HABITS, AND MANNERS 203 (1924).
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support a resolution to publish an updated digest of contested election cases
if it also mandated that anyone in the future who ventured to cite one of the
digested cases “as either an authority, argument, or a precedent” would be
“put in the penitentiary for the term of his natural life.”638
The House was also perceived by outsiders to be deciding contested
elections on a partisan basis. In October 1868, the Secretary of the Navy,
Gideon Welles, wrote in his diary that there were “villainous plans to cheat
Representatives clearly and fairly elected by the Democrats out of their seats.
Dawes and company will be ready to help the fraud, as they have lent
themselves to great rascalities in the present Congress. They are destroying
public confidence in popular government.”639 An 1873 guide to the
“practical workings of affairs at Washington” explained that elected
members of the minority party “not unfrequently” found their seats
contested by an opponent “in sympathy with the party in power.”640 After
being “startled by a report from the Committee on Elections that they are
not entitled to their seats,” such members were then unseated, “not because
Congress wishes to enforce the will of the people sending Representatives
to Washington, but because it wishes to secure one more vote for the party
in power.”641 And when a case was “too clear to be decided on mere party
grounds,” the same result was accomplished by delaying until the close of
the session, “thus really excluding the rightfully chosen Member from his
seat.”642 Examples of the public perceiving partisanship in specific cases
decided during the 1860s are set forth in the previous discussion of the
experience of Henry Dawes during those years.
d.

Quantitative Analysis by Jeffrey A. Jenkins

Scholars have sought to confirm, through statistical analysis, whether the
House acted in as partisan a manner as the other evidence suggests it did.
The most recent effort was by Jeffrey A. Jenkins, who in 2004 reviewed all
601 contested elections cases in the House from 1789 to 2002.643 Jenkins
found that, in the cases involving a majority party candidate against the
candidate of another party, the majority party candidate won only slightly
638. 22 CONG. REC. 2199 (1891).
639. 3 GIDEON WELLES, DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 460 (1911).
640. EDWARD WINSLOW MARTIN, BEHIND THE SCENES IN WASHINGTON 7, 201–02 (1873).
641. Id. at 202.
642. Id.
643. Jeffrey A. Jenkins, Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives,
1789–2002, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 112, 120 (2004).
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more than half the decisions (50.2%).644 But Jenkins argues that this
statistic alone645 is misleading because that population likely includes not
only cases that are “ripe for partisan activity,” but also a large number of
“frivolous” cases brought by majority party candidates who believed that
they would be awarded a seat “simply by virtue of their majority party
affiliation,” which were easily rejected by the Committee on Elections or the
House.646 At the same time, “only serious cases will be brought by minority
party candidates.”647 All of this would result in an overall majority win rate
that, without further analysis, would understate partisan influence.
Jenkins developed several strategies to effectively “weed out” the
“frivolous” cases and focus on those that were more “ripe for partisan
activity.” First, Jenkins excluded the cases in which the House Committee
on Elections was unanimous, i.e., he included only those cases in which the
committee “split.”648 In those “split-committee” cases, the majority party
candidate won nearly 70% of the decisions.649
As a second strategy, Jenkins focused on the subset of cases in which the
House’s decision resulted in a contestant unseating a contestee (a “flip”),
noting that “it is one thing for a majority to allow a minority member to
retain his or her seat, while it is quite another for the majority to unseat one
644. Id. at 120. Jenkins excluded from this population the cases in which neither candidate was
awarded the seat (because the seat was vacated), qualifications cases (in which there was no contestant
in the case), and cases in which the contestee and the contestant were from the same majority party.
See id. at 120 n.46 (listing the bases for exclusion of cases from the analysis).
645. Although the entire point of Jenkins’s analysis was that this 50.2% majority win percentage,
alone, does not reflect the degree of partisanship in these decisions, legal scholars have cited that
number, alone, as evidence that House members “forego tempting opportunities to pursue [tribal
partisanship]” in contested elections, without noting Jenkins’s further analysis to the contrary. Levitt,
The Partisanship Spectrum, supra note 44, at 1840–41. Professor Levitt notes that there is “no justiciable
rule precluding a partisan majority of the House . . . from simply unseating opposition winners” and
the “structure of the House is certainly designed to promote majoritarian action.” Id. at 1840.
He argues, therefore, that “rules and structure alone would suggest that 601 cases should favor the
majority party’s claimant,” but, “in fact, only 50.2 percent of the decisions favored the majority party
candidate.” Id. (citing Jenkins, supra note 643, at 120). Professor Muller cites Professor Levitt for the
proposition that “[e]vidence suggests that Congress has generally resisted raw tribal partisanship in
adjudicating election contests.” Muller, supra note 22, at 736. Both Levitt and Muller do, however,
acknowledge partisanship in House election contests in the late nineteenth century. See Levitt,
The Partisanship Spectrum, supra note 44, at 1840 (suggesting the inherent structure of the House fosters
partisanship); Muller, supra, at 736 n.104.
646. See Jenkins, supra note 643, at 120–21 (noting that, “in fact, majority party claimants do
contest at a significantly higher rate, bringing 72 percent of all cases”).
647. Id. at 121.
648. Id.
649. Id.
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of its own in favor of a member of the minority.”650 He found that in
85.8% of the cases in which a contestee was unseated, the contestant who
convinced the House to “flip” the seat was a member of the majority
party.651
As a third strategy, Jenkins focused on those cases in which the result was
determined by a roll call vote, as opposed to voice vote or the House taking
no action.652 Jenkins found that 87.0% of the elections determined by roll
call votes involved “party votes,” in which “at least 50 percent of one major
party opposed at least 50 percent of the other major party.”653 Moreover,
17.1% of the roll call votes involved “perfectly-aligned party votes,” in
which “all voting members of one party oppose all voting members of the
other party.”654 Jenkins reported that results in the period 1861–1899 were
“even more extreme” and supported the conclusion that it was a
“particularly partisan era”: 94.6% of the roll call votes in that period
involved “party votes,” and 20.7% involved “perfectly-aligned party
vote[s].”655
Finally, Jenkins applied three models to assess individual vote choices in
the roll call votes: a partisan model (member votes with majority of his
party); an ideological model (member votes according to two “ideological
‘scores’”); and a naive model (member votes with the “winning” side).656
He found that the party model and the ideological model were about equally
good at predicting voting (with the party model and the ideological model
correctly classifying 92.7% and 93.4% of individual roll call votes,
respectively) and significantly better than the naive model (which correctly
classified 65.3% of votes).657

650. Id. Overall, Jenkins determined that for the entire period he studied, the contestee retained
his seat in 67.7% of the cases, the contestant won in 21.3% of the cases, and the seat was vacated in
11% of the cases. See id. at 120 (displaying table of outcome statistics in contested election cases).
Challengers were more successful during the late nineteenth century 1861–1899 (winning 28.7% of the
time) than they were in the Antebelllum period (winning 22.4% of the time); they were least successful
in the twentieth century (winning only 10.8% of the time). See id. (reporting outcomes in contested
election cases broken down by time period).
651. Id. at 121.
652. Id. at 121–23.
653. Id. at 123.
654. Id.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 123–25.
657. Id. at 124.
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2. The Inapplicability of Stare Decisis to House Contested Election
Decisions
In sum, the House’s approach to deciding contested elections in the late
nineteenth century was characterized by partisan decision-making and a
deficit of legal process. Because of this, it would make little intuitive sense
for a court to follow the House’s decisions as if they were judicial precedent.
Justice Ginsburg had this intuition in Arizona State Legislature, where she
wrote that, given the evidently partisan result in Baldwin,658 and the House’s
apparent disregard of its own precedent in reaching that result, it was “not
a disposition that should attract this Court’s reliance.”659 Her conclusion
in this regard was perhaps “deeply undertheorized,”660 but the distance
between her intuition and theory is not great. The intuition arises from a
disconnect between the House’s un-judicious decision-making process in
these cases and the goals underlying the doctrine of stare decisis.
The doctrine’s purposes—the reasons why court are supposed to follow
precedent—would not be furthered by treating the House’s historical
decisions as precedent.
Most fundamentally, following precedent is thought to “contribute[] to
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”661 However, the
House’s decision-making in these cases—both actual and as perceived—
was overtly partisan. It is hard to see how following precedent set through
such a system would give society “faith in the even-handed administration
658. Justice Ginsburg perceived that the Elections Committee had voted in a partisan manner,
even though she mistakenly believed that one of the two Democrats on the Elections Committee
(William Radford of New York) voted in favor of Trowbridge. See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 818 (2015) (stating that “all but one” of the committee who voted
for Trowbridge was a Republican). Radford’s name did not appear on the minority report along with
the other Democrat on the committee (S.S. Marshall of Illinois), see H.R. REP. NO. 39-14, at 5 (1866)
(indicating Marshall’s signature but not Radford’s), but as the Congressional Globe makes clear, Radford
intended for his name to be on the minority report, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 819
(1866), and he voted against Trowbridge along with every other Democrat who voted, see id. at 845.
659. Ariz. State Legis., 576 U.S. at 819. In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts responded that Baldwin
v. Trowbridge could not be “dismissed as an act of partisanship” without similarly dismissing “every
decision in favor of a candidate from the same party as a majority of the Elections Committee.” Id.
at 839 n.3 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
660. Muller, supra note 22, at 736.
661. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
265–66 (1986)); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (explaining stare decisis
as the foundation for why the public views the judiciary “as a source of impersonal and reasoned
judgments”); see also Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368–70 (1988)
(emphasizing the principles of certainty, reliance, equality, and efficiency as justifications for following
precedent).
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of justice” or support an impression that courts are providing that “serene
and impartial uniformity which is the essence of the idea of law.”662
Moreover, stare decisis is also supposed to promote the “predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, foster[] reliance on judicial
decisions,”663 and “expedite[] the work of the courts by preventing the
constant reconsideration of settled questions.”664 The belief that following
precedent will further these goals, is based on certain presumptions, often
unstated, about both the court that generated the precedent—to which
decision-making is effectively being outsourced665—and the precedent
itself. Those presumptions are invalid with respect to the House’s late
nineteenth-century approach to contested election cases.
First, stare decisis presumes that the precedent-generating court had, in
common with the precedent-receiving court, certain features conducive to
good decision-making, such that the precedent can serve as a “secure
foundation”666 on which to build.667 However, the House system for
662. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 34–36 (1921)
(“Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith
in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts . . . the method of philosophy must remain
the organon of the courts if chance and favor are to be excluded, and the affairs of men are to be
governed with the serene and impartial uniformity which is the essence of the idea of law.”).
663. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
664. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist
Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 652 (1999) (summarizing the policies supporting adherence to precedent
as “economy, stability, and legitimacy”); see also CARDOZO, supra note 662, at 149 (“[T]he labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in
every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses
laid by others who had gone before him.”).
665. Maltz, supra note 661, at 371–72 (noting view that “stare decisis simply transfers plenary
decision making authority from . . . the contemporary judge [to] the predecessor judge who generated
the relevant precedent”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 423 (1988) (“Precedent decentralizes decisionmaking and allows each judge
to build on the wisdom of others.”).
666. CARDOZO, supra note 662, at 149; see also Easterbrook, supra note 665, at 422–23
(presuming that precedent will have been produced by “generations of judges wrestling with hard
questions” allowing “each judge to build on the wisdom of others”); J.C. WELLS, A TREATISE ON THE
DOCTRINES OF RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECISIS § 594, at 541 (1879) (presuming that the
precedent-generating court will supply “certain fixed land marks approaching correctness though not
infallibly perfect”).
667. Normally, both the precedent-generating institution and the precedent-receiving institution
are courts in the same legal system, and it is reasonable to assume that the earlier court had the same
decision-making features as the later court. However, even in that context, there have been instances
in which judges or commentators have challenged the presumption by arguing, for example, that
“extraordinary pressures on the courts that rendered particular rulings should undermine those rulings’
claims to adherence.” Fallon, supra note 447, at 1791 (identifying instances of such arguments).
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deciding contested election cases did not have these features.668
The decision-makers in the House did not hold judicial offices which
impelled them to impartiality.669 To the contrary, House members held the
most political of all federal positions, and operated within party structures,
with none of the “institutional guarant[ees] against repercussions or
retaliations” enjoyed by judges.670 Nor were the House decision-makers
part of a judicial culture—involving “[t]he training of the judge . . . coupled
with what is styled the judicial temperament”671—that, at its best, inspires
in judges in a “deep-felt need, duty, and responsibility for bringing out [just]
result[s]”672 that are “founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
Of course, in some circumstances, a precedent-receiving court can overrule a bad precedent, though it
is difficult to define when such circumstances are present. See Easterbrook, supra note 665, at 424
(“Doctrines with sufficiently bad pedigrees or sufficiently bad effects must go, but this is argument by
weasel word—how bad is bad enough?”). To say that some precedent will be overturned is different
than saying that the precedent-generating court’s decision should never have qualified as precedent in
the first place because of some deficiency in that court’s decision-making process.
668. The House process was similar to a court process to the extent it involved lawyering.
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS 19 (1960)
(acknowledging that in the court process, the “personnel are all trained and in the main rather
experienced lawyers”); id. at 29 (“Issues [are] limited, sharpened, and phrased in advance.”);
id. at 29–30 (pointing out that courts rely on “adversary argument by counsel”).
669. See id. at 46 (remarking how holding judicial office instills impartiality and the “doggedness
with which it presses upon the officeholder a demand to be selfless”); see also id. at 46 (explaining that
judicial office requires “not a passive but a positive and active attitude: the judge must be seeking, as
best he can, to see the matter fairly, and with an eye not to the litigants merely, but to All-of-Us as
well”). In Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court recognized that the absence of this feature was one
reason why historical decisions by the House were of “quite limited” value in determining original
intent. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546 n.85 (1969) (“Unlike a court, which is presumed
to be disinterested, in an exclusion case the concerned house [of Congress] is in effect a party to the
controversy that it must adjudicate. Consequently, some members may be inclined to vote for
exclusion though they strongly doubt its constitutionality.”) (quoting The Power of a House of Congress,
supra note 480, at 679).
670. LLEWELLYN, supra note 668, at 32 (noting the feature of “judicial security” against
“repercussions or retaliations because some person or persons may dislike the decision or find it
wrong” and how this helps “eliminat[e] the incidence of fear or hope or secret favor”).
671. CARDOZO, supra note 662, at 176 (“The training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled
the judicial temperament, will help in some degree to emancipate him from the suggestive power of
individual dislikes and prepossessions.”).
672. LLEWELLYN, supra note 668, at 23; see id. at 24 (“The deciding is done under an ideology
which in older days amounted to a faith that there is and can be only one single right answer.
This underlies such ideas as ‘finding the law’ and ‘the true’ rule, and ‘the’ just decision. I refer not
merely to a manner of writing the opinion but to a frame of thought and to an emotional attitude in
the labor of bringing forth a decision. Even judges who know with their minds that varying answers
would be legally permissible will be found with a strong urge to feel that one alone among them must
be the right one.”).
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individuals.”673 Moreover, there is little reason to think that House
members approached their decision-making—as courts generally do—with
the understanding that “the context for seeing and discussing the question
to be decided [was] to be set by and in a body of legal doctrine,”674 i.e.,
precedent,675 to be worked with “only by way of a limited number of
recognized correct [doctrinal] techniques.”676 And House members—who
did not have to explain the basis or reasoning for their decisions—did not
act with the “discipline imposed on decision-making by the knowledge that
[their] decision [would] function as precedent.”677 Thus, unlike judges, they
were not “pushed to a form of neutrality” in which they would have to
“articulat[e] standards that [they were] willing to live with in the future.”678
Second, stare decisis presumes that the decisions of the precedentgenerating court, even if in some sense wrong or incorrect, will at least come
in the form of an opinion—a written precedent—which memorializes the
basis for the decision, including the operative facts and the controlling law.
673. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1986) (“[The doctrine of stare decisis] permits
society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both
in appearance and in fact.”).
674. LLEWELLYN, supra note 668, at 20 (elaborating on the understanding among judges
“that where there is no real room for doubt, that body [of doctrine] is to control the deciding; that
where there is real room for doubt, that body of doctrine is nonetheless to guide the deciding; and that
even when there is deep trouble, the deciding should strive to remain moderately consonant with the
language and also with the spirit of some part of that body of doctrine”).
675. Stated differently, there is a presumption that the precedent-generating courts themselves
felt bound to conform their decisions to precedent, and that this was beneficial to their decisionmaking. Being subject “to the test of congruence with the conclusions of those confronting the same
problem” reduces “idiosyncratic conclusions” and “increases both the chance of the court’s being right
and the likelihood that similar cases arising contemporaneously will be treated the same by different
judges.” Easterbrook, supra note 665, at 423.
676. LLEWELLYN, supra note 668, at 21.
677. Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1779
(2006) (“In deciding a particular case, a judge must provide reasons that will have precedential effect
on later cases (both in the same court and in lower courts). Thus, the judge is pushed to a form of
neutrality—not the neutrality of being value-free, but the neutrality of articulating standards that one
is willing to live with in the future.”); see also The Power of a House of Congress, supra note 480, at 679
(explaining that “it may be unrealistic to suppose that many Congressmen seriously concern themselves
with abstract and unresolved constitutional issues in the first place” and that “the likelihood of effective
judicial review [of Congressional decisions] has undoubtedly been regarded a remote possibility”).
678. Farber, supra note 677, at 1180. Llewellyn also emphasized the salutary effect of the
“felt pressure or even compulsion” to issue a published opinion “which tells any interested person
what the cause is and why the decision—under the authorities—is right, and perhaps why it is wise.”
LLEWELLYN, supra note 668, at 26. He argued that this instilled in the court issuing the opinion a
“due measure of caution by way of contemplation of effects ahead.” Id.
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The House, however, did not provide as much; it simply voted up or down,
if it voted at all. The committee reports were more like legal briefs than
judicial decisions. Obviously, the efficiency goal of stare decisis is not served
if the precedent-receiving court has no reasonably discernible precedent to
follow.679 Similarly, the goal of protecting reliance interests is not served if
the original decision did not give society any reasonably discernible
precedent to follow.680
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution provides that a state’s “legislature” is to “direct the
manner” in which the state appoints its presidential electors and “prescribe
the time, place, and manner” in which the state is to hold congressional
elections. Does this language mean that the “legislature” is to make election
law subject to (1) the state constitutional restraints and inter-branch checks
and balances that normally apply to legislatures, or (2) the constitutionallymandated lawmaking procedures that normally apply to legislatures, but not
any substantive constitutional limitations or too much inter-branch
interference? I believe that the former interpretation is the natural reading

679. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546 n.85 (1969) (“Determining the basis for a
congressional action is itself difficult; since a congressional action unlike a reported judicial decision,
contains no statement of the reasons for the disposition, one must fall back on the debates and the
committee reports. If more than one issue is raised in the debates, one can never be sure on what basis
the action was predicated.”) (quoting The Power of a House of Congress, supra note 480, at 679).
680. If the House were a foreign court, it is unlikely that its judgments in these matters would
be respected by a court in the United States. Under the common law and state statutes, a domestic
court may not recognize a foreign court’s judgment if the judgment was rendered “under a judicial
system that does not provide impartial tribunals and procedures compatible with due process of law.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987); see also Ronald A. Brand, Federal
Judicial Center International Litigation Guide, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. PITT. L.
REV. 491, 510 (2013) (explaining that this mandatory ground for non-recognition is also contained in
the 1962 and 2005 versions of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act). Examples
of evidence that could support a non-recognition conclusion as to a judicial system include evidence
that “judgments are rendered on the basis of political decisions rather than the rule of law,” Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4 cmt. 12 (2005), or “[e]vidence that the
judiciary was dominated by the political branches of government or by an opposing litigant,”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. b (1987).
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of the text, and it is supported by precedent.681 However, others apparently
disagree and would overrule the precedent.682
By looking to history, originalism promises a neutral way to choose
between competing interpretations of the Constitution. Part II of this
Article revisited the Founding generation’s original understanding of the
Elector Appointment and Elections Clauses. The history demonstrates
beyond cavil that the Founding generation understood that “legislatures”
would operate as normal legislatures, not independent legislatures, with
respect to both procedure and substance. Part III of this Article revisited
the nineteenth-century history of the Doctrine and debunked the notion
that the Doctrine ever became the “prevailing view” after the Founding—
in truth, the Doctrine never amounted to much of anything. And, finally,
Part IV of this Article demonstrated that the invocations of the Doctrine
that occurred episodically in the nineteenth century are irrelevant under any
form of recognized constitutional interpretation.683
681. By focusing in this Article on the Doctrine’s lack of historical support, I do not mean to
suggest that the Doctrine has any good basis in text, precedent, or other considerations. Others have
addressed those topics better than I ever could, including in the recent tour de force by Dean Vikram
Amar and Professor Akhil Amar. Amar & Amar supra note 63. For a recent analysis of how the
Doctrine presumes without basis that state “legislatures” intend to evade state constitutions, as well as
the potentially unforeseen consequences of the Doctrine, see Carolyn Shapiro, The Independent State
Legislature Claim, Textualism, and State Law, 90 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4047322 [https://perma.cc/7MZ6-HRJP].
For a pithy explanation of why the non-originalist rationales offered in support of the Doctrine are
nonsense, see Jason Marisam, The Dangerous Independent State Legislature Theory, 2022 MICH. ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4041062 [https://perma.
cc/W3E7-HF6H]. For confirmation that the Doctrine would be a twenty-first century departure from
not only the Founding but almost all prior historical practice, see Weingartner, supra note 268.
682. One can reject the Doctrine without endorsing the result in Arizona State Legislature, in
which the Supreme Court upheld the Arizona constitution’s assignment of the re-districting function
to an independent commission that operates without any involvement of the “legislature.” It is one
thing to confidently say that a “legislature” must operate within the constraints set by its constitution
(as I do here), but it is quite another to say that the constitution need not involve the “legislature” at
all (as the Court did in Arizona State Legislature). See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 848 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing the line is crossed when there is
“an unelected, unaccountable institution that permanently and totally displaces the legislature from the
redistricting process”).
683. Mostly, the Doctrine as presently conceived by certain Justices would simply serve as a
vehicle for the Supreme Court to overrule disfavored state court interpretations of state law. See Moore
v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089, 1091 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (“[T]here must be some
limit on the authority of state courts to countermand actions taken by state legislatures when they are
prescribing rules for the conduct of federal elections.”) However, at other times, interest in the
Doctrine may be giving expression to a legitimate concern about mid-election state manipulation of
federal election law. However, the Doctrine is a spectacularly overbroad tool to address that concern.
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Sometime soon, the burden of deciding this question will fall on the
Justices of the Supreme Court. In Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men,
the protagonist, Jack Burden, a student of American history, imagines for a
time that his conduct is dictated by “the Great Twitch,” the “pulse in the
blood and the twitch of the nerve, like a dead frog’s leg in the experiment
when the electric current goes through.”684 The Great Twitch meant that
“nobody had any responsibility for anything,” and it relieved Burden,
“because it meant that he could not be called guilty of anything.”685 This
Article demonstrates that there is no Great Twitch—sparked by the electric
current of originalism or some other argument from history—which
commands the independent state legislature doctrine. No history, from the
Founding or subsequently, relieves us of the burden of making sense of our
Constitution in light of our nation’s complicated past and ongoing
aspirations, including our desire to continue democratic self-government.
We all live, like Burden, with “the agony of will.”686 And so the Justices of

It sweeps within its purview any alleged departure from the handiwork of the “legislature,” irrespective
of whether it occurs long before, shortly before, or during the election, and irrespective of its effect on
voters and candidates who actually have an interest in the election. Instead of enforcing “respect” for
“legislatures,” we should be focusing on how mid-election changes in law may affect the constitutional
rights of people by creating fundamental unfairness and/or detrimental reliance in elections.
See generally Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 691 (2001)
(analyzing how courts have dealt with such issues). Some have suggested that the Elector Appointment
and Elections Clauses can be read as a federal policy against mid-election “new law,” apparently even
when no person’s constitutional rights have been violated. See Michael L. Wells and Jeffry Netter,
Article II and the Florida Election Case: A Public Choice Perspective, 61 Md. L. Rev. 711, 722 (2002) (arguing
that the Elector Appointment Clause is “the appropriate vehicle for applying the “‘rules-of-the-game
norm’”). If so, it should be done without grafting onto those clauses the Doctrine and its inapposite
fetishization of “legislatures,” disparagement of state courts, and disregard of state constitutions.
See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional
Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1932–34 (2003) (explaining that, if the Elector Appointment Clause
is interpreted to allow the Supreme Court to determine whether there has been a “material” change in
state law governing presidential elections, the “‘Independent Legislature’ grounded separation of the
state election-law context from its state-court judicial interpretation does little or no work”); Amar &
Amar supra note 63, at 56-57 (explaining that any federal interest in avoiding state manipulation of
federal election law would “constrain not just state courts but also elected state legislatures and other
state governmental entities”). And great care would need to be taken in defining what would constitute
a “material” change in law, lest, as in 2020, every alleged “irregularity” in a state’s election
administration give rise to a claim that the Constitution has been violated. See id. at 60 (suggesting what
might constitute a sufficiently egregious change-in-law to justify federal court intervention).
684. ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING’S MEN 466 (1946).
685. Id. at 656–57.
686. Id. at 657.
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the Supreme Court must sometime soon, as they always have and always
will, “go into the convulsion of the world, out of history into history and
the awful responsibility of Time.”687

687. Id. at 661.
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